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ABSTRACT

VICO’S NARRATIVE ART:
FROM THE FORESTS TO THE ACADEMIES

By
Ariana Ragusa
December 2016

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Frederick Evans, Ph.D.
In this dissertation, I argue that Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), most famously
considered a philosopher of history, is above all a philosopher of narration. I unfold Vico’s
narrative response to and rejection of traditional philosophical discourse; through relating the
story of himself and the story of mankind, Vico demonstrates that storytelling gives birth to the
human self and world. Furthermore, I emphasize the ontological import of narrative, often
overlooked, in his two major works, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico and The New
Science. Finally, I conclude by showing the relevance of Vico’s pedagogical call to cultivate the
child’s narrative imagination in childhood education today. It is my contention that Vico’s
narrative art can revive the lost art of storytelling and make possible our own recovery of
narratable selves.
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INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, I argue that Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), most famously
considered a philosopher of history, is above all a philosopher of narration. I unfold Vico’s
narrative response to and rejection of traditional philosophical discourse; through relating the
story of himself and the story of mankind, Vico demonstrates that storytelling gives birth to the
human self and world. Furthermore, I emphasize the ontological import of narrative, often
overlooked, in his two major works, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico1 and The New
Science of Giambattista Vico.2 Finally, I conclude by showing the relevance of Vico’s
pedagogical call to cultivate the child’s narrative imagination in childhood education today. I
contend that Vico’s narrative art can revive the lost art of storytelling and make possible our own
recovery of narratable selves.
Vico is first and foremost a storyteller or logopoi, “teller of tales.”3 His narrative art
encompasses both the singular and collective dimensions of storytelling; his two fables, the New
Science and the Autobiography, work in concert to narrate both dimensions of our experience.
Taken together, the narratives illustrate the productive tension between singular life stories and
collective stories. They reveal the way in which our unique life stories are intimately bound up
with and carved out from collective stories. On the collective level, Vico’s narrative primarily
1

Giambattista Vico, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, trans. Max Harold Fisch and Thomas Goddard
Bergin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1944).
2
Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Hereafter cited as NS. I rely primarily upon Vico’s third and final 1744
edition of the New Science, which is broken up into numbered paragraphs. Bergin and Fisch base their New Science
upon the edition edited by Fausto Nicolini, who, as they explain, “numbered the paragraphs for convenience of
reference.” Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch, preface to The New Science of Giambattista Vico, by
Giambattista Vico (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1944), v. Thus, I will cite the paragraphs throughout this
dissertation when referring to the New Science, as is the common practice in Vichian scholarship today.
3
That his New Science is called a science at all should be taken metaphorically and ironically, according to Verene.
See Donald Phillip Verene, The History of Philosophy: A Reader’s Guide (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 2008), 129.
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involves the excavation of vera narratio or true stories, fables, and myth that make up the Age of
Gods and the Age of Heroes in Vico’s New Science. In order to interpret his strategy on this
collective level, I use the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s expressive gestural
theory of language.4 I turn to the Italian feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero’s theory of
narrative identity, on the other hand, to interpret his narrative strategy on the singular level, in his
Autobiography.5 To draw the dimensions together, I look to Fred Evan’s notion of elliptical
identity.6 I argue that there is an elliptical relationship between the collective voices of the New
Science and the voice of Vico as a singular, unique existent in the Autobiography. This will shed
light on the way in which Vico’s personal voice relates to the voices unearthed in his broader
story of mankind. In conclusion, I suggest practical techniques for fostering the art of
storytelling in the young in order to revive storytelling today.
In order to relate the story of humanity, Giambattista Vico delves into our oral history.
He leaves the security of our written, recorded history and enters the dark, murky depths of
unrecorded prehistory, which is a path avoided by many traditional philosophers. For instance,
the idealist philosopher George Wilhelm Frederick Hegel, whom Vico is often erroneously
conflated with, observes in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History: “Legends, folksongs,
traditions – these are to be excluded from original history, because they are obscure modes of

David Abram connects Merleau-Ponty’s expressive, gestural theory of language with Vico’s non-rationalistic
theory of language. See David Abrams, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More Than
Human World (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 76. Furthermore, James Eddie establishes the connection
between the two thinkers by writing of Vico, “we can read him today not only as an anticipation, but as an
illustration of this theory of expression and meaning.” See James M. Eddie, “Vico and Existential Philosophy,” in
Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium, eds. Giorgio Taglacozzo and Hayden V. White (Baltimore, The
John Hopkins Press, 1969), 487.
5
Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, trans. Paul A. Kottman (London: Routledge,
2000).
6
Fred Evans, The Multivoiced Body: Society and Communication in the Age of Diversity (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2008).
4

ix

memory, proper to the mentality of pre-literate people.”7 This is, in fact, the obscure terrain that
Vico directs his reader towards. Moreover, Vico shows that our beginnings are obfuscated by
the written tradition and the abstract discourse that the written word brings about.
By interpreting Vico’s elusive, primary fables culled from the depths of our archaic
imaginations through Merleau-Ponty’s gestural theory of language, we draw Merleau-Ponty’s
work towards unexplored depths. Since Vico relates stories that prefigure the written tradition,
his narratives add a fresh way of realizing Merleau-Ponty’s primary expressions. Reading the
two thinkers together will give us a richer understanding of the pre-reflective depths of
experience. Placed in the light of Vico’s fables, which are unearthed from a condition of primary
orality, Merleau-Ponty’s sense of history and history’s relation to expression is realized in novel
ways.8
Vico’s journey through our archaic, oral prehistory also nourishes our identities on the
singular level. On the one hand, Vico is the great champion of the people’s reading of history.
By showing that the archaic heroes and poetic characters are social inventions and exposing the
Homeric epics to be the invention of the Greek people as a whole (rather than of an individual),
he champions the collective dimension of creativity. But this is only part of Vico’s story. Here
the productive tension between the collective and singular levels of narration comes into play.
Although Vico makes no mention of the self in the New Science, he often calls out to the
reader, beckoning her to narrate the New Science for herself. She is urged to remake the story for
herself.9 Once we take into account this singular existent, whom Vico addresses in his New

7

G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to The Philosophy of History, trans. Leo Rauch (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1988), 4.
8
Walter Ong describes primary orality as “the orality of a culture totally untouched by any writing or print…it is
primary by contrast with the ‘secondary orality’ of present day high-technology culture, in which a new orality is
sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other electronic devices.” See Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy
(London: Routledge, 2002), 11.
9
NS par. 349.
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Science, we realize that there is something more at work than the slow accretion of the collective
story in Vico’s narrative art: he is calling forth the creative powers of the individual, singular
existent. In short, Vico urges the individual reader to become a storyteller. At this point, we are
forced to ask, how does one become a storyteller? And, more importantly, how do we tell the
story of our own life?
If we are to follow the example of Vico’s life story, we will find that Vico did not begin
as a storyteller. First, he had to overcome his training in philosophy in order to enjoy the
pleasure of storytelling. In other words, he had to retrain his mind to focus upon particulars
rather than universals since the tales of poets, orators, and historians deal with particulars. In his
Autobiography, he relates:

And to his cost he learned that that study proper to minute wits is not easy for
minds already made universal by metaphysics. So he gave up this study as one
which chained and confined his mind, now accustomed through long study of
metaphysics to move freely in the infinite genera; and in the constant reading of
orators, historians and poets his intellect took increasing delight in observing
between the remotest matters ties that bound them together in some common
relation.10

Language not only shapes his mind but his body’s ability to feel pleasure; by retraining himself
to take up a different order of expression he is able to feel delight. This experience of delight
was impossible for him as a philosopher since his mind was held captive by his metaphysical
training, which taught him to see himself through universals and generalizations. In this way,
Vico demonstrates, metaphysics sculpts the mind of modern humanity in the Age of Men – his
own age. And it continues to rob us today of the pleasures and delights of metaphor, poetry, and
imagistic thinking. The pleasures of narrative, which is narrative’s special gift, is not available
to the metaphysician; his mind has been fashioned by his reflective, rational, universalizing

10

Vico, Autobiography, 123.

xi

discourse that precludes him from the delight experienced through narrative.11 Vico needed to
reorient his mind in order to apprehend the language “spoken by means of heroic emblems, or
similitudes, comparison, images, metaphors, and natural descriptions, which make up the great
body of heroic language which was spoken at the time the heroes reigned.”12 Through language,
Vico changes himself, and opens himself up to a different experience of reality: the heroic realm
of expression.
Cavarero parallels Vico’s lament that the philosophers direct their eye towards the
universal at the expense of the particular. She observes that philosophers are “servants of the
universal…the ones who teach us that the knowledge of Man requires that the particularity of
each one, the uniqueness of human existence, be unknowable. Knowledge of universals, which
excludes embodied uniqueness from its epistemology, attains its maximum perfection by
presupposing the absence from such a uniqueness.”13 Philosophical discourse eviscerates the
unique and unrepeatable status of singular existents. It can teach us what man is, but it cannot
tell us who we are. “What man is can be known and defined, as Aristotle assures us; who
Socrates is, instead, eludes the parameters of knowledge as science.”14 Stories about unique,
embodied, and singular existents are an embarrassment to those who desire universal, scientific
truth. And yet, Cavarero observes, the philosophical desire for definitions covers over a more
fundamental desire: the desire to hear our own life story. When the philosopher ignores this
primary desire, she invites tragic consequences.
For instance, consider the tragic fate of Oedipus. In solving the riddle of the sphinx, he
reveals himself to be a proto-typical philosopher. When the sphinx asks him what walks on four

11

Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 2.
NS par. 32.
13
Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 1.
14
Ibid., 9.
12
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in the morning, three in the afternoon, and two in the evening, he is able to respond, Man. His
response corresponds with the what is X question of Platonic discourse: what is the good, the
true, the beautiful, the just?15 But there is something monstrous about this abstract universal
Man and its definatory logic; in fact, some residue of the monstrous sphinx’s knowledge lingers
in the concept. The monstrosity of the concept lies in its sheer illusion. Cavarero explains, “man
is a universal that applies to everyone precisely because it applies to no one. It disincarnates
itself from the living singularity of each one while claiming to substantiate it. It is at once
masculine and neuter, a hybrid creature generated by thought, a fantastic universal produced by
mind.”16 The concept is a monstrous invention.
Tragedy arises when the philosopher attempts to live through the universal concepts, or,
in other words, when one attempts to “recognizes oneself in the definition Man.”17 This is how
the humans of the Vico’s third age become “dissolute in luxury, and finally go mad and waste
their substance.”18 Verene explains, “Vico shows that to believe in the reality of the concept is a
form of madness. An exclusive attachment to conceptual analysis is a kind of dissoluteness of
mind that is accompanied by a dissoluteness of life founded on wit and not the apprehension of
the necessities of the human condition.”19 Although humans appear before each other, they are
unable to relate. They only know how to think and act through abstract concepts. Verene
affirms, “Only with the decline of the power and the reality of the heroes do thought and
language begin to order experience in terms of abstract or intelligible universals. Men begin to
think and act according to the class concepts and syllogistic thinking found in Aristotelian

15

Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 8.
Ibid., 9.
17
Ibid.
18
NS par 241.
19
Donald Phillip Verene, Vico’s New Science of Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 215.
16
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logic.”20 Their bodies are physically close to each other in the cities, yet they are asocial and
lonely, living in a “deep solitude of spirit and will.”21 They live, in short, alone together.
This description characterizes our present age - an age dominated by the universal
concept Man. Vico anticipated the fatigue of the concept today and the tragic fate of humans
who attempt to define themselves through the concept. Vico’s Age of Man is the Cartesian world
he forewarned us of and which we inhabit today. As Gianturco says, “We live in a Cartesian
world, a world of scientific research, technology, gadgets, which invade and condition our
lives.”22 Today, in the cities and Academies, storytellers are on the verge of extinction, and
narrative has been replaced by information.23
This age is dominated by generalizing philosophical and scientific discourse that creates
the condition Vico calls the barbarism of reflection. Verene observes, “The deep solitude of
spirit of which Vico speaks is brought about over the overuse of the intellect in human affairs,
such that society and the human spirit lose touch with the natural forms of imagination…This
barbarism of intellect is more confining and inhuman than the conditions of primitive life out of
which society originally comes.”24 This is the barbarism at the end of Vico’s ideal eternal story.
There is a barbarism of the beginning as well called the barbarism of sense, yet, despite its
savagery, we are made more inhuman by the barbarism of reflection than sense. Vico explains,
“For the latter displayed a generous savagery, against which one could defend oneself or take
flight or be on one’s guard; but the former with a vile savagery, under soft words and embraces
plots against the life and fortune of friends and intimates.”25 Although Vico does not advocate a
return to a condition of barbaric sense, he seeks to reinfuse the condition of reflection with
20

Donald Phillip Verene, The New Art of Autobiography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 85.
NS par. 412.
22
Elio Gianturco, introduction to On the Study Methods of Our Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), xxi.
23
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hanna Arendt (New York: Shocken Books, 2007), 88.
24
Verene, Vico’s New Science of Imagination, 194.
25
NS par. 1106.
21
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enough sense to allow for new passionate, stories to be born. The Heroic Age, stirring between
both barbaric conditions, births the most beautiful forms of expression and storytelling,
according to Vico. His aim is to reinfuse the Academies and cities with this sensuous heroism.
I’ve experience the fatigue of the concept in my Introduction to Philosophy courses as an
adjunct lecturer. But I have witnessed the power of narration and life stories to reanimate the
lives of students. When I first introduced sections of Cavarero’s text, Relating Narratives:
Storytelling and Selfhood, to my students, I was astounded by their reactions. They expressed
emotion, delight, passion, and an eagerness to participate that I had never experienced in the
classroom before. For instance, we read Cavarero’s story of Ulysses at the court of the
Phoenicians, which is meant to illustrate her thesis that we can only see who we are through the
tale of another. Ulysses in disguise is welcomed into the court of the Phoenicians. While eating
dinner a bard begins to sing the tales of the wily Ulysses, unaware that Ulysses is in the
audience. Upon hearing the tale of his trials and adventures from the mouth of an other, Ulysses
begins to weep for the first time26 Cavarero observes, “before hearing his story, Ulysses did not
yet know who he was: the story of the rhapsod, the story told by an ‘other,’ finally revealed his
own identity.”27
One student related a similar experience. She had struggled to win a scholarship to
college and had surpassed seemingly insurmountable barriers to achieve the award. She was,
like Ulysses, “captured in the present of the action that cuts off the temporal series of before and
after.”28 Her heroic efforts were honored at an award ceremony and, as she waited to be
introduced and formally receive her award, the speaker narrated the events of her life that had led

26

Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 17.
Ibid., 18.
28
Ibid., 18.
27
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up to that point. The speaker, in other words, put her life into the form of a story - and she cried,
just as Ulysses did.
After experiencing a litany of reactions like this, I began to incorporate Cavarero’s work
into take-home exercises. For instance, one Thanksgiving students were asked to give a friend or
family member a gift: the gift of narration. This is in the spirit of Cavarero’s notion that sharing
life stories gives the listener pleasure and so has “an ethic of the gift.”29 One student’s
experience stands out. He wrote the life story of his mother and shared it at his family’s
thanksgiving table. He related all the sacrifices she had made to afford him a college education,
and she wept. And the whole table was brought to tears. It was an emotional experience that
nourished his entire family.
Our students dwell within the Age of Man; they are conditioned to think of education as
presenting generalized, abstract discourse. They expect to learn something about what they are,
whether it be through the discipline of biology, chemistry, sociology, economics, history, or
politics, etc. But they rarely expect to learn about who they are as singular, unique, and
unrepeatable existents. As Cavarero observes “foreign to the defining language of philosophy
and the human sciences, biographical narration does not explain, does not organize nor
understand the events from within a conceptual framework, a system that gives sense; rather it
assembles the fragments of a life experience that discloses the meaning of the uniqueness of that
very life.”30 The student should be able to engage in a form of education that allows her to
realize the unique meaning of her life.
We must, therefore, learn how to tell stories again in order to relate to each other and
bestow upon each other the gift of identity. This is especially urgent for early childhood
29

Ibid., 3.
Adriana Cavarero and Elvira Roncalli, “Narrative Against Destruction,” New Literary History 46, no.1 (Winter
2015): 9.
30
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education. What is at stake is “a confrontation between two discursive registers that manifest
opposite characteristics. One, that of philosophy, has the form of definitory knowledge that
regards the universality of Man. The other, that of narration, has the form of biographical
knowledge that regards the unrepeatable identity of someone. The questions that sustain the two
discursive styles are equally diverse. The first asks what is Man? The second asks instead of
someone ‘who he or she is.”31 Vico switched discursive registers in order to realize who we are
on the collective level and who he was on the singular level. He took up the discourse of
narration, offering us a biographical form of knowledge to discover meaning in our lives. The
way of the storyteller traced out by Vico and its revival today will prevent the “danger of losing
to the flatness of the concept and conceptual criticism.”32
In my first chapter, I introduce some fundamental concepts in Vico’s oeuvre and show
that his thought is primarily dominated by the category of birth; he is a philosopher of
beginnings. His major methodological principle directs us to return to the beginnings of thing.33
By attending to the category of birth, Vico stands outside the dominant western philosophical
tradition, which habitually attends to the category of death.34 After establishing Vico’s emphasis
upon beginnings and birth, we treat Vico’s return to the beginning of things in light of the
phenomenological epoche. Vico departs from the natural world attitude of the scholars and
grammarians in order to plumb the depths of pre-reflective experience.35 He departs from
traditional philosophical discourse and takes up narrative discourse in order to access our
originary natal scenes. In chapter two, I draw out Verene’s contention that Vico is a philosopher
31

Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 13.
Verene, Vico’s New Science of Imagination, 192.
33
NS par. 314.
34
See Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 28.
35
See Enzo Paci, “Vico, Structuralism, and the Phenomenological Encyclopedia of the Science,” in Giambattista
Vico: An International Symposium, eds. Giorgio Taglacozzo and Hayden V. White (Baltimore, The John Hopkins
Press, 1969), 502. See also Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (London:
Routledge, 2012), xxii.
32
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of place over time.36 Vico’s universal principle of etymology gives us the tools to excavate our
primary places.37 These originary poetic places ground Vico’s gestural theory of expression.
Vico’s etymologicon demonstrates that the movement from the forest, to the huts, to the cities,
and finally the academies is wholly entwined with the language corresponding to each manner of
dwelling.38 Next, I turn towards the emphasis Vico places upon the poetic character Hercules,
who fashioned the first human place by burning clearings in the forest. Here, I use Edward
Casey's work on place to analyze the different dwellings described by Vico, beginning with the
first place created by the poetic character Jove.

Finally, I consider the primacy of voice in

relation to place and characterize the poetic character Jove as the first dialogic body. I show that
Fred Evan’s contention that voice has priority over place pushes us further outside dominant
philosophical biases and closer to the singing heroes of Vico’s Heroic Age.
In chapter three, I highlight the scholarly neglect of the relevance of images in Vico’s
work and blame this neglect on the broader tendency to ignore imagery and other rhetorical
devices in the western philosophical tradition. I then honor Donald Phillip Verene, perhaps the
greatest advocate of Vico studies in America, for initiating a turn in Vico scholarship by
directing attention towards Vico’s own self-proclaimed (and notoriously overlooked) master key.
His major work, Vico’s Science of Imagination, solidified this redirection of Viconian
scholarship. Verene shifted the focus towards the epistemological function of imagination over
reflection and made this the mark of Vico’s originality. Moreover, he establishes Vico as a
Verene, Vico’s New Science of Imagination, 183.
NS par. 236. Here we will also consider Edward Casey’s work on place. See Edward Case, The Fate of Place
(Berkley: University of California Press), 197-331. But our work will tease out the ontological priority of voice in
Vico’s New Science in light of Evan’s contention that voice precedes place. See Evans, The Multivoiced Body, 150.
The human world is, after all, born of the giganti voices shouting in unison beneath the thundering, turbulent
sky/body of Jove. Moreover, Casey’s consideration of Renaissance Philosophers on place neglects the “latent”
Renaissance our project brings to light. See Casey, The Fate of Place, 128. For this reason, Grassi’s consideration
of place in the rhetorical tradition of the Renaissance will give us more. See Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as
Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition, trans. John Michael Krois (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1980), 100.
38
NS par. 382.
36
37
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philosopher of the image over the concept, the concrete over the abstract, and lived experience
over reflection.39 Although Verene anchors Vico’s work in the realm of concrete, situated
beginnings, he remains stuck in the idealistic perspective that he attempts to overcome. Despite
identifying the idealistic error of his predecessors, namely the Hegelianism of Croce and
Cassirer, he remains in the idealistic trap due to his misreading of the storia ideale eterna and his
imposition of idealist subjectivity onto Vico’s truly alien proto-humans.40
I next look to Sandra Luft’s critique of Verene. I use her overall critique of idealist
readings of Vico and follow her lead towards the strange, uncanny beginnings of Vico’s New
Science.41 She treats Vico’s New Science as an entirely poetic science, and recovers the
originary poesis of thinking and being at the heart of Vico’s descent. By emphasizing the
ontological depth of Vico’s verum-factum principle, she overcomes traditional epistemological
readings of this principle. Moreover, she highlights the ontological dimension of the category of
birth and situates the storia ideale eterna within this category.42 She restores Vico’s heroic
return to our unfamiliar, raw, and concrete origins. Second, Luft’s postmodern reading brings
Vico into conversation with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida (though she unfortunately
neglects Merleau-Ponty). Her reading shows us that Vico is sensitive to the postmodern
criticism of the traditional enlightenment notion of subjectivity.43 Although she establishes
many legitimate comparisons between Vico’s work and postmodernist thought, her imposition of
the arbitrary nature of language construction onto Vico is an affront to the natural dimension of
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his metaphoric theory of linguistic creativity. Furthermore, her postmodern textually constituted
no-self cannot be justifiably imposed upon (what I call) Vico’s narratable self.
I begin chapter four with a meditation upon the intimate relationship between images and
narrative; both Cavarero and Vico introduce their major texts with images: Vico places a selfcommissioned engraving as the frontispiece of the New Science to serve as an introduction,44and
Cavarero uses the image of a stork to introduce her text, Relating Narratives. Cavarero explains
that images function as narratives do - they provide the figure or design (which can only come
after the event); the image is the story.45 Cavarero’s meditations upon the image of the stork
give us a fresh perspective on Vico’s frontispiece that has perplexed Vico scholars to date.
Second, we use Arendt and Cavarero’s notion of the relational character of identity (wherein one
cannot tell one’s own story) in order to explain the perplexing lie about the date of his own birth
in the Autobiography.46 Our greatest desire is to hear the story of our own birth, Cavarero
argues, and this desire is frustrated by our inability to tell it ourselves; thus, Vico’s inability to
access the day of his birth demonstrates this limitation. Vico indicates, moreover, that simply
becoming one’s own biographer will not resolve this impossibility, echoing Cavarero. Next, I
show that Vico’s narrative art reveals the radical singularity articulated by Cavarero. By
acknowledging that he was born of this mother and not another, and that events occurred thus
and not otherwise, he demonstrates what Cavarero calls the “accidentality of being.”47 This
emphasis upon birth and uniqueness is found in the New Science as well.48 But we conclude by
showing that Cavarero neglects the ‘we’ in her attempt to protect the radical singularity of the
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‘you.’49 Vico’s narrative performance, conversely, discloses both our collective and singular
identities. We will see how Evan’s concept of elliptical identity resolves the tension between the
collective and singular dimension of identity.
In chapter five, I draw out relevant connections between Merleau-Ponty and Vico. I first
demonstrate the major ways in which Vico and Merleau-Ponty stand outside traditional theories
of language by demonstrating that, for both, words are not the vehicle of ideas, but rather, bear
the sense of their meaning.50 Second, language accomplishes thought and not the other way
around.51 Third, words do not express determinate objects, but rather, share in the creation of the
object through the power of naming.52 After considering their mutual differences from the
dominant theories of language, I examine the tension between spontaneous and sedimented
language elaborated by Merleau-Ponty. I then consider this creative tension at work in MerleauPonty’s notion of coherent deformation, as well as in Vico’s parallel art of topics. 53 I conclude
by considering the ways in which Vico’s narrative art, which consists of the originary orally
related fables, can deepen Merleau-Ponty’s scattered reflections on history and the individual’s
active engagement with her history.
To conclude my dissertation, I examine the ways in which we can use Vico’s recovery of
narrative to “keep the waters sweet” today.54 We must reawaken the pleasures of storytelling in
order to cure philosophy of its tragic fate.55 The narrative art has traditionally been relegated to
the feminine domain, cast out from the kingdom of philosophical discourse. This castigated
feminine art (carried out, all the while, by average everyday women) will allow us to re-narrate
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selves and worlds.56 Vico’s attempt to awaken pleasure in our bodies through his storytelling
can be applied to childhood education today; the child’s sensorial, passionate experience of
reality is too often diluted by appeals to their disembodied cognitive capacities. The pleasure
that attends storytelling should attend learning as well.57
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CHAPTER ONE

1.1

Birth over Death

There are salient tendencies of the western philosophical tradition that prove resistant to Vico’s
three most important areas of emphasis: birth, body, and place. In short, western philosophers
focus their attention upon death over birth, mind over body, and time over place. Since a careful
consideration of the manner in which things are born and the role that the body and place take in
this birth is at the heart of Vico’s poetic science (as well as his personal life story), many of his
greatest contributions tend to be glossed over. My task in this chapter, and the chapter that
follows, is to identify these habitual tendencies of the western philosophical tradition; once they
are identified, I can open up a space for Vico’s deep reflections upon birth, body, and place to
shine through.
Next, I show that Vico's method is comparable to the phenomenological epoche in that
the reader is required to set aside or bracket out the conceit of scholars and nations; these
conceits are similar to the natural attitude identified by phenomenologists. But I claim that
Vico’s effort draws us nearer to pre-reflective, lived experience than phenomenological attempts
since he delves into our oral pre-history. Moreover, he mingles the oral narratives with his own
reflective analysis, creating a hybrid discourse that allows us to catch glimpses of our primary
orality. By adapting the discourse of narration, Vico more trenchantly resists the natural world
attitude or in his terms, the conceit of scholars and nations. I treat the third topic, place, in
chapter two.
The first section primarily uses Arendt and Cavarero's critique of the tradition's penchant
for death over birth. The second section largely uses Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the
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phenomenological reduction and concludes by using Cavarero's critique of abstract discourse.
Next, I use Casey to show the relevance of place in Vico's work, but end with the entirely
original contribution that Vico's discovery of the poetic character Jove affirms Evan’s
multivoiced body. Vico shows that the solitary voice is the defining feature of the Academies
and Cities (dwelling places in the last age), despite the physical closeness of bodies. I think that
Vico's discourse of narration can help to bring the voices together in order to create new places
as the giganti once did, together. Narration, moreover, responds to certain ethical and political
demands. For Vico, reviving the powers of narration contributes to our ability to live socially
with each other. Vico announces on the first page of his introduction that man’s nature is
principally, “that of being social.”58 This, in part, is why we are made more inhuman by the
barbarism of reflection than the barbarism of reflection: we are detached from our natural ability
to live in community with others.
Before examining the ways in which Vico’s work stands outside of traditional
frameworks, it is worthwhile to note that Vico was self-consciously aware of himself as an
outsider. Indeed, he reveled in it. For instance, after spending nine years at Vatolla in a castle in
Cilento as a tutor to the Rocca family, he says that he returned to his native Naples as a “stranger
in his own land.”59 His description of his years of isolation from the intellectual life of Naples is
a lie or at best, an exaggeration. Verene calls it, “Vico’s fictio.”60 Vico was, in fact, deeply
influenced by the Cartesian currents of thought fashionable at the time in Naples.61 Despite his
evident immersion in the intellectual life of Naples, Vico wished to portray himself as an
outsider; he took pride in his marginal status. This, moreover, is heightened by his self-professed
58
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autodidactism. Indeed, as Pinto observes, Vico is “one of the most formidable autodidacts, selftaught scholars, in the history of thought.”62 Vico writes of himself, “Vico blessed his good
fortune in having no teacher whose words he had sworn by, and he felt most grateful for those
woods in which, guided by his good genius, he followed the main course of his studies
untroubled by sectarian prejudice.”63 Vico’s professed autodidactism accentuates his status as an
outsider and stranger. Moreover, we see here his gratitude for the woods, which, I argue, are
symbolically related to the first forests of the earth.
Vico’s decision to describe his solitary intellectual endeavors as set in the woods has
philosophical import. The fable he creates of his nine-year intellectual sojourn in the woods of
Vatolla expresses the path that humanity takes in his larger fable, the New Science. His New
Science traces the birth of the human world from the forests to the academies. Vico, in his own
life, metaphorically left the cities and academies for the forest in order to make his discovery of
the fabulous beginnings of humanity; this is precisely what he urges the reader of the New
Science to do. Vico writes, “he who meditates this Science narrates to himself this ideal eternal
history so far as he himself makes it for himself.”64 If we are to narrate this story for ourselves,
we too must metaphorically leave the cities and academies. And we should, no less, treat Vico
as the stranger he fictitiously portrayed. As Verene warns, “Vico should be approached as an
unfamiliar other, whose thought teaches doctrines much less close to us than we may wish to
think.”65
To begin my critical examination of the tradition, and so edge our way outside of the
academies, I recount one of Vico’s most important narrations, namely, the birth of the first poetic
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character, Jove. I will refer to the poetic character Jove throughout the chapter, in relation to
each topic discussed below: birth, body, and place. The discovery of the poetic characters is
Vico’s self-proclaimed master key to the New Science.66 And, as Vico observes, Vico writes,
“every gentile nation had its Jove.” 67 Meditating upon the poetic character Jove, then, will
provide a major clue to unlocking the Vico code since Jove is present at every natal scene.
Here is the story of the first poetic character Jove. After great floods covered the earth,
the drying earth produced terrifying thunderclaps and flashed lightning across the sky. At the
time, gigantic, proto-humans or giganti roamed uncultivated forests and stood atop mountains;
terrified and astonished by the postdiluvian, flashing light ripping across the sky and pounding
thunder claps, the giganti flung their necks back in unison to gaze at the awesome, violent
spectacle.68 Their enormous, uncultivated bodies shook and reverberated with the thunderclaps
and together they shouted; spontaneously and fearfully, the first word is born, and with it the first
human world. In their irrational ignorance, they imagined that the sky was an animate body, and
that the thunderbolts and lightning were signs speaking to them. As Vico explains, “the first
men, who spoke by signs naturally believed that lightning bolts and thunderclaps were signs
made to them by Jove...they believed Jove commanded by signs, that such signs were real words,
and that nature was the language of Jove. The science of this language the gentiles universally
believed to be divination.” 69 These signs were taken to be real words. From this starting point,
the whole natural world began to speak the language of the god, Jove. Interpreting his signs
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became the first science: the art of divination or theology. Thus, the beasts stopped their wild
wandering of the forests of the earth and established the first human place.70
What does the discovery of the first poetic character unlock? First and foremost, it is an
inaugural event. In order to witness this event (in the form of a story), we must follow Vico’s
doctrine of beginnings, which reads as follows, “Doctrines must take their beginnings from that
of the matters of which they treat.”71 Even though this fundamental axiom only appears in one
particular context, Vico notes that it could have been placed with his general maxims, and further
confirms its importance by writing that it is, “universally used in all the matters which are herein
discussed.”72 This principle motivates the New Science. Fisch writes that this axiom is, “the
controlling methodological postulate of Vico’s new science...[it] assumes that genesis or
becoming is of the essence of that which this new science treats: that, at least for the new
science, nascence and nature are the same.”73 Vico’s principles of birth express the essence of
our nature.
So, a return to beginnings entails a return to the birth of things. In the case of the New
Science, Vico returns to the birth of nations, which (as Fisch has intimated) are etymologically, a
kind of birth. Goetsch calls this return to birth Vico’s logic of decent or an anabasis (heroic
journey). He observes, “Vico urges a heroic journey on us, an anabasis, which begins with a
descent to the origins of humanity, which is at the same time an ascent in that it is a return to the
beginning of principles which structure the birth, growth, and end of human society.”74 Vico
challenges the reader to carry out a heroic journey, which draws her back towards scenes of birth
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and forward towards scenes of death. Unfortunately, scholars have been too preoccupied with
the part of the journey that carries us towards death.
Despite acknowledging the centrality of Vico’s doctrine of beginnings and its focus upon
birth, scholars have yet to notice the philosophical implications of the category of birth. This is
because the western metaphysical tradition is not equipped to deal with the category of birth
since it has exhausted its energies on the category of death. Scholarly neglect of birth in Vico’s
work is due primarily to the philosophical tradition’s overarching neglect. To carry out the
anabasis Vico urges upon us, we must unburden ourselves of the tradition’s morbid
preoccupation with death. Instead, we must learn to turn our gaze towards the vibrant, frenzied,
chaotic, process of birth encountered at all beginnings.
Meditating upon the category of birth is subversive. By what seems to me a cruel twist of
fate, the philosopher who delights and revels in births and beginnings is labeled a tragic
philosopher. Verene observes, “Vico looks at history and never smiles.”75 Elsewhere Verene
asserts, “the true narration of the ideal eternal history is tragic.”76 Moreover Harrison writes,
“the New Science ends up telling a disconsolate story about the order of institutions - a story that
promises little or nothing in the way of salvation.”77 Verene and Harrison are referring to the
pattern of Vico’s ideal eternal story, which manifests itself in different ways. On the level of
human nature for instance, Vico’s writes, “The nature of peoples is first crude, then severe, then
benign, then delicate, and finally dissolute.”78 In terms of human desires, Vico intones, “Men
first feel necessity, then look for utility, next attend to comfort, still later amuse themselves with
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pleasure, thence grow dissolute in luxury, and finally go mad and waste their substance.”79
Scholars like Verene and Harrison bemoan the dissolution and madness that follows upon the
birth of things. Harrison even goes so far as to claim that, according to Vico, “Human
beings...are always already dead. This proleptic knowledge of finitude predetermines their most
creative as well as their most destructive dispositions.” 80 These sentiments look over the fact
that the bulk of the New Science is (almost blissfully) unconcerned with the end of the order of
things.
The New Science is primarily concerned with the birth of things and crafting a method to
encounter it. If Vico does not dwell upon it, why do his interpreters? Against these traditional
interpretations, Piovani writes, “The symbol of Vichian philosophy is not the nocturnal owl of
Minerva, but specifically the morning eagle, the supposed searcher for the waters of the sources,
near which were established the first settlements of men issued from a state of feral
wandering.”81 In what follows, I attempt to reconfigure Vico as the morning eagle. Far from
Harrison’s dire pronouncements about the human being, Vico shows that we are always capable
of rebirth.
To situate Vico as a philosopher of birth I will emphasize the two major principles of
birth in the New Science that work in concert with the doctrine of beginnings. Here are Vico’s
two principles of birth:

The nature of institutions is nothing but their coming into being (nascimento) at
certain times and in certain guises. Whenever the times and guise are thus and
so, such and not otherwise are the institutions that come into being. 82 The
inseparable properties of institutions must be due to the modification or guise
79
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with which they are born. By these properties we may therefore verify that the
nature or birth (natura or nascimento) was thus and not otherwise.83

Bergin and Fisch translate cosa as institution here. I will refer to cosa as both thing and
institution throughout.84 These principles direct our attention towards the raw emergence of
things. Nature, birth, and nation share an etymological root. Verene observes, “Etymologically
a nation is a “birth,” that which comes from a common origin.”85 This is a hint that Vico’s
principles express something about the category of birth itself. Fisch will help us to understand
the different ways in which Vico understands the term nation. “There is not only an original and
individual birth for each system [of institutions] but a continual birth of new institutions within
it, a continual transformation of old institutions, and even a rebirth of the nation after death.”86
Conceiving of the nation as birth does not respond to the fascist desire for purity in this sense.
The manner in which a nation appears is always subject to a process of becoming and its origins
are always vague and obscure; every attempt to retrieve our primordial natal scenes throws us
into the vague, muddled, inchoate beginnings, which always lends themselves to reinterpretation.
Vico’s narrative traces the process of birth and rebirth running throughout the New Science. His
fables are primarily concerned with birth through and through. Even upon the death of nations,

83

NS par. 148.
Bergin and Fisch have translated Vico’s cosa as institution. They explain, “Why did Vico avoid the terms
‘institution’...why did he prefer for the most part the term cosa? Because the term ‘institution’ was theoretically
loaded; loaded, moreover, with the very theory he was most concerned to discredit; and because the term cosa was
theoretically neutral, or innocent.” Bergin and Fisch, Introduction to the New Science, xliv. Throughout this
dissertation I will use both. On the one hand, cosa still feels innocent, in the sense of the phenomenological return
to the things themselves. Moreover, ‘thing’ seems to more adequately express the raw facere elaborated by Piovani.
See Piovani, “Vico Without Hegel,” 118. On the contrary, using the term institutions will be helpful in our
comparison with the work of Merleau-Ponty. Donald Landes explains the meaning of institutions for MerleauPonty as it appears in the essay, “Indirect Languages and Voices of Silence.” He writes, “Merleau-Ponty begins to
speak of institution in relation to constituted language, expression, and the sedimented structures of available
significations...The institution is the establishing of a tradition as an open trajectory of future actions, and this
function is possible insofar as the institution itself is forgotten and tacitly taken up and carried forward in new acts.”
Donald Landes, The Merleau-Ponty Dictionary, 113. Additionally, he observes, an institution is a coherent
deformation. Ibid., 113.
85
Verene, Vico’s Science of Imagination, 183.
86
Fisch, introduction to New Science, xxi.
84

8

he tells the tale of their rebirth; birth and a rebirth is a theme we will revisit in the Autobiography
below. In short, focus upon his doctrine of beginnings eclipses focus upon his doctrine of ends.
In order to understand the nature of beginnings within Vico, we must clarify the nature of
divine providence, which has unfortunately, lent itself to idealistic readings. Luft, for instance,
shows how most commentators miss Vico’s beginnings or the originary poesis grounding the
New Science. “If, however the New Science is a poetic science, then the historical process it
traces must be understood not from its end but from its beginnings...that things can never be
other than what they are at their origins is an ontological claim.”87 It is the epistemological
reading of Vico that has contributed, in part, to the errors of interpretation in Viconian
scholarship, which lead to his depiction as a tragic philosopher.88
Idealist interpretations of divine providence have also cast a dark shadow over Vico’s
beginnings. Divine providence is Vico’s principle of how things coming into being at certain
times and within certain guises. Divine providence is simply, “the course of the institutions
[things] of the nations had to be, must now be, and will have to be.” (NS, par 94) Recall, the
giganti began to divine the natural signs of Jove; divination, or interpretation of the god’s signs
was the first science. To divine is, moreover, to recall, to shine a light on the hidden dimension
of things. For instance, the Persians, Vico tells us, called their sky Jove because it signified what
is hidden from men - interpreting his signs is an attempt to bring forth the latent depth of
things.89 For Vico, divine providence is the natural unfolding of what remains hidden to men. It
does not have the idealistic implications, which the idealists impose upon it.
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Piovani demonstrate that these principles set forth a revolutionary theory, which is turned
towards, “the grasping of being, not in its completeness but its genesis.”90 Emphasizing these
principles situates Vico outside of the Hegelian framework plaguing Vichian studies. Piovani
notes, “Here Vico stands at the antipodes of Hegel...For Vico the essence is literally the
beginning; for Hegel it is the conclusion.”91 Yet even scholars like Piovani who do the
admirable work of wresting Vico from the hands of the Hegelians, still fall short of capturing the
ontological depth of Vico’s notion of birth.92 The birth of things marks the ontological
emergence of things. As adherents of the rational idealist tradition, many philosophers do not
take into account Vico’s genetic principles, which direct the reader’s attention towards the
beginning of things.
Vico’s principles of birth accords with the way Hannah Arendt relates natality and
appearance. She writes, paralleling Vico’s principle, “the world in which men are born contains
many things, natural and artificial, alive and dead, all of which have in common that fact that
they appear, and are therefore destined to be seen, touched, tasted, smelled, to be perceived by
sensing creatures.”93 The coincidence between being and appearing that Arendt unfolds carries
ontological weight, as does Vico’s notion of birth and appearing.94 Vico’s narrative traces the
story of our various manifestations or ways of appearing. In meditating upon his narrative, we
witness the process of becoming human, which is always a process of becoming. The western
philosophical tradition upholds a severe distinction between being and appearing.95 The
coincidence of being and appearing overcomes the two world theory upheld by philosophers and
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scientists whom distinguish (true) being from (mere) appearing.96 Unlike inanimate objects,
however, “to be alive means to be possessed by an urge toward self-display.”
Vico’s principle of birth and the coincidence between being and appearing is manifested
in the true narration of Jove. The first human word is born through the creation of the poetic
character Jove. The strongest of the wandering giants gather together and appear, exposed
before each other and the canopy of thundering sky. They gesticulate and shout and through
their actions and speech give birth to the human world. Arendt writes, “To men the reality of the
world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; ‘for what appears to all,
this we call Being,’ and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream.”97
It is only appearing before each other that the first human world is established in word and deed.
The giganti are totally exposed.
Due to the philosophical tradition’s tendency to divorce the realm of pure thought from
the realm of appearance, birth is renounced. Cavarero writes, “the philosopher abandons the
world of his own birth in order to establish his abode in pure thought, thus carrying out a
symbolic matricide in the erasure of his birth.”98 Elsewhere, she explains, “But here birth is a
fall, a negative event. This immediately turns the place of origin from which each person enters
the world into a simple (and devalued) place of appearance on earth.’”99 Philosophers, on the
other hand, have tended to turn their gaze towards eternal ideas, which are not bound by our
lived, embodied experience of the earth. Pure thought is not bound by birth or death, and both
categories are covered over by those western philosophers like Plato who yearn for it.100 To
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bring birth to mind necessarily entails death, which philosophers have tried to avoid by escaping
into a realm of eternal ideas.
Arendt dismantles the conceptual constructs of the philosophers and their desire for pure,
lifeless, eternal concepts, by affirming, “Not Man but men inhabit this planet.”101 As we say in
our introduction, Man is a concept that eclipses the unique status of singular existents. The
category of birth, moreover, is intimately related to another category that is often overlooked in
the western philosophical tradition: the category of the unique. Not only are appearance and
exhibition central to the birthing process, but the unique way in which it appears and shows itself
is significant. It shows up in a unique way, demonstrating that it is “thus and not otherwise”102
as Vico’s principle of birth demonstrates. Things emerge in a unique way, at this time and not
another. Birth always announces something unique.
If we turn with Vico towards the birth of something as necessarily involving its ways of
appearing at certain times, in certain guises, and in certain places, we come close to Hannah
Arendt’s category of birth. When a thinker engages with the category of birth, we may consider
this a subversive action against the dominant tendency of the western philosophical tradition.103
Cavarero writes, “birth, the act by which embodied individuals are born and actualized, will also
restore meaning to everyone, female and male. Humans always come into this world in this way,
never otherwise.”104 Focusing upon birth forces us to confront not only our embodiment, but
also our unique, unrepeatable singularity. We are not just any body, but this unique body, born
in this way and not another, of this mother and not another. Philosophical discourse cannot
relate the manner in which we appear in this unique way and not another. We need narrative
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discourse to relate the story of our birth and to respond to the desire of the narratable self. As we
shall later see, the story of our own birth is what we most desire, according to Cavarero.
Directing our focus to the category of birth will replenish meaning for humanity as a
whole. Birth necessarily entails embodiment, and the flight towards philosophical abstraction is
an attempt to flee transitory embodiment. Universal principles stave off the terror of death to
which fragile, finite beings, born this way and not another must succumb. There is a, “persistent
‘living for death’ that constitutes one of the most consistent principles in the philosophical
tradition of the West.” 105 Along with this fear of death is an attendant hostility towards the
body. Vico faces the fact of our finitude with the heroic courage, delighting in the narration of
the birth of being, despite its inevitable decay. The giganti are the infants of the human world,
the newborns. The Age of Gods is the infancy of man. The giants and heroes are the main object
of his narration. Most of the New Science is devoted to the way words, bodies, and institutions
are born at certain times in certain ways and under certain guises. Merely looking at the sheer
amount of space devoted to birth should indicate to the reader of the New Science that her
meditation should follow Vico’s gaze towards birth. His reflections upon the end of times take
up only a small portion of the text. Book Two, on Poetic Wisdom, makes up the bulk of the text;
it is primarily concerned with the infants of the human race, as he consistently refers to the giants
and heroes, who give birth to the poetic characters and the first places of humanity. Vico is on a
journey of descent to shine a light upon the natal scenes prefiguring the adult age, the Age of
Man.
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1.2

Vico’s Conceit of Scholars and The Natural World Attitude

The second axiom of Vico’s New Science reveals the source of both our creativity and errors. It
states, “It is a property of the human mind that whenever men can form no idea of distant and
unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and at hand.”106 For these reason nations
and all the learned philosophers misinterpret their own origins. When they attempted to recover
their beginnings, “it was on the basis of their own enlightened, cultivated, and magnificent times
that they judged the origins of humanity, which must nevertheless by the nature of things have
been small, crude, and quite obscure.”107 The nations and scholars are incapable of telling the
story of their own birth because they project their own refined wisdom on to what is unfamiliar
and obscure. This tendency, to apprehend the unfamiliar causes what Vico calls the two
conceits, those of nations and those of scholars. According to Vico, “Every nation...has had the
same conceit that it before all other nations invented the comforts of human life and that its
remembered history goes back to the very beginning of the world.”108 He continues, “To this
conceit of nations is added that of scholars, who will have it that what they know is as old as the
world.”109 Throughout the New Science Vico will point out the erroneous opinions of the
scholars and nations. The sciences have their beginnings in fables, which arise out of the
collective needs of the people, rather than the art of refined individuals.110
Let’s consider Vico’s discovery of the true Homer in order to show how he exposes the
error of scholars and nations. We saw that, according to Vico, Homer was not an individual
man, but rather the collective voice of the Greek people. Moreover, the Homeric poems are
corruptions of the true narrations born in the Age of Gods. He observes, “The fables in their
106
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origin were true and severe narrations, whence mythos, fable was defined as vera narratio. But
because they were originally for the most part gross, they gradually lost their original meanings,
were then altered, subsequently became improbable, after that obscure, then scandalous, and
finally incredible.”111 Our primordial fables are born out of need, not sophisticated artistry.
Cantelli observes, “men began to write and to speak, not to express profound philosophical
conceptions, but in order to resolve practical problems, to found first families, to organize their
work, and to satisfy the stringent necessities of survival.”112 Thus, when scholars find in Homer
the recondite wisdom of one ingenious thinker, they are imposing their own ideas onto the
poems, which are in fact the vulgar expressions of unrefined minstrels and bards, who are,
moreover, modifying the crude, severe narrations of barbaric beasts.
Vico’s discovery of the true Homer refutes scholarly depictions of Homer (still common
in classrooms today.) He writes, “This discovery of the origins of poetry does away with the
opinion of the matchless wisdom of the ancients, so ardently sought after from Plato to
Bacon...for the wisdom of the ancients was the vulgar wisdom of the lawgivers who founded the
human race, not the esoteric wisdom of great and rare philosophers.”113 Their own conceptual
frameworks limit the scholars. Although the true narrations lay right before their eyes, they
choose to see only what is familiar. For instance, Vico relates the erudite Varro observed the
three ages of man described by the Egyptians, but chose not to realize their true meaning. 114
The remembered history of the scholars does not reach back to the first fables, which the
Homeric fables are drawn from. The first fables are true histories, yet from the vantage point of
their own enlightened times, the fables appear to be merely incredible. They are “physical
111
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histories.”115 For example, witness the sorry fate of the poetic character, Jove. Once the vast
body of the sky itself, he becomes a mere personification. Vico observes, “Later, as these vast
imaginations shrank and the power of abstractions grew, the personifications were reduced to
diminutive signs. Jove becomes so small that he is flown about by an eagle.”116 The poetic
character shrink with the imaginations of the poets (and we shall see later that their gigantic
bodies shrink as well, giving us the human form we see today.) The fables, which scholars
critique, are shriveled versions of their originary ontological dimensions. The first fables lie
buried under the weight of erudite, ignorant learning.
Vico attempts to set aside the conceit of scholars in order to access the vera narratio
lying at the birth of the human world. His heroic descent requires that the scholar leaves her
familiar ways of knowing and encounter our unfamiliar, fabulous beginnings. “We had to
descend from these human and refined natures of ours to those quite wild and savage natures,
which we cannot at all imagine and can comprehend only with great effort.”117 The lazy
contentment with the familiar is a choice, and Vico urges the reader to bracket it off. Vico
develops a “new art of criticism concerning the founders of nations, who must have preceded by
more than a thousand years the writers with whom criticism has so far been occupied.”118 His
new art is a narrative art, mirroring the true narrations he discovers. But before he can become
the biographer of humanity, he must set aside the judgements of the scholars and nations.
Philosophers like to hide their grotesque and vulgar origins, yet they cannot escape them.
“For in these, as in embryos or matrices, we have discovered the outlines of all esoteric
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wisdom.”119 Our beginnings betray our refined opinions of ourselves. “The New Science is
everywhere a reminder that scholars hide, overlook, or mistreat the gross physical evidence of
human activity, including their own.”120 Returning to our natal scenes forces us to encounter
ourselves as strange others.
Vico’s conceit of scholars and nations is similar to the habitual, average-everyday
knowing of the Natural Attitude identified by phenomenologists. Both the Conceits of Scholars
and the Natural Attitude reveal a familiar, given world that is left unquestioned and taken for
granted. Although I argue that Vico’s method of identifying and setting aside the conceit of
scholars functions like the phenomenological epoche, his reduction does not reveal pure
transcendental essences in line with Husserl. His work is closer to the phenomenological
reduction of Merleau-Ponty.121 Merleau-Ponty exposes the impossibility of a complete
reduction.122 He questions the natural world attitude without losing contact with our embodied,
lived experience. In this way, Merleau-Ponty’s approach is ambiguous; he simultaneously
unfolds both our beginnings and ends. Vico, like Merleau-Ponty, draws near the pre-theoretical
attitude while exposing the presupposition of the theoretical, conceited scholars throughout the
New Science; his method sets aside the conceit of scholars without severing our “naive contact
with the world.”123 Kearney explains, “Phenomenology is ‘ambiguous,’ according to MerleauPonty, in that it looks in two directions at once - toward the origin of consciousness in the lived
experience of our embodied being-in-the-world and towards the end of consciousness in the
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theoretical knowledge of predicative judgment (logic, science, reason.)”124 Both directions are
adumbrated by Vico’s corsi, from the forests to the academies.
The conceited scholars and nations have forgotten their origins. Their memory never
dips below the familiar.125

Vico anticipates Husserl’s argument that the crisis of the sciences is

caused by the natural attitude’s severing of our intentional relations. The abstract language of
science is derivative of primordial lived experience, yet it’s natural appearance obfuscates the
fact that it is an artificial construct.126 The language of the conceited scholars, like the scientific
language characterizing the natural attitude, is derivative of a more primordial mode of
expression.
Suspending the attitude of the scholars exposes this. Merleau-Ponty writes, “We must
first awaken that experience of the world of which science is the second order expression.”127
Enzo Paci calls this second order expression the logic of the learned and shows that Vico
subjects it to a phenomenological epoche. Vico is seeking direct and unmediated access to the
world. He attempts to restore our direct relationship to things. In order to do this, he brackets
off the conceit of the scholars and grammarians: this is Vico’s epoche. Fred Evans shows that
Merleau-Ponty unfolds our “direct, unmediated relation to the world” by taking up the
phenomenological method which by, “Putting into brackets our standard beliefs, he allows the
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things themselves, ‘phenomena’, to tell their own story.”128 I will argue that one must take up
the language of narration (like Vico) in order to hear their story. In this way, I argue, Vico
reaches our pre-reflective experience. Paci writes, “The first stage of the world is within us, in
the present in our genetic past. But in us it must undergo a qualitative mutation; it must
recommence from the life of truth implicit in the subject and uncovered by the epoche.”129
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty observes, “Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we
do not rediscover the primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so long as we do not
describe the gesture that breaks this silence. Speech is a gesture and its signification a world.”130
Vico points us towards the voices of silences and indirect languages elaborated by MerleauPonty. He sets aside the secondary expressions of the philosophers and learned men and takes
up the primary expressions of the first poets.

1.3 Narrative Discourse over Philosophical Discourse
Vico is aware that his poetic discourse is radically different from ancient philosophical discourse
as well as Renaissance and baroque poetics. Mazzotta affirms, moreover, that he is “conscious
of the novelty of his discourse.”131 Vico revels in performative and imaginative play. As Verene
explains, “Vico’s science is performative...His account of the human world will be vera narratio,
or true speech; it will be like the natural speech through which the mind originally gives form to
the world.”132 In order to bracket off the Natural World Attitude and the Conceit of scholars, we
too must re-enact Vico’s poetic performance. According to Vico, we must meditate the New
Science for ourselves. According to Vico, Verene observes, “to meditate is to allow the mind to
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return to those point of origin...for the humans narrate to itself what it had originally created.”133
The Vichian scientist attempts to re-enter the corporeal imaginations of the first poets by taking
up their oral expressions, which constituted their age: expressions vastly unfamiliar to reflective
thinkers in the Age of Man. Verene affirms, “The new Vichian scientist who is also a new poet,
practices the art of telling this fable.”134 In other words, to encounter the originary thinking that
Vico unearths, we must become storytellers ourselves. We must relearn the art of narration.
Evans shows that scholars have begun to examine the relationship between
phenomenological lived experience and our narrative experience of reality. He notes that,
“According to Carr (and contrary to many popular views), narrative is not exclusively imposed
on experience from without by some authoritarian voice in the interest of manipulation and
power, but reflects the very structure of our experience and action itself.”135 Thus, the basic
pattern of narrative consisting of a beginning, middle, and end, mirrors the structure of our own
lived experience. Kearney affirms this point. He notes, “our lives are constantly interpreting
themselves...in terms of beginnings, middles, and ends (though not necessarily in that order.)”136
We are always caught up in a story we did not create, the story of the collective we. This is
precisely the story that Vico is narrating. The reader, who is urged to take up the story, is meant
to realize the collective dimension of her own unique singular tale. Carr observes, “Narrative is
our primary way of organizing our experience of time, and understood in this sense it can
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elucidate our pretheoretical past.”137 In this way we can understand Vico’s ideal eternal history
as the narrative structure meant to capture the pre-reflective lived experience of the giganti and
heroes. Cavarero also affirms, “that every human life between birth and death can eventually be
told as a story with beginning and end is the prepolitical and prehistorical condition of history,
the great story without beginning or end.”138 Vico’s takes up narrative to recover our
prereflective experience; he sets aside rational discourse entirely. His new critical art “is not an
art of the concept. It is an art whereby we grasp philosophical meanings through narrative
speech and not through argumentative process.”139 Vico adopts narrative discourse to express
what emerges spontaneously in humanity, yet some scholars question whether or not the
narrative structuring of experience is a merely phenomenon of particular cultures rather than a
universal experience.
Evans argues that the narrative structure consisting of beginning, middle, may be a mere
cultural artifice. He observes, “the phenomenologist David Carr starts off his work by claiming
that sensory experience, let alone storytelling, has a narrative structure (past, present, and at least
an implicit future.) But at the end of one of his major works he admits that the existence of
cultures in which people do not tell stories with linear plots about themselves may mean that this
thesis holds only for ‘our,’ that is, Western, culture.”140 According to Evans, voice precedes the
narratable self. He observes, “Voice, in contrast, allows for social languages that can be the
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basis for either a narrative or nonnarrative account of us.”141 We will discuss the primacy of
voice in Vico’s New Science below.
Perhaps Vico’s narrative art offers an account of ourselves on a primordial level since his
art entails linear narratives as well as nonlinear narratives. In other words, the mute images,
gestures, deeds, and things that constitute the true speech, or true narration in the Age of Gods
and Heroes, do not operate according to a linear plot. They are, moreover, corporeal events and
actions. Vico adopts the linear plot structure as a storyteller in the Age of Man; therein, he
responds to our desire for unity by relating the story of three ages: beginning with gods,
climaxing with heroes and ending with men. Since we will argue that this form of narration
relates to the primary narratives in a more intimate fashion, narrative still holds a privileged
status in terms of grasping our pre-reflective experience. In the Divine Age the giganti create
vera narratio, or true narrations, the mute images, and gestures. Then, in the Heroic Age, they
break into song, which mixes with the images of the first age with the vocalic sphere, and finally
in the third age they take up abstract, reflective discourse. The first languages are entirely bodily
expressions. The second age exercises the vocal chords of the body, allowing voice and song to
fashion the human world. So, Vico’s various narratives do not fit neatly into contemporary
definitions of narrative as being structured from beginning to end. We trace the rise of bodily
narratives, to vocal narrative, to the articulate discourse of the scholars. This last discourse is,
moreover, a reified narrative.
If we include the narratives of the first ages then as narratives proper, perhaps we will
escape the sense in which Vico’s narratives would only express an experience that is culturally
relative. If it is true, though, that our identities are bound up with narrative and that we desire the
unifying force of narrative, Vico’s narrative art responds to this desire. Kearney observes,
141
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“Every life is in search of narrative. We all seek, willy-nilly, to introduce some kind of concord
into the everyday discord and dispersal we find about us. We may, therefore, agree with the poet
who described narrative as a stay against confusion.”142 Vico’s narrative works on both the
communal and singular level: both spring from the same impulse, namely, a desire for unity.
Kearney observes, “For the storytelling impulse is, and always has been, a desire for a certain
unity of life.”143 Storytelling is an essential aspect of our identities. Kearney parallels Arendt’s
assertion that, “The chief characteristic of a specifically human life...is that is is always full of
events that can eventually be told as a story.”144 We are selves in search of narration. Vico
responds to the desires of the narratable self.
He creates the ideal eternal story in order to respond to the reader’s desire for a unified
self and to uncover the original stories at the birth of humanity. As Kearney affirms, “to imagine
the origins of storytelling we need to tell ourselves a story.”145 This, I argue, is what motivates
Vico to adopt the discourse of narration. Although the notion that we are essentially narratable
selves propounded by thinkers like Arendt, Carr, Cavarero, and Kearney will help to explain the
role of Vico as narrator and the task of re-narration required of the reader, Vico’s science resists
any tendencies towards essentialist claims about the self.
The narrations that are born in the Age of Gods, spring from beasts, not humans. They
are proto-humans who are, nonetheless, dialogic creatures. Their voices resound with the
thunderclaps of Jove and each other. The heroes, moreover, have not yet transformed into the
humans of the Age of Man either. The true narrations do stave off the chaos and confusion
encountered by the beasts, yet not through a story which has a linear plot structure. Rather, the
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first narrations are concrete metaphors. Vico describes this exchange between voice and sky as a
true narration. This is the first myth, concrete metaphor, or fable in brief. It is a condensed, but
true, narrative. And yet, our more refined linear narratives have more in common with the
abstract, philosophical discourse. Therefore, they allow us greater access to the first narrations.
The first narratives, in other words, are not born out of the humanly desire for unity, but out of
the fearful grunts and vibrating bodies or awe-struck giants.
Let’s look at the vast distance between the true narratives Vico recovers and the
traditional philosophical discourse adopted by scholars in the Age of Men. This will help us
understand the three kinds of narration present in Vico’s new critical method. The first
narratives spring from the same principle that is the source of error for the scholars. When
humans have no knowledge about things that are far away and unfamiliar, they judge them by
what is familiar and nearby. Thus, the first poets fashion the world by not knowing. This
imposition of the familiar upon the unfamiliar is the process underpinning our creative acts. The
error of scholars and the ingenuity of beasts then are on the opposite ends of the same principle.
The poetic character, Jove, was created in this ignorant fashion. We find in the inaugural acts of
creation the movement from the concrete to the abstract. Vico expresses this principle
elsewhere, “wherever it is lost in ignorance man makes himself the measure of all things.”146
The principles limit the understanding of the scholars and nations since they cannot see beyond
their own concepts to meet what is unfamiliar and strange. For instance, we saw how they
interpret their poetic history in the image of their own refined history. As Cantelli explains, “All
knowledge is interpretation of that which is unknown on the basis of what is known. It refers
that which is far to that which is near.”147
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The first poetic character is an image, which on this primordial level is a metaphor.
Metaphor operates according to this logic. Di Pietro explains, “Metaphors begin with body
references and then extend to more abstract areas.”148 In the first age metaphors are born of the
body. By the third age, the metaphoric event has lost its corporeal roots. Di Pietro observes, “It
is in the last age that prose style develops, with its use of metaphors which are greatly removed
from their concrete references.”149 Vico exposes the metaphoric corporeal base of our most
abstract and refined concepts by showing how they are originally born of the body.
Additionally, Goetsch observes, “Metaphor is based on a metaphysics of the body.”150 The first
narrations then are concrete metaphors created through bodily skills and fashioned by ignorance,
without a touch of reason. Vico observes, “As rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes
all things by understanding them, this imaginative metaphysics shows that men become all things
by not understanding them.”151 The first poets create the human world through corporeal
imaginations devoid of understanding. They create by not knowing.
The poetic character Jove is a concrete metaphor born of a bodily gesture. More
importantly, it is an event. Verene explains, “Vico asks us to imagine a beginning point of
human experience in which all was body and bodily motion, in which meaning was an action
between bodies, and in which human thought was nothing more than a bodily act of
sensation.”152 The first poets gave birth to the human world through the movement of their
bodies. Their words were actions, things, and deeds. The capacity they share is the ability to
make sense of the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. And nothing is more familiar to the
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giganti than their own bodies. White observes that poetic logic is governed by the movement
from the familiar to the unfamiliar and the concrete to the abstract.”153 The sky becomes a
familiar place, the body of a god. Vico calls this the “poetic transformation of bodies.”154
Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of conceptual metaphor can help us to understand this
process of moving from the familiar to the unfamiliar in metaphoric creation.155 They come
closer to expressing the ontological event of metaphor more sufficiently than other attempts by
cognitive scientists who remain too close to a conceptual model of cognition. Of course, in
considering the initial event of metaphor creation we are not dealing with conceptual domains, as
the concept has not yet been invented; yet, we can understand a conceptual domain as “any
coherent organization of experience.”156 In respect to the true story of Jove, the shaking bodies
of the giganti would be the source domain while the lightning filled sky would be the target
domain.157 In this scenario, the sky is unknown and the body, the concrete, known, familiar
domain. Typically the unfamiliar, abstract concepts are the targets and the concrete concepts are
the sources.158 In other words, abstract things are understood in terms of concrete things. Vico
observes, “Thus we discover the important principle that every language, no matter how copious
and learned, discovers the hard necessity of expressing spiritual things by means of relationships
with corporeal things.”159
In this primordial activity of corporeal creativity, we witness the ontological depth of
metaphor. In the Age of Man, and in our own time, metaphor is considered to be a mere
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rhetorical device. Danesi explains, “by and large, people still think of metaphor as a stylistic
device of language, used by poets and writers to decorate or make their messages more effective
or ornate.”160 Lakoff and Johnson demonstrate that this is not the case. They observe,
“Metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than
thought and action...On the contrary, metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language
but in thought and action.”161 Vico affirms the ubiquity of metaphor. He observes, “In general
metaphor makes up the great body of the languages among nations.”162 Our conceptual systems
are primarily metaphoric. Let us consider some example of conceptual metaphors to understand
how metaphors structure our experience of reality, even in our own refined Age of Man. Lakoff
and Johnson provide the example of the conceptual metaphor: argument is war. We find this at
work in our habitual, everyday language. We say, for instance, “Your claim is indefensible. He
attacked every weak point in my argument. His criticisms were right on target. I demolished his
argument. I’ve never won an argument with him. If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.”163 We experience arguments in terms of the experience of
war. Thus, even the abstract demonstrations of the scholars is structured by conceptual
metaphors. Vico’s etymologies coursing throughout the New Science, expose the metaphoric
nature of the conceptual thinking of the scholars.
More importantly, Lakoff and Johnson demonstrate the way in which metaphors are
intimately related to the body. Metaphors have an experiential basis.164 They arise from our
physical experiences. For instance, the conceptual metaphor, happy is up, is based upon the
physical tendency to relate a slouched posture with sadness and an erect posture with
160
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happiness.165 In this sense, Lakoff and Johnson tether metaphoric concepts to our corporeal
experience of reality. Vico anticipates their work by revealing the experiential basis of metaphor
creation. Although Lakoff and Johnson aptly describe way in which conceptual metaphors
structure our experience, they inadequately express the initial event of metaphoric creation. In a
sense, they examine metaphor at the end of times, whereas Vico plunges us to bestial
imaginations that create metaphors without a hint of intelligence or reflection. For instance, the
first poetic character or concrete metaphor, Jove, was created entirely out of the bodily skills of
the giganti. In this sense, Vico’s elaboration of the creation of the poetic characters gives us
more insight into the birth of metaphoric thinking. Although, Lakoff and Johnson’s insight into
the inner logic of metaphor creation helps us to interpret the movement of Vico’s poetic logic,
which moves always from the familiar to the unfamiliar.
Metaphor is expressed in an entirely corporeally during the Age of Gods, where the
languages were mute. Let’s explore the words we find in this age to realize how different they
are than the articulate languages of the scholars. For instance, let us consider the five “real
words” an archaic king used to express himself to his enemy. The king “used five real words to
answer Darius the Great, who declared war on him. These five were a frog, a mouse, a bird, a
ploughshare, and a bow.”166 Vico relates their meaning:

The frog signified that he, Idanthyrsus, was born of the earth of Scythia as
frogs are born of earth in summer rains, so that he was a son of that land. The
mouse signified that he, like a mouse, had made his home where he was born;
that is, that he had established his nation there. The bird signified that there the
auspices were his; that is, that he was subject to none but God. The
ploughshare signified that he had reduced those lands to cultivation, and thus
tamed and made them his own by force. And finally the bow signified that as
supreme commander of the arms of Scythia he had the duty and the might to
defend her.167
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This “speech made up of physical things”168 would not be detected by minds refined by
abstraction. The scholars ignore the images and things constituting language in the Ages of Gods
and Heroes. They pretend that their languages will be purer and more refined without them.
They imagine that, “to describe reality correctly, we need words whose meanings are clear and
precise, words that fit reality.”169 Moreover, they condemn metaphors as a hindrance to clear
thinking. They imagine that “metaphor and other kinds of poetic, fanciful, rhetorical, and
figurative language can always be avoided in speaking objectively, and they should be avoided,
since their meanings are not clear and precise and do not fit reality in any obvious way.”170 This,
however, is an illusion. Since the scholars remain trapped in their own familiar, linguistically
constituted perceptions of reality, they look right over the metaphors and images that dance
beneath their nose.
Michele Le Doeuff explains the situation:

Whether one looks for a characterization of philosophical discourse to Plato, to
Hegel or to Brehier, one always meets with a reference to the rational, the
concept, the logical, the argued, the abstract...Philosophy is not a story, not a
pictorial description, not a work of pure literature. Philosophical discourse is
inscribed and declares its status as philosophy through a break with myth, fable,
the poetic, the domain of the image.171

Vico’s narrative art throws us into the domain of the image made up of the myth and fables; thus,
he departs from rational philosophical discourse. Yet he does not merely return to this
primordial realm; rather, he first exposes the arrogant presuppositions of the scholars who cling
to the rational concept. Despite their arrogance, their dream of a pure, rational philosophy
devoid of myth, imagery, and figurative speech does not hold. Le Doeuff continues:
168
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If, however, one goes looking for this philosophy in the texts, which are meant
to embody it, the least that can be said is that it is not to be found there in a pure
state. We shall also find statues that breathe the scent of roses, comedies,
tragedies, architects, foundations, dwellings, doors, windows, sand, navigators,
various musical instruments, islands, clocks, horses, donkey’s and even a lion,
representatives of every craft and trade, scenes of sea and storm, forests and
trees: in short, a whole pictorial world sufficient to decorate even the driest
‘History of Philosophy.’172

Images and metaphors populate philosophical texts even while the philosophers profess to do
without metaphoric, imagistic thinking. Recall, for instance, the conceptual metaphor,
“argument is war”, that supports their most erudite essays. Beyond sustaining their theoretical
texts, moreover, Vico demonstrates the metaphoric, imagistic root of all conceptual thinking.
His imaginative etymologies aid this demonstration. Paralleling Le Doeuff’s technique of
highlighting the images that sustain philosophical discourse, Vico enumerates the images, which
the rational, conceptual scholars depend upon and yet don’t acknowledge.173 In order to
faithfully follow Vico’s doctrine of beginnings, we must “go back and fetch it from” 174 stones,
rocks, frogs, cicadas, and simpletons. In order to access the primordial realm of stories and
images that are at the origin of philosophical discourse, Vico identifies and sets aside the
discourse of the scholars and the grammarians.
Vico returns to the lived phenomenological experience, which is prior to reflective
discourse of the scholars. To access our primordial phenomenological experience, reflective
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intelligence is useless. Vico writes, “intelligence...has been rendered useless by the two conceits
enumerated in the Axioms.”175 Moreover, according to Vico, “the poetic falsehoods are the
same as the general truths of the philosophers, with the sole difference that the latter are abstract
and the former clothed in images.”176 The line between truth and falsehood is blurred: there is a
poetic truth in narrative fiction that rivals the truth found in the abstract, logical argumentation of
the philosophers.
As mentioned above, Vico emphasized his position as standing outside the Academy and
the philosophers who dwell there. In his Autobiography he recounts the devastating loss of his
chance to become a professor of law and the University of Naples, due to an error in his oration:
he mispronounced a word (a highly embarrassing moment for a rhetorician.) The coveted
position went, in his view, to an undeserving candidate who won the seat because of his elite
connections. But, despite his failure, Vico later realized that his exclusion from the Academy
was what allowed him the freedom to formulate the original ideas that make up the New Science.
For instance, Verene affirms, “As a result of this loss, Vico felt free to cease writing works in
Latin and to write the New Science in Tuscan Italian.”177 But Vico did not leave the Academy all
together.
He retained what Mazzotta has termed, a liminal status, on the threshold between the
Academies and the forest. Unlike Descartes who left schooling all together for the book of the
world, Vico remained a lowly professor of Rhetoric (a position later taken up by his son.)
Perhaps this explains why Vico is always engaged in conversation with the philosophers of the
Academies and Cities, persistently pointing out their flaws. He hovers near them, and shows
how we must set their positions aside in order to catch a glimpse of the origin of things. In the
175
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introduction to his text, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, he tells the reader that the
philosophers “busied themselves in unearthing the causes of language and in formulating it into a
system on the basis of the philosophy to which they were devoted, and in which they were
learned. Whereas I, not being an adherent of any school of thought, shall seek out the ancient
wisdom of the Italians from the very origins of their words.”178 He proudly distinguishes himself
from the scholars, who are blinded by their learning. Vico professes to encounter the languages
without any theoretical biases.
Descartes left the Academy for the book of the world, but, according to Vico, we must
act as if there were no books in the world. Vico unhinges the entire abstract, conceptual
apparatus and attempts to go beyond it. There are no books in the primordial forests of the earth.
Vico positioned himself as an outsider and took great pains to show the distance one must
traverse in order to follow his new method. Philosophers, he thought, were generally ignorant of
these gaps, differences, and distances; they must leave their comfort zone and encounter
philologians: poets, storytellers, and bards. Vico attends to the silent spaces between
philosophers and poets, humans and monsters, bodies and places, in his struggle to draw what is
far, near - but first, he forces the scholars to realize how very far things are. Once he has created
the yawning gap, distancing the ages, then he can create his “savage and wild comparisons.”179
Once Vico leaves the books and the Academies he can reveal, “ that as much as the poets had
first sensed in the way of vulgar wisdom, the philosophers later understood in the way of esoteric
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wisdom.”180 He develops the sense of the first poets to unravel the understanding of the
philosophers.
Let us refer again to the true story of the poetic character, Jove. It is significant that the
birth of the first human word is a communal act. The giganti are entwined it a total sensorial
experience with nature and others in a constant process of birth and becoming. Merleau-Ponty’s
term connaissance, “refers both to a kind of embodied, operative knowledge (connaissance) of
the world that is below full cognition, and to our birth that is always a co-birth (co-naissance)
with others and with all of nature.”181 Vico’s giganti birth the human world in unison, beneath
the bellowing, majestic sky. It is their engagement with each other and the earth that allows for
the birth of the new. Erudite wisdom distains communal sense – yet narrative and poetry are
born of it. The second order expressions of the erudite foster a solitary mode of dwelling. By
bracketing off the learned, erudite wisdom of the conceited scholars and the conventional
language, which constitutes their age, Age of Man, Vico encounters the generative mute language
of the Age of Gods and symbolic language of the Age of Heroes that is entirely communally and
responsive to the earth. Like Merleau-Ponty he returns to our primordial acts of birth by
shedding the logic of the learned.182
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CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Placing Hercules over Jove
In chapter one, I showed how Vico’s recovery of the poetic character Jove exposes our ignorance
about the first human thought. It also exposes our ignorance about the first human place. In this
chapter, I elaborate the ways in which we can think about Vico as a philosopher of place. “We
wander ignorant both of men and places.”183 The poetic character Jove establishes the first place.
When Jove came to command by his signs (the lightning bolts and all the language of nature) the
first science was born: divination or theology. Divination was simply the interpretation of Jove’s
natural signs.184 As commander, Jove also made the giganti stay in one place. Vico observes,
“And for having put an end to the feral wandering of a few giants, so that they became princes of
the gentes, he received the epithet, Stayor, stayer or establisher.”185 By restricting the wandering
of the giganti, Jove inaugurates the first place.
Vico’s universal principle of etymology is his most explicit expression of the relationship
between words, bodies, and places. But it is the relationship between words and bodies that have
attracted the most scholarly attention. The principles read as follows:

The human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in the
body, and only with great difficulty does it come to understand itself by means
of reflection.186
This axiom gives us the universal principle of etymology in all languages: words
are carried over from bodies and from the property of bodies to signify the
institutions of mind and spirit.187
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The corporeal emergence of language is readily identifiable here. That “words are carried over
from bodies”188 shows that languages and bodies are intimately entwined. Words, moreover,
create reality - they carry ontological weight. According to Vico, “the name creates the
character, the word engenders the thing.”189 The intimate relationship between languages and
bodies prefigures the abstract language of the third age, which becomes detached from the body.
Vico’s etymologies reveal that languages are primordially born of bodies, though the Age of Man
forgets bodies and place. He observes, for instance, “in all the languages the greater part of the
expressions relating to inanimate things are formed by metaphor from the human body and its
parts...Thus, head for top or beginning; the brow and shoulder of a hill; the eyes of needles or
potatoes; mouth for any opening; the lip of a cup or pitcher...”190 Corporeal metaphors prefigure
the concept and etymologies allow us to glimpse the corporeal root grounding our most refined
concepts. Born of the body, metaphors mark the birth of the concept.
By plumbing the depths of our pre-reflective experience, Vico encounters the hidden
metaphors and embodied thinking that engendered our primordial experience of reality, and its
residues continues to weave itself around our experience in the reflective age. “What he is about
in his etymologies is a reconstruction from the evidence of language of historical layers of prelogical encounters with reality, the definition of hidden process, the linguistic system of
processing experience which existed, and still exists, outside rational or logical processing.”191
Cleary, he is tracing language back to its originary depths and revealing corporeal roots.
Often, however, when scholars consider Vico’s universal principle of etymology, only
the linguistic dimension is highlighted. For instance, Edie observes that Vico’s universal
188
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principle of etymology “is the first formulation of a non-rationalistic theory of language which is
today beginning to be adopted.” 192 Although it is important to acknowledge the principle’s
elucidation of the birth of language and thought, it is of equal importance to acknowledge its
emphasis upon the places where language and thought are born. The principle reveals how the
first stories are born in the primordial forests of the earth and die (reified and depleted) in the
Academies. Following upon his first axiom of the universal principle of etymology, Vico
presents what he calls “a great principle of etymology.” 193 It reads as follows, “The order of
ideas must follow the order of institutions. This was the order of institutions: first the forests,
after that the huts, then the villages, next the cities, and finally the academies.” 194 Whereas we
saw ideas born of bodies above, we now see ideas born of forests and academies. The ideas
change in accord with a change of place.
To realize Vico’s preoccupation with place more fully, let us now turn to the first New
Science. Vico’s approach towards etymology in the first New Science, is entirely concerned with
place. He observes, “the second principle [that follows from our discovery of the origin of
articulate language] is that of an etymologican common to all native languages.”195 Moreover,
Vico demonstrates that:

Such an etymologicon must be made to proceed in constant accordance with the
natural order of ideas. Thus, since the forests came first, then the hovels, next
the fields, flocks and herds, followed by the cities, the nations, and, finally, the
philosophers, the etymologicon for each language must explain the origin and
progress of its words through these stages.196
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Place is at the forefront in his discussion of the emergence of language. Different manners of
dwelling give birth to different ways of being in the world. We cannot trace the origin of a word
without witnessing a pastiche of places.
Just as the ontological import of narrative is neglected, the ontological import of place is
overlooked. Words emerge simultaneously with place; in other words, ideas and institutions
(here understood as places) follow the same order.197 The natural order of places or institutions
moves from the forests, to the huts, to the villages, to the cities, and lastly to the academies
where the philosophers dwell.198 The order is natural; in other words, we will not find
philosophers in the first forests of the earth, or savage poets in the academies.
The movement from the forest to the academies is revealed through the genetic history of
every word.199 For instance, Vico shows that he Latin word, lex or law, connotes sophisticated,
erudite authority, yet when one peels back the layers of its life story, we find a mere collection of
acorns at its origin. Consider, for instance, the sylvan roots of the law:

Thus we observe in the Latin language that almost the whole corpus of its words
had sylvan or rustic origins. For example, lex. First it must have meant a
collection of acorns. Thence we believe is derived ilex, as it were illex, the
oak...for the oak produces acorns by which the swine are drawn together. Lex
was next a collection of vegetables, from which the later were called legumeina.
Later on, at a time when vulgar letters had not yet been invented for writing
down the laws, lex, by a necessity of civil nature meant a collection of citizens,
or the public parliment; so that the presence of people was the lex, or ‘law,’ that
solemnized the wills that were made calatis comitiis, in the presence of the
assembled comitia. Finally, collecting letters, and making, as it were, a sheaf of
them for each word, was called legere, reading. 200

We move from a collection of acorns, to a collection of vegetables, and finally, a collection of
citizens. The abstract concept law was originally the corporeal presence of human bodies
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gathered together in one place; this human gathering, moreover, is a refinement of the gathering
of acorns round the trunk of oak tree, firmly rooted in one place. Vico’s universal principle of
etymology draws us away from our abstract concept of the law to a bunch of acorns resting
beneath an oak tree. Far from the refined, intellectual activity of reading, we find ourselves
emplaced, amidst acorns. Thinking, too, is for Vico a kind of gathering. Here we witness our
collective story through tracing etymologies. The etymologies tell the story of our archaic
dwelling places.201 As we shall see, humanity, in the Age of Man, becomes detached from place.
Philosophers do not dwell in the forest; they arrive with the coming of the cities and
academies. But the philosophers and Academies would not be possible without the poets and
forests, a truth the philosophers like to hide. Philosophical discourse is impossible in the forest
and yet philosophical discourse feeds upon it sylvan roots without acknowledging it. Plato, for
instance, grafted his own esoteric wisdom onto the wisdom of Homer. Unlike many refined
academics though, Vico expresses his gratitude for the forests. As we saw above, “he felt most
grateful for those woods” during his years at Vatolla.202 Vico portrays himself as a forest
dweller, which is to situate himself outside of the Academy; his thought, in other words, is born
of a different place because his body inhabits a different place. As an autodidact, he is not bound
to the Academy and his imagination is left to roam freely in the primordial woods of the
primordial poets. His etymologicon demonstrates that ideas and places emerge simultaneously;
his own ideas are original because they are born of the forest, not the Academies.
Above, I make the original claim that Vico exaggerated his years in the woods to
demonstrate that one must return to the primordial forests, where the first poets dwelt, in order to
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reawaken their poetic wisdom and reinvent language in the Age of Man. The force of Vico’s
ingenuity is gathered from the forest. Vico brackets off the scholarly attitude and leaves the map
for the forest. He appears to be taking up Merleau-Ponty’s injunction that we “return to this
world prior to knowledge, this world of which knowledge always speaks, and this world with
regard to every scientific determination is abstract, signitive, and dependent, just like geography
with regard to landscape, where we first learned what a forest, a meadow, or a river is.”203 Vico
offers us, no less, a “poetic geography.”204
Why have scholars neglected the relevance of place in Vico’s etymologican and,
moreover, realize Jove as the first place or topos? The link between the forest and the poetic
characters is not given the attention it deserves in Viconian scholarship because it is an
uncommon idea in the western philosophical tradition in general. Casey observes, “in ancient
and modern Western philosophy there is rarely any serious discussion of the role of the body in
the determination of place.”205 For this reason, it has been all too easy for scholars to overlook
the interrelation between body and place in his universal principles of etymology. Additionally,
scholars (especially historicists) forget the relevance of lightning and thunder flashing through
the sky in the true narration of Jove. The first poets create the first human world through a
confrontation with the earth and sky. The natural setting is a lead protagonist in this tale.
Lollini, for one, observes the centrality of nature and place in Vico’s poetic characters. He
observes, “this original language is not the expression of human subjectivity, freedom or action,
and takes place as an event deeply implicated with the earth, the sky, and the body, as a
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combination of voices, gestures, bodily expressions and natural phenomena.”206 The intersection
between bodies and natural environ spark the birth of the first human world.207 Ideas are not
only embodied but implaced. And bodies, like ideas, change alongside place. In this regard I
concur with Edward Casey’s notion that “built places are extensions of our bodies.”208 The
erect, shaking bodies of the giganti build the first human place. Casey observes, “The body has
everything to do with the transformation of a mere site into a dwelling place. Indeed, bodies
build places.”209 The giganti don’t build the first human world lying down or in immobile
intellectual contemplation (the posture of erudite scholars.)210 Nor like Thales, are they lost in
self-reflective thought, tripping over wells; the giganti are entirely exposed and engaged with the
earth and thunderous sky. They are not wrapped up in interior contemplation; rather, the body is
entirely extended and entwined with place.
Vico observes, in fact, that it is only with great effort that the body comes to turn inward.
Vico notes, “that infirmity of the human mind by which, immersed and buried in the body, it
naturally inclines itself to take notice of bodily things, and finds the effort to attend to itself too
laborious; just as the bodily eye sees all objects outside itself but needs a mirror to see itself.”211
It is only with great difficulty that we withdraw from our immersion in embodied place to some
interior allusive interior space, which is largely a fiction of the Age of Man. Bodily movement is
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necessary for building places.212 Action and deeds are called for even to move around already
built places. Casey observes, “Constructing, inhabiting, and travelling as well as those actions in
which wandering and residing combine, are bodily activities...the living moving body converts
the flatland of sheer sites into the variegated landscape of habitable or traversed places.”213
If we consider the movement in the conceptual mansions, which were described above as
humanity’s dwelling place in the Age of Man, their movement is limited to shuffling around
prefabricated furniture. Their freedom and creative capabilities are diminished to this delicate,
simple fluttering about. Conversely, the first poets create the first place through intense, awestricken, and vibrant, shaking and shouting. The poetic character Hercules, moreover, burns
clearings in the forest to give birth to human places. Let’s consider this account of his poetic
geography. Vico writes:
Cities were called arae, altars...for they must have been the first altars of the
gentile nations, and the first fire lighted upon them was that which served to
clear the forests of trees and bring them under cultivation...And since these
altars were evidently the first asylums of the world...we are told that within the
asylum opened in the Lucus or clearing.214

The clearing and cultivated of the forest was arduous work, and without it the cities could not be
born. According to Vico the luci are “the burnt lands within the enclosure of the woods.”215 The
arduous work to create the first places is called for in the creation of the first words. That effort
we will consider more fully below in our consideration of spontaneous versus sedimented
language in Merleau-Ponty’s gestural theory of language.
Place, furthermore, is intimately related to birth, a category, we saw above, that is vastly
unrecognized in the western philosophical tradition. For something to be born, it requires a
212
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place. As Verene explains, “the nation as birth and death requires a geography, a place.”216
Perhaps, once again, the primacy of place is demonstrated in the first edition of Vico’s New
Science more clearly. There, his treatment of poetic character begins with the poetic character
Hercules, rather than Jove. Verene observes, “Jove is the first place or topos from which to
think. Hercules through his work signifies the first place in which to act.”217 Hercules, asserts
Vico, “subdued the first lands of the world and brought them under cultivation.”218 Anytime an
individual carries out a great labor he will be called Hercules.219 Hercules’ great labor was to
have burned the clearing in the forest and cultivated the fields - a labor that must have required
great bodily skill and strength. Both Jove and Hercules are instrumental poetic characters. Just
as every nation has its Jove, Vico affirms, every nation has its Hercules.220 The nations could not
begin without Jove and could not grow without the valor of Hercules.221
Hercules, moreover, is related to the poetic character Juno, who is associated with
marriage. Religion, marriage and burial are the three institutions, which Vico establishes as
present in every nation. For our purposes here, it is important to see the way in which marriage
helps to establish the first place. Verene explains, “The fear of Jove leads the first humans to
control their bodies. The fear also leads them to copulate away from the sight of Jove, in caves
and this leads them to marriage.”222 Vico says that marriage causes the giganti to stay tethered to
one place with their woman. Verene observes that “marriage begins the human sense of place
but human society does not begin until Hercules clears the great forests for cultivation. Juno
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imposes the great labor onto Hercules.”223 Thus, the poetic characters, born of the wholly
corporeal imagination of beasts, create the first human place and the civilized world. The beasts
create place through their heroic labor and bodily skills.
The bestial bodies, moreover, are transformed alongside the transformation of place. As
the land is brought under cultivation, so too are their bodies cultivated. The wild and dangerous
forests mirror the unbound, robust, feral bodies of the giants. With marriage, their bodies shrink.
I argue that this “education of the bodies”224 is Vico’s way of demonstrating the inextricable
relationship between body and place.

Vico writes that after their feral wandering in the forest is

put to an end by the fearful thunderclaps of Jove, their marriages keep them in place. “While
after they began to remain in one place with their woman, first in caves, then in huts near
perennial springs and in fields which, brought under cultivation, gave them sustenance...they
should shrink to the present stature of mankind.”225 As we follow his etymologicon from the
forests, caves, and huts, to the academies we watch the gross beast’s corporeal bodies shrink
alongside their shrinking imaginations until they become the reflective, refined creatures we are
today. Ideas, bodies, language, and institutions all accelerate at the same rate.

2.2 Place over Time
Vico’s philosophy of place is treated as subordinate to his cyclical theory of time. Indeed, he is
most well-known for his cyclical theory of time; typically, when Vico appears in any history of
philosophy, he is noted primarily for his cyclical theory of history.226 Verene clarifies, “Vico is
ordinarily thought of as a philosopher of time. His philosophy is traditionally interpreted as a
223
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philosophy of history. In such an interpretation his thought is identified with his conception of
corsi and ricorsi, with a theory of cycles of history. My contention is that Vico is above all a
philosopher of place not time.”227 In line with Verene, I will attempt to demonstrate that Vico is
primarily a philosopher of place over time. Above, I identified two major customary attitudes
dominating the western intellectual tradition, namely, its penchant for death over birth and for
abstract discourse over narrative discourse. Now, I will identify a third habitual, unquestioned
belief: a penchant for time over place. Place is eclipsed by time; this tendency is not peculiar to
Viconian scholarship alone - it plagues modern philosophy in general.
Casey affirms our era’s preoccupation with time at the expense of place. Moderns are
primarily occupied with the problematics of time. He observes, “In modern and postmodern
times we are so inured to the putative primacy of time that we rarely question the tempocentrist
dogma that time is the first of all things.”228 When scholars approach the New Science they carry
with them their fealty to this kind of thinking dominant in the Academies. If they are to read
Vico on his terms, they must, like Vico swear no fealty to any dogma or doctrine. Vico’s theory
of time is focused upon by the modern reader because she is conditioned by the dogma of her era
and so, imposes it upon Vico’s narration.
In fact, Vico anticipates our modern age’s detachment from place. By the time we reach
the third age, the Age of Man, Vico shows that thinking loses its intimate relation to place. Most
importantly, humanity loses its place. The first poets established the first place beneath the sky,
which was the vast the trembling body of Jove. Verene explains, “In the age of men, place
becomes indefinite. Place and property is the subject of abstract definitions by governments and
law. The nation becomes more and more a temporal sequence whose movement appears
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historically self-generated rather than charted in terms of movements in the divine sky. Absolute
idealism, which is a philosophy of time, reflects on human institutions from this third perspective
and fails to understand their origin in the primitive sense of place.”229 The law that was once a
gathering beneath an oak tree, becomes a no place. Hercules once burned a clearing for the
primordial altars, where humanity gathered together and interpreted the sky god’s commands;
with the onset of abstract law and language, humanity loses its primordial relation to the earth
and sky. Abstractions take the place of acorns.
Vico describes the first places of humanity; we must “get back into place”230 if we are to
understand their manner of dwelling. Verene affirms, “Human society and human thought begin
in a sense of place and our understanding of them ultimately requires a type of thought that is
itself based on a sense of place.”231 Verene argues the narrative of the New Science takes the
form of a recollective fantasia as a way to get back into place or, in other words, to think as the
first poets thought. In chapter two, we will discuss why his theory of recollective fantasia is too
refined a concept to help us interpret the primordial places.
Although Verene draws our attention to the primacy of place in Vico’s narration, Edward
Casey’s work on place offers a better way to think through place in the manner of the first poets.
Vico’s poets created the first place through a metaphorical event. This process of creation hinges
upon Vico’s principle of creativity, namely, that the first poets fashioned the world through
ignorance: they made the unfamiliar known through the familiar. Through corporeal expressions
they make the world familiar. Place is something familiar to us. “A place is my familiaris
(literally, a familiar spirit.)”232 The first poets, in order to make the first place, made the earth
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and the mountain tops familiar. They turn their unknown, mute, no-place, into the body of Jove
by poetically transforming it into something familiar, namely, their own bodies. This
transformational event captures the way in which we arrive at place through our bodies. Casey
explains, for Merleau-Ponty, “the places we inhabit are known by the bodies we live. Moreover,
we cannot be emplaced without being embodied. Conversely, to be embodied is to be capable of
implacement.”233 Every nation had their Jove, because at the birth of every place we find a body.
The ideal eternal story begins with place. The forest is the primordial dwelling place of
nascent humanity and each successive place, from the forests, to the huts, villages, cities, and
ultimately the academies reveal different ways of dwelling on earth, beneath the sky. 234 Jove’s
robust, palpitating, thundering body, the sky itself, is the first topos or place wherein thought
begins. Although the academy is a dwelling place that is derivative of the originary clearing in
the forest, it has forgotten its roots there. During the condition of barbaric reflection place
becomes a no-place. Harrison observes, “At the center, one forgets that one is dwelling in the
clearing. The center becomes utopic. The wider the circle of the clearing the more the center is
nowhere and the more the logos becomes reflective, abstract, universalistic, in essence,
ironic.”235 The topos is forgotten, we become once again like the giganti who “wandered
ignorant of...places.”236 This forgetting is also caused by the rise of Descartes’ analytic geometry.
Vico worried that the rise of Descartes’ ratio-mathematical method would further push the
Academies away from place.
Vico’s principle of etymology anticipates the shift from place to space in western
intellectual thought. Edward Casey documents this transition in his monumental work, The Fate
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of Place. He writes, “Where have all the places gone? In the long wake of Aristotle, the answer
has become increasingly evident: submerged in space.”237 If it is a challenge for us today to
reawaken the predominance of place once enjoyed in myth and the ancient world, it will be
equally as difficult to realize it in Vico’s work.238 Vico, moreover, is aware of the rising
dominance of Descartes’ analytic geometry and critical thinking and advocates his own art of
topics (which entails a return to places) in order to counter it.
Vico is the philosopher who plunges us into the “thick night of darkness enveloping
antiquity.”239 I italicize the word thick because I believe that it expresses the voluminosity that
unravels the abstract, conceptual notion of space. Merleau-Ponty writes, “Just as by the thick
and living presence of my body, in one fell swoop I take up my dwelling in space. [My
italics].240” For Merleau-Ponty, “depth is the ‘voluminosity’ of space that not only allows things
to be seen...but allows for things to have an unseen side.”241 Depth is the hidden or absent aspect
of a thing. By returning to the first places, Vico uncovers primordial depth.
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of depth, for instance, exposes the illusory character of
Cartesian space. Its bird’s eye view ignores lived experience, which reveals depth. There is no
experience of depth in the bird’s eye view of Cartesian space. Since the topos forest emerges out
of humanity’s relation to the sky, where the celestial sky touches the treetops and the relationship
to the sky is dissolved as we move towards Cartesian space, we lose emplaced, situated
experience. 242 The experiential basis of reality allows for the birth of new ideas to emerge as
responses to the needs and utilities of the situation. When this response is prevented by
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preordained concepts fixing the ground of lived experience our creative energies are stifled. This
is the sense in which the map takes place the of the landscape.
As Evans explains, Casey gives both phenomenological and ontological priority to place.
In describing its phenomenological priority Evans writes, “even geometrized space, calibrated
time, and numbers refer back tacitly or overtly to the capacities of our body, and through them,
to the place where they too are already situated and oriented.”243 Vico’s etymologies expose the
situated, emplaced, and corporeal origins of concepts, which can never fully be eviscerated from
them. Our primordial places and natal scenes always lie hidden, waiting to be uncovered. In
another sense, we can say that, the primordial forest will always brush the edge of the Academic
kingdom, no matter how far or wide her territory. As Harrison asserts, there is always the edge
where “history meets earth.”244
Vico inhabits this edge between history and the earth. The Academy as Mazzotta showed
us is a threshold and Vico is a liminal figure taking up this threshold. Using Casey’s
terminology, we may describe the Academy as a “limitropic phenomena.”245 The Academies are
both material buildings and thresholds.246 A place, Evans explains, is, “both a ‘substrate’ and a
‘shelter’...as a shelter it offers ‘stability’; as an aegis, it ‘fosters new intentions and creations.’247
Vico takes shelter in the Academies yet uses it as a place to carry out original thought.

2.3 Place and Voice
Now I would like to turn towards one further possibility unexplored by Vico scholars to date. I
would like to emphasize the primary place Vico gives to voice. The first place is, after all,
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created through the shouting voices of the giganti. Vico observes, in the first New Science, “the
Greeks called Jove, the first of the gods, Zeus, from the whistles of thunderbolts, and the Latins
called him Ious, the genitive of the Iovis, from the roar of thunder.”248 The shouts of the
gigantic, responding to the crashing thunder, appear to give primacy to the voice, as though the
first place emerges with the word Papa! This is not a simple onomatopoeic creation since every
nation has its Jove and Jove is said in many ways.
The Anabasis is a descent into the thickness of being and this sort of depth and
voluminosity is integral to Merleau-Ponty’s work on place. In order to thrive, a place needs both
powers.249 Vico’s narrative discourse honors the voice of the giganti and their difference. He is
able to enter into a dialogic exchange with and respond to these original voices.250 Evans
observes, “Although voice and place reciprocally presuppose one another, the discursive
dimension of voices give them priority over places.”251 Vico’s principle of etymology seems to
privilege place, yet it cannot be denied that the formation of the first human place occurs
simultaneously with the vocalic shouting of the giants. As Evans explains, “even with its
constituting role, then, language does not rule absolutely over its corporeal setting, nor does
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voice over place; the two are intertwined from the beginning for us, reciprocally presupposing
one another.”252 There is a reciprocal relationship between voice and place.
We could call the first poets, the group of giganti on the mountainside the first dialogic
body. The giganti create the first poetic character collectively, which accords with Evans
argument that “a voice doesn’t first exist and then respond to others; it is always already
responding to or addressing other voices, always part of an interplay that simultaneously
separates the voices and holds them together thus forming a dialogic body.” 253 The sky is the
body of Jove born of voices shot through with others. The human world is born with their
shouting in communion with the thunder since voice and body have the power to turn the earth
into a human place. As Evans explains, “The voices and their social discourses, in turn, give our
bodies an identity and transform geographical locations into cultural settings: our bodies so to
speak, hold voices to the earth, but the voices simultaneously pull us and our surroundings up
into the more ethereal orbit of their discourse.”254 This transformation could not occur without
an interplay of voices. Vico’s tale does not relate the experience of a lone giant shouting on a
mountaintop; place is born by their gathering and shouting together. This marks an event. Evans
observes, “the Multivoiced body is an event – the interplay of voices – that helps establish the
place in which it occurs.”255 In this light, we can ready the poetic character Jove as an event
expressing the Multivoiced body.
Through the voice we come full circle to the concept of birth and its intimate relation to
the unique begun in the last chapter. Arendt describes the contrast at stake, “the philosophers
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living for death...versus the free vocalizations of the infant are replaced with a grave silence.”256
The passionate cries of sorrow and joy of the infant are revealed in humanity's own infancy.
Vico’s originary narrations call forth the originary voices of the acoustic sphere. He parallels
Cavarero’s observation that, “The poetic voice, a song, lies at the Greek origins of the western
tradition.”257 By recovering the acoustic origin of languages, Vico disrupts the disembodied,
conceptual notion of language.
Vico’s narrative about the originary scenes of humanity’s infancy focuses upon the
acoustic sphere.258 Cavarero observes, “The privileging of the vocalic facilitates the
disorganization of the semantic.”259 By attuning his thought to the vocalic, Vico disrupts the
semantic order of philosophical discourse in the Academies. Additionally, he captures the sense
in which the voice is inherently relational.260 The giants shout in response to the earth and each
other. The scene is entirely oral in character and does not have a trace of the written tradition
upon it. The written tradition and the erudite wisdom of the scholars are dominated by sight.261
We cannot close our ears with the same mastery with which we can close our eyes. The ear is at
all times penetrable. Cavarero emphasizes the point, “The voice vibrates in the air, striking the
ear of the other, even when it does not mean to do so.... The ear is an open canal; it can be
surprised from anywhere at any moment. It is always cocked to a sonorous universe that it does
not control.”262 Vico’s giants are can’t shut out the roaring thunder above them, nor their fellow
giant’s feverish shouts. They can’t simply look away; sound resounds around the earth and
penetrates their bodies uncontrollably.
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Through reawakening our encounter with the oral tradition and the acoustic sphere, Vico
returns the pleasures of this sonorous universe to the arid, abstract written discourse constituting
the Age of Man. Vico’s discovery of the true Homer is the result of his return to primary orality.
“Briefly, the epochal passage from orality to writing, from Homer to Plato, is, above all, a
passage from narrative verse which enchants the hearer by evoking images in the seductive and
irreflexive flux of the tale, to philosophical discourse, which proceeds rather with method to
define its fixed terms.... the work of abstraction is born of the repudiation of the pleasure of
narration.”263
The pleasure that Vico says will fill the body of the reader when she narrates the New
Science to herself evokes the pleasure awakened by the acoustic sphere.264 Cavarero observes,
“destined for the ear of another, the voice implies a listener – or better, a reciprocity of
pleasure.”265 When we narrate the New Science to ourselves we are meant to hear and, once
again, delight in the songs of oral poetry. Vico wants to recover the residue of voice sedimented
beneath conceptual language. Cavarero observes, “As the material of an originary acoustic
pleasure, the voice precedes and makes possible a language that always bears its trace.”266 Vico
re-enchants the reader with the ancient voices of the first poets. By unearthing the languages
born of a primary orality, he draws the pleasurable aspects that accompany narration out and so
disrupts the rational, abstract discourse of the Age of Man.
This return to orality is the return to the infancy of humanity. And no one is more keenly
aware of the primacy of voice than a mother. As she cradles her newborn infant in her arm, she
is privy to the primordial duet that mothers across cultures and ages have performed, “the mom
263

Ibid., 95.
“In doing this the reader will experience in his mortal body a divine pleasure as he contemplates the divine ideas
this world of nations in all the extent of its places, times, and varieties.” NS par. 345.
265
Cavarero, For More than One Voice, 7.
266
Ibid., 138.
264

52

and baby duet.”267 The mother and child sing to each other, responding to the pleasures of voice.
Vico plumbs the depths of this ancient duet in his return to the infancy of man.
In considering the primacy of voice in Vico’s thought, though, we find a tension between
singular narratives and collective narratives. On the one hand, Vico’s recovery of archaic myths
relates a collective narrative. The first dialogic body expressed in the poetic character Jove
expresses the communal dimension of invention. The voice is shot through with other voices at
the moment of creation. On the other hand, Vico addresses a singular reader and requires that
singular existent to narrate the New Science for herself. This is the only instance in which Vico
acknowledges the singular self in the New Science. It is not until he narrates his own personal
life story that we find a story about a singular, unrepeatable existent.
The voice and song are not present in Vico’s Autobiography; they remain tucked away in
the collective tale elaborated in his New Science. But the he, which is portrayed in the
Autobiography, is not the master of his own tale. His life story is told as a fable. By lying about
the date of his birth he shows that his true origins are shrouded in darkness; a darkness that the
New Science tries to shine a light upon. When Vico tells the story of the birth of poetic
metaphysics and its transformation into rational metaphysics he shows how passionate bursts of
emotion and song is reduced to arid, abstract written discourse. He, in fact, tells the strange story
of metaphysics in a way advised by Cavarero. She professes that “the history of metaphysics
should in fact finally be told as the strange history of the devocalization of logos.”268 Cavarero
traces logos back to its etymological root, legein. “From the ancient Greek, the verb means both
‘speaking’ and ‘gathering,’ ‘binding,’ and ‘joining.’”269 We saw above how Vico traced this
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kind of gathering further back into our archaic memories by describing specific corporeal roots:
the gathering of acorns.
This accords with Vico’s notion that the first speech was mute and made up of natural
signs: deeds, physical objects, and gestures. He writes, “Logic comes from logos, whose first and
proper meaning was fabula, fable, carried over into Italian as favella, speech.”270 The first mute
speech in the Divine Age becomes the robust song of the Heroic Age. Finally, speech loses both
its materiality and vocalic dimension in the Age of Man.
But how does the singular voice relate to the collective voice of archaic peoples? Or,
rather, what part does it play in the strange story of the devocalization of logos? Cavarero wants
to preserve the unique aspect of the voice to protect it from being swallowed up in the collective
dimension of voice and thought. She observes, “The voice, which is embodied in the plurality of
voices, always puts forward first of all the who of saying. As a faithful testimony to the
uniqueness of the one who emits it…the voice not only dethrones the “subject” of traditional
metaphysics, but it renders its subject ridiculous.”271 For Cavarero the voice announces a
singular, unique existent. She relates the following Bible story to demonstrate this. When Jacob
tries to trick his father Isaac into believing that he is his brother, Esau, he covers his skin so that
he will not be betrayed if his father reaches for him. When Isaac touches Jacob to confirm his
identity, he is fooled. But Jacob’s voice betrays him. Ultimately, Jacob is able to deceive him
with an olfactory ruse, but what is important for Cavarero’s purpose is that Jacob’s unique voice
exposed who is is.272
Although Cavarero’s notion of voice offers a strong defense against the logocentrism of
traditional metaphysics and its traditional subject, there is a strong sense in which the unique
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voice of the singular existent is always already shot through with other voices. For instance, I
have often been confused over the telephone with my best friend (before cell phones and number
identifications, of course); growing up together, we adapted similar tones and intonations. My
voice is in a sense shot through with hers. This does not deny my uniqueness; only my deep
relatedness to my best friend. And so, we return to the giants on the mountain tops and their
relation to me or you: the singular existent narrating the New Science for ourselves. How deep is
the gulf between the collective stories of shouting giganti and my singular story? How far is the
self from the forest?
Evans can help us resolve the tension between the personal and anonymous dimension of
voices through his concept of elliptical identity. Evans observes, “we are elliptically identical
with our ‘lead voice,’ that is the social discourse upon whose basis we tend to evaluate our
surroundings and direct our actions, whether or not we are fully aware of the existence or logic
of this discourse.”273 The notion of elliptical identity allows us to realize ourselves as singular
existents while respecting our inherent relation to broader social discourses. In terms of Vico’s
narrative art, we find him calling out to the singular existent to modify her lead voice as she is
plunged into the thick night of darkness to engage with the other voices of the giants and heroes.
Vico knows the reader will not be swallowed up by other voices, since she is told to personalize
it and make it her own. Evans honors “the dynamic plurivocity of our existence and the
contestation among the many linguistic strands that constitute voice.”274 The reader of the New
Science is invited to personalize the story, to make it for herself. Vico’s Autobiography revealed
his lead voice: the way he personalized the discoveries of the New Science for himself. The two
texts work elliptically to reveal the way in which our personal voice mingles with the anonymous
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dimension of discourse. As Evans explains, “as voices…we are as much the personal dimension
as the anonymous dimension of the voices we articulate and, elliptically, are.275 Vico’s narrative
art straddles both dimensions of our experience.
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CHAPTER THREE

3.1 Overlooked Images
Vico’s New Science abounds with fragments, etymologies, tropes, stories, and images; they
circulate through his text like blood flowing through the body and flow outside the traditional
frameworks of philosophical discourse. 276 This lack of order and clarity is disturbing to readers
trained in the western metaphysical tradition. In wishing away this disorderly array of fragments
and images, scholars undermine their true purpose in Vico’s philosophical insights. “Vico’s
friends often seem less kind than his enemies. Not content with simply rejecting his claims, they
praise the originality of his insights while denying the lucidity of his thought...the chief
complaint of Vico’s critics focuses on how he orders (or fails to order) his thought.”277 Berlin,
for one, observes that Vico is a, “rich and profound but inexact and obscure thinker.”278 My
study aims to understand the ways in which Vico’s narratives and images have ontological and
philosophical import. Vico’s disorderly and obscure style, in other words, will be shown to
demonstrate the disorderly and obscure emergence of things in the world. His style is intimately
entwined with the meaning of his work. Far from regretting his unfortunate style, I will show
that it expresses his most important truths.
Clear and distinct lines cannot bind the force of his imaginative, robust style. Mazzotta
affirms that, “linear argument violates both the more characteristic serpentine movement of
Vico’s prose as well as his more general principles about the spiral, oblique process necessary to
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reach knowledge.”279 Digression, repetitions and blasts of insight fill the New Science,
scandalizing any sense of rigid, causal order. This, moreover, imitates the language of the heroic
age which he favors. Mazzotta continues, “It conveys Vico’s sense of the complications existing
within the order of causality. The positive link between cause and effect never function by a
linear mechanism in this poetic-philosophical universe.”280 The rushing torrents of Vico’s
thought break idealist boundaries. The moment we enter into Vico’s narrative performance we
realize we are outside the domain of the concept: his text begins with an image. Later we will
explore his image, or dipintura, in depth.
We encounter in Vico’s work the trait that Vico admires in Homer. Vico writes of
Homer, “For delicacy is a small virtue and greatness naturally disdains small things. Indeed, as a
great rushing torrent cannot fail to carry turbid waters and roll stones and trunks along in the
violence of its course, so his very greatness accounts for the low expressions we so often find in
Homer.”281 Vico describes the poetic language of the divine and heroic ages as rushing waters
keeping the Age of Man sweet. Poetic speech moves, “much as great and rapid waters continue
far into the sea, keeping sweet the waters borne on by the force of their flow.”282 The metaphor
of the rushing waters of imagination is applied to Homer. By reading Homer in the light of the
New Science Vico attempts to keep our arid, abstract thinking sweet. We may say with James
Joyce that our imaginations grow every time we read Vico.283 Vico’s style is meant to expand
our heroic minds, as his style mimics that of the storytellers and bards recovered in the Heroic
Age.
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Contemporary scholars are guilty of the same conceits that Vico identified in his axiom
of the conceit of scholars. They impose their own theoretical framework onto Vico’s thought.
This, as we have seen, is a natural tendency of the human mind to understand. We naturally
understand what is unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. Recall that, “whenever men can form no
idea of distant and unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and at hand.”284 This
tendency accounts for the birth of language as well as the error of scholars. Vico explains, “This
axiom points to the inexhaustible source of all errors about the principle of humanity that have
been adopted by entire nations and scholars.”285 Above, I showed that Vico’s method entails
bracketing off of the scholarly attitude. By setting aside the conceit of scholars and nations, Vico
is able to descend towards our nascent beginnings and return with the revivifying bounty
discovered there.
It is the conceit of scholars and nations that have kept this bounty hidden today. My aim
in this chapter is to discover what errors have kept Vico’s work hidden. To begin with, I point to
an overlooked image in Viconian scholarship. Most readers today use the third 1744 edition of
the New Science. The most famous publication is the Bergin and Fisch translation. It omits an
image that accompanies the original text. This apparently insignificant omission points to the
tendency of scholars to overlook the importance of Vico’s images – in this case, they simply
omit it altogether.
The original 1744 editions include a smaller dipintura as well as a larger dipintura,
which appears in the Bergin and Fisch translation and that serves as Vico’s introduction to the
work. We will discuss the meaning of the larger dipintura in chapter three. Now, we will
analyze the forgotten dipinutra, which only appeared in original editions of the work. The
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second, more popular dipintura, is explicitly meant to serve as an introduction to the work and
Vico’s introduction is a commentary on the engraving. On the contrary, there is no commentary
to support the smaller image, except for the one enigmatic inscription on the plinth. The image
shows a woman with winged temples resting upon a globe, holding a triangle and looking in a
mirror. We read the Latin phrase, IGNOTA LATEBAT, on the plinth that she lays her elbow on.
The inscription is our only written clue as to the meaning of the image.286
Verene translates the phrase as, “She, unknown, was lying hidden.”287 We know from
Vico’s commentary of the second dipintura that the woman in the figure is meant to represent
lady metaphysics. In the second paragraph of the New Science Vico explains, “The lady with the
winged temples who surmounts the celestial globe or world of nations is lady metaphysics.”288
Given that the smaller impresa pictures the same woman with the wing-temple crown, we can
infer that it too represents the figure of lady metaphysics. It is she who is lying buried and
unknown. Verene observes, “The sense of metaphysics that Vico wishes to endorse or bring to
light in his work is that of something that has been there in the background of human thought all
along but has not been found or discovered...no one has concealed it from us except
ourselves.”289 This theme of concealment and unconcealment of course resonates with
Heidegger’s notion of truth, which we will explore in our section on Grassi. Just as this impresa
has been hidden from the majority of Viconian scholars, so too has his lady, poetic metaphysics.
The reason for the occlusion of the impresa illuminates the scholarly prejudices at work
in reading Vico. During the Renaissance and modern era, emblematic meanings were a source
of fascination; the interest in finding meaning in emblematic devices diminished with time.
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Frankel observes that the dipintura and its explanation “strike the modern reader as bizarre and
have therefore been neglected by scholars.”290 It is only recently, for instance, that the larger
dipintura that is actually published in the popular Bergin and Fisch translation has garnered any
interest. In fact, an abridged version of the text actually eliminated this dipintura and the
commentary upon it all together. Verene observes, “Such an editorial decision was quite in
accord with the usual philosophical approach to work to the work, which focuses on its
conceptual and systematic parts, regarding its employment of images as inessential
embellishments, and holding the true beginnings of the work to be Vico’s presentation of his
axioms.291 Given that we are discussing the work of a thinker who establishes a doctrine of
beginnings as his motivating principle, this is an absolute travesty. The scholars do not follow
his doctrine; by ignoring the image, they do not begin at the beginning. The conceptual biases
inherent in philosophical discourse have actually contributed to the sheer elimination of the
beginning of Vico’s text. Since the beginning that is an image, philosophers who are dominated
by the concept fail to even consider it as part of the text. They familiarize the text by imposing a
conceptual framework that does not include images in its line of sight. To wipe out the true
beginning of things directly challenges Vico’s most important doctrine.
The handling of Vico’s primary images is emblematic of the way in which scholars
handle Vico’s the imagistic thinking throughout the New Science. They appear right before their
eyes and still, they lay hidden. Scholars like Frankel and Verene who attempt to understand the
philosophical function of the images at the beginning of the New Science are the exceptions.
Frankel, in fact, links the three ages in the New Science: the age of the gods, heroes and man,
with the image and the way it precedes the written text. She observes:
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Three kinds of languages were spoken which compose the vocabulary of this
science: (1) That of the time of the families when gentile men were newly
received into humanity. This, we shall find, was a mute language of signs and
physical objects having natural relations to the ideas they wished to express. (2)
That spoken by means of heroic emblems, or similitudes, comparisons, images,
metaphors and natural descriptions, which make up the great body of the heroic
language which was spoken at the time the heroes reigned. (3) Human language
using words agreed upon by the people, a language of which they are absolute
lords...a language whereby the people fix the meaning of the laws which the
nobles as well as the plebs are bound.292

The first language is mute, the second is a mixture of articulate and mute (as the heroes burst into
song), and the last language is almost entirely articulate. Frankel lines up the second dipintura
with the ages constituted by a mute language and compares the commentary upon the image to
the articulate language in the age of men; thereby, the three stages of language are compressed
into the dipintura and its commentary, which, taken together, make up the introduction. Thus,
the introduction is both the image and the written text. Frankel explains, “The image and Vico’s
words describing it make it seem likely that Vico intended to give his Introduction a structure
that would graphically reproduce in itself the origins and development of mankind through its
three ages.”293 We can apply her reasoning to the first and less known dipintura. Although it
does not entail a commentary upon it, which would represent human language, the inscription on
the plinth is enough to indicate the third age constituted by articulate, written language. So, there
to, the three ages are represented, making it a total expression of Vico’s ideal eternal story which
traces the birth and death of these languages.
Vico’s commentary about the introduction has itself causes consternation. Pompa
charges it with a lack of clarity. Pompa complains, at the outset of his monumental study on
Vico, “the introduction takes the form of some comments upon an allegorical picture which
constitutes the frontispiece. These comments are so condensed that is to be doubted that it can
292
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ever have succeeded, as was evidently intended, in giving a clear idea of the contents of the work
to the reader.”294 The penchant for clarity, defining idealist philosophy, one again, obscures the
import of introduction. Vico, in fact, praises the beauty of the condensed heroic expressions. He
writes, “that languages are more beautiful in proportion as they are richer in these condensed
heroic expressions; that they are more beautiful because they are more expressive; and that
because they are more expressive they are truer.”295 The dipintura is one such condensed
expression; the commentary is meant to aid our engagement with the image, since it is, first and
foremost, the image that expresses the meaning of the work.
Scholars also neglect the materials section, which follows the introduction. Mali
observes, “Concerned as they were with the theories, they have rarely, if ever, concentrated on
the original raw matter from which Vico carved these theories - the archaic mythological
texture.”296 Mali casts this scholarly neglect in terms of Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum,
“the medium if the message.” Vico weaves together the raw materials into a narrative - perhaps,
Mali’s own metaphor of ‘carving’ theories from the stories is also tainted with the tendency
towards abstraction and reflection. Vico does not set the materials into the framework of a
theory, but into the pattern of a story, they confirm Vico’s claim that it is nearly impossible for
minds trained in abstract philosophical discourse to access the imagistic thinking of the first
poets. Vico says that it is “beyond our powers to enter into the vast imaginations of those first
men, whose minds were not in the least abstract, refined, or spiritualized, because they were
entirely immersed in the senses, buffeted by passions, buried in the body.”297 Although it is
nearly impossible to do, Vico makes the heroic attempt to imagine how the first poets thought by
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employing their mute, imagistic language. He offers the dipintura as a way to reawaken this
archaic way of expression. Although he lays it before the scholars to see, it remains hidden since
they are too refined by their abstract philosophical discourse see it, and, in the case above, it is
physically eliminated from the text.
Pompa, we have seen, begins his study on Vico’s New Science by dismissing the
beginning of Vico’s text. Although Vico’s imaginative insights are praised, they are largely
dismissed as well. Berlin, for instance, acknowledges the value of the child’s world, which Vico
recovers. He writes, “The language of so called primitives is not an imperfect rendering of what
later generations will express more accurately: it embodies its own unique vision of the world,
which can be grasped, but not translated totally into the language of another culture.”298 Berlin
understands that Vico rejects the notion that any one language can adequately express reality, yet
Berlin privileges the language of abstract theoretical thinking at the expense of corporeal
imaginations of the first poets. Luft observes, “Berlin never appreciates the corporeal nature of
poetic making; for him there is always a ‘perpetual activity of mind.’”299 Berlin imposes his own
concept of mind and subjectivity onto the imaginations the first poets.
Let’s consider how Berlin misconstrues the poetic images of the first thinkers. According
to Berlin they are made through a kind of inner knowing. He asserts that the Vichian subject
turns away from the natural world, which is not of his own making, and towards the objects of
his own making in order to attain knowledge. The subject can have an inner knowledge about
his own creations, whereas, he is precluded from an inner knowledge about nature since it is not
of his own making. Thus, there is a great divorce between nature and artifice, between the
constructed and the given. Berlin notes, “men had only an outside view, as it were, of what went
298
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on the stage of nature. Men could only know ‘from the inside’ only what they had made
themselves and nothing else.”300 This reading hinges upon Vico’s use of the scholastic verumfactum principle. Below I will argue that this reading, which pits nature against the artificial
constructions of humanity is false. Merleau-Ponty’s gestural theory of expression for instance
will show us the ambiguous relationship between the natural and conventional in Vico’s theory
of linguistic creativity.
Here, I wish only to show the way in which this notion of maker’s knowledge
propounded here is falsely applied to the subject. Luft explains, “Berlin’s idealism is explicit in
his claims that Vico makes an absolute distinction between inner and outer life, that Vico’s great
achievement is to add a new form of knowledge to traditional forms - that of self-knowledge, an
understanding of the inner life from the inside.”301 Just as we have an insider’s view of the
things we make, Berlin argues, so to do we have an insider’s view of ourselves. Berlin observes,
“with regard to ourselves we were privileged observers with an inside view...We possess selfawareness.”302 Here the subject is reduced to a pure knowing mind. Berlin takes up the idealist
position that we have direct access to a translucent, self-mastering Subject. Luft writes that
Berlin, “understands the certum so completely as the product of subjective activity that its
materiality and temporality - the ‘raw concreteness of the facare’ - are lost.”303 Just as the
dipintura was eliminated from the text, the vibrating, shaking, grumbling bodies of the giants at
the scene of their first creation are stripped away. Berlin turns Vico’s verum-factum principle
into a making and knowing reduced to the realm of pure thought. Later, I will show that Vico’s
subject is entirely different than the idealistic subject that Berlin attributes to Vico. Vico never
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imagines that we have a privileged clear and transparent access to ourselves. Berlin’s idealistic
notion of subjectivity, which he projects upon Vico’s bestioni, prevents him from recognizing
the original, corporeal expressions of the first poetic making. Their making is, in fact, born
through our inability to see ourselves clearly. As Palmer affirms, “the making of human
institutions is born of our inability to have clear and distinct ideas of ourselves.”304 Man, recall,
fashions his world by not knowing.
Berlin’s reading of the verum-factum principle, which treats the made as intimately
related to the inner life of the mind, strips the ‘made’ of its material, earthly residue. Just as
scholars overlook the material section of the New Science, so too is the material dimension of
originary poesis or making ignored. Berlin asks, “How can early men, whose signs were mute,
who spoke with their bodies, who sang before they spoke, be judged by the criteria of our own
sophisticated culture?305 Surely, Berlin is too steeped in the sophisticated culture of the
Academies to see Vico’s answer: we must bracket out our judgments and re-narrate the first
narrations to ourselves. He simply writes, “These men literally saw what we do not see.”306 Our
aim is to see what the first poets saw; therefore, we must leave Berlin’s idealist impositions.
Vico’s New Science initiates the reader into a new way of seeing; this initiation is announced by
the image that is the introduction.

3.2

Verene Honors the Image

Verene, unlike Berlin, attempts to throw off the shackles of the idealist tradition in order to offer
a more genuine interpretation of Vico. He faithfully attempts to follow Vico’s logic of descent
towards beginnings. Verene was the first thinker to direct our attention to Vico’s self304
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proclaimed master key. He observes, “It is rare that an author gives us such a direct statement of
the central premises of his thought and surprising that he provides such clear guidance for its
interpretation.’307 It is astonishing that scholars have ignored Vico’s explicit directions. Verene
continues, “More surprising is the fact that none of the commentators who have written book
length studies of Vico’s thought has made the imaginative universal the basis of their
interpretation.”308 Let us look at the key passage to which Verene refers to here and which
provides the basis of his work on Vico.

We find that the principle origins both of languages and letters lies in the fact
that the first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of nature, were poets
who spoke in poetic characters. This discovery, which is the master key of this
Science, has cost us the persistent research of almost all our literary life, because
with our civilized natures we [moderns] cannot at all imagine and can
understand only by great toil the poetic nature of the first men. 309

To be fair to the scholars who overlooked this master key, Vico warns that it takes great toil and
effort to grasp the poetic speech of the first peoples who were all poets. Vico admits that its
discovery consumed his scholarly life. He seems to be warning the reader that it too will take
him great effort to realize this discovery; and, as the history of scholarship shows, it lay hidden
until Verene saw it clearly. Verene emphasizes the imaginative universals, poetic characters or
imaginative genera that make up Vico’s poetic wisdom.310 Vico’s poetic wisdom contrasts with
the erudite wisdom of the scholars in the last age. He observes, “Vico’s theory of poetic wisdom
is the basis for the New Science. The bulk of the work itself is taken up by it; his discovery of
the true Homer is offered in evidence of it; and the chapters on the course and recourse of nations
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are developments from it.”311 The second book of the New Science is titled Poetic Wisdom and
it is to this portion of his text that most scholars turn. Verene explains that poetic wisdom,
“designates the entire manner of thought and acting through which the human world originally
comes into being.”312 Wisdom according to Vico begins with the Muse and divination.313 It is
born out of the fear of the gods, the thundering, roaring voice of Zeus and the interpretation of
his signs, which infuse the earth with divinity, not with the learned reflection of philosophers.314
The intelligible universals of the philosophers in the Age of Men are derivative of the imaginative
universals which make up the poetic wisdom of the gods and heroes. Verene explains, “The
intelligible universal or generic concept of this third age is that of the traditional Aristotelian
logic.”315 The logic of the philosophers is inconceivable without the logic of the poets: we must
be children before we become adults. We will see this natural order of things traced out in his
pedagogical theories.
Verene makes a major contribution to Viconian scholarship by highlighting Vico’s poetic
wisdom and poetic characters. Pompa and Berlin, for instance, pay little attention to Vico’s
master key which is at the core of his poetic wisdom.316 Verene suggests that there is one
overarching reason for the failure of scholars to draw out the philosophical implications of
Vico’s poetic characters; he intones, “Since the imaginative universal is ultimately a theory of
the image and not of the concept in any traditional sense, it causes great difficulties for standard
philosophical interpretation.”317 Verene takes on the difficult task of making Vico’s theory of
the image known in a tradition hostile to it. In so doing, he takes us beyond Berlin’s idealistic
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reading. Luft notes, “Verene transcends Berlin’s more overt idealism by replacing imaginative
activity to the bodily responses of the first men, to the point that ‘mentality’ is on the border
between animals and humans.’”318 This draws us closer to the wholly corporeal imaginations yet
still retains the mind-body dualism, plaguing idealist thought. Unlike Berlin, Verene, moreover,
“grasps the significance of Vico’s insight that language enables the bestioni to cross that
border.”319 Verene aptly captures the birth of poetic characters and their ontological depth.
Despite Verene’s heroic efforts to salvage the imagistic ground of Vico’s poetic science,
his work has some shortcomings. Verene creates his own term to describe Vico’s activity of
narrating the New Science. He calls the backward glance of Vico, the historian, recollective
fantasia. The language of recollective fantasia is, he explains, the “power to speak” about the
originary fantasia, which gave birth to human reality. It is the language reflective philosophers
can use to access the original powers of fantasia.320 The addition of this category of imagination
is problematic. Ultimately, the truth arrived at through the philosopher-historian’s recollective
fantasia or form of making takes precedence over the original fantasia of the first poets, Vico’s
primary concern. Luft observes, “For him, as for Berlin, the made convertible with the true is not
the original ontological factum, but a ‘truth’ remade by philosopher-historians.”321 Although he
captures the kind of making that generates the poetic characters, he does not see the truth of the
first narratives until what is originally made is re-made by the reflective thinking of the erudite
philosopher. This is where I believe that Cavarero’s notion of the storyteller and her
relationship to the narratable self will help us to understand Vico’s role, without dishonoring the
originary stories and events.
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I follow Luft’s notion that the imposition of reflective fantasia rarefies the original,
unfamiliar words and subjects them, once again, to the familiarizing lens of refined, reflective
thinking. Verene falls into the trap, which Vico warns of. He demonstrates the principle
rehearsed above, namely that, “whenever men can form no idea of distant and unknown things,
they judge them by what is familiar and at hand.”322 So, despite his heroic attempt to realize
Vico’s descent into our murky beginnings, Vico’s first poets are no longer the strangers they are
meant to be. By emphasizing the reflective recollection of the philosopher’s backward gaze and
locating the truth of Vico’s poetic science there, Verene betrays Vico’s doctrine of beginnings. In
other words, he takes the descent with Vico, but forgets to leave behind his own unquestioned
idealism. Overall, we can say with Luft that, “Verene’s inability to capture what is truly alien in
Vico’s philosophy, to escape the influence of German idealism, reveals the dilemma of Vico
scholarship in general.”323 In order to preserve the strangeness of Vico’s beginnings, we must
look beyond Verene’s analysis.
Verene was influenced by the work of Ernesto Grassi, to whom I now turn. Luft shows
that, “Grassi, whom Verene credits with pointing him toward the concreteness of rhetorical
language, is more successful in achieving concreteness.”324 Grassi draws us closer to the
ontological dimension of language elaborated by Vico and other thinkers of the Italian Humanist
Renaissance. Like Karl-Otto Apel, Grassi describes Vico as the owl of Minerva. Both Verene
and Grassi unearth the ontological function of metaphor, which grounds his poetic logic.
Through taking up Heidegger though, Grassi develops a richer reading than Verene. Luft notes,
“Though Verene draws on Grassi’s interpretation of language, Grassi himself rethought
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rhetorical speech in terms of Heidegger’s more radical conception of language as showing.”325
He argues that Vico used the tropes of the rhetorical tradition but fashioned them anew by
granting them ontological status.
Let us examine the way in which Grassi reveals the ontological dimension of the most
important trope in Vico’s corpus. Vico observes, “All the tropes are corollaries of this poetic
logic. The most luminous and therefore the most necessary and frequent is metaphor.”326 But
Vico does not treat metaphor in the New Science as a mere rhetorical device. He observes, “this
metaphor is certainly not the metaphor that is intended as a rhetorical figure, the mere
transposition of meaning from one thing to another...metaphor is nothing other than the modality
through which what is ‘originary’ is revealed to us.”327 Metaphor gives birth to reality. It is an
event of originary poesis. Vico, moreover, writes that metaphor, “gives sense and passion to
insensate things,” granting them, “the being of animate substances.”328 Furthermore, as we have
seen Vico calls metaphor a “fable in brief.”329 The metaphorical event that gives birth to the first
human place, the giants and their dialogue with the sky, allows for the possibility of the
emergence of rational logic. The powers of invention are rooted in our archaic logic; rational
logic is to a certain degree incapable of invention.330 Grassi writes, “Its essence is such that it
can possess no ‘inventive character.”331
Grassi shows that rational demonstration is, moreover, divorced from the concrete. He
writes of rational demonstration, “It shows something (deiknumi: I show) upon (apo) the basis of
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reasons. It cannot be bound to time, places, or personalities; it is unrhetorical.”332 The kind of
showing that metaphor exhibits is entirely different. “Archaic logic is fecund; it involves a
creative showing through the original poieses of founding metaphor.”333 We can witness this
kind of creative showing with the birth of the first poetic character Jove. Verene affirms that
through, “the image, which is the metaphor understood on this level, the primary act of
intelligibility takes place.”334 Here Verene reveals that this act of metaphoric creativity is an
expression of the verum-factum principle.

3.3 A Look at Luft
Verene directed us towards the master key yet did not grasp the radical implications of Vico’s
discovery. Luft explains strange and radical import of Vico’s master key. Luft captures the
sense in which Vico’s master key makes us strangers to ourselves. She observes:
Vico’s master key frees him from the conceits of Platonists, Cartesians, and
philosophes, most of whom believe that humans are by nature not only rational
but dualistic beings, possessing both a body and a subjective substance,
whether soul, spirit, ego, consciousness, or mind. It had taken him 20 years to
understand that the first men were not merely primitive thinkers, as are savages
or children, but were not human at all. Beasts with wholly physical bodies,
they were incapable of thought. What made them poets, that is, creators, were
the skills of their bodies - perception, memory and imagination (ingenium) from which originated their concrete metaphoric language. 335

Idealists interpreters have not understood how distant and unfamiliar the first poets truly were.
They read into them their own dualistic metaphysics, which separates the mind and body. They
cannot apprehend the entirely corporeal thinking of these first peoples. Luft continues, “The
first peoples of the human race, Vico shows by his fresh interpretation of myths and poems, were
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little more than beasts living a promiscuous, feral existence in the open fields.”336 Everywhere,
idealist interpreters read Vico’s concept of mind from their own intellectualist biases. Yet mind
for Vico in the early ages had no trace of refinement or purity. “Though Vico continually refers
to ‘mind,’ what makes abstract thought possible is the concrete social practices enabled by poetic
language.”337 The bodily actions of the poets give birth to the fantasia of mind as detached from
the body. Luft calls the imaginative universals, ‘concrete metaphors,’ to emphasize the corporeal
nature of the fables338 Luft observes, “Even in the third age, when humans become subjective
beings, subjectivity can never be other than a factum of the abstract language and practices
constructed at the end of the heroic age.”339 The men of the third age then are creators as well.
They create the conceptual construct, Man, yet they forget that Man is a poetic creation. The
subjectivity, which the idealists presuppose in their interpretations of Vico, is nothing but a
poetic creation.
We must be clear on the important distinction between metaphor as a mere rhetorical
trope and the originary concrete metaphors, created in the age of the gods and heroes. As a
professor of Rhetoric, Vico was immersed in the classical tradition of Rhetoric but he reinvented
this tradition. Of fundamental importance is the inordinate attention he placed on elocution. As
one of the five heads of traditional rhetoric which includes, invention, disposition, elocution,
pronunciation, and memory, Vico’s emphasis upon elocution is unusual since it was typically
treated as a mere ornament. Over half of his text on Rhetoric, the Institutes is devoted to
elocution.340 In fact, Vico identifies rhetoric with expression. Guiliani observes, “He bases this
on the fundamental idea that the study of expressive means cannot be dissociated from mental
336
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procedures. Linguistic communication is also mental communication.”341 Thought cannot be
tethered from expression.
Likewise, metaphors are not mere ornamental figures of speech as traditional rhetoric
treats it. Just as Vico gave primacy to expression in his rhetoric, he gave primacy to the trope of
metaphor and confers upon it not only cognitive value, but ontological depth. The originary
metaphors are born of poverty of speech, need and utility. Vico observes that poetic language
which is grounded upon metaphor, “was born entirely of poverty of language and need of
expression.”342 They are not born of the refined artistry of reflective, individual thinkers. As De
Mauro observes, “metaphorical expressions, traditionally viewed as an extrinsic ornament, as
rhetorical luxury. Actually did originate and now do originate from the exigence of adhering,
with limited resources, to the complexities of reality.”343 The metaphors are created in response
to the needs and demands of the present situation. As our environment changes, so too will the
demand for new metaphors.
To clearly see the difference between a concrete metaphor and a mere rhetorical
metaphor, we should examine the difference between the tradition use of the topics, or
commonplace and what Vico calls the sensory topics. Goetsch summarizes the traditional view
of topics. He observes, “topoi have been referred to in two dominant ways in the commonplace
tradition: either as locale in mental or imaginative space that ‘contains’ arguments or as speechwithin-a-speech that amplifies the subject under consideration.”344 These are the conventional
topics made use of in the Age of Men. Vico, on the other hand, describes originary sensory
topics, “The first founders of humanity applied themselves to a sensory topics, by which they
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brought together those properties or qualities or relations of individuals and species which were,
so to speak, concrete, and from these created their poetic genera.”345 The traditional topics are
something that can be taught in a classroom to aid the student or orators ability to find
arguments, so that she may having something to say on any given topic. The sensory topics are
related to the “primary operations of our mind” which are memory, imagination, and
ingenuity.346 The sensory topics regulate these primordial operations. As Vico observes, “it was
fitting that the infancy of the world should concern itself with the first operation of the mind, for
the world then had need of all inventions for the necessities and utilities of life, all of which had
been provided before the philosophers appear.”347 Here we can see the way in which Vico bends
the traditional notion of the art of topics to an art that gives birth to the human world.
Through the sensory topics, the first poets gave birth to poetic general or concrete
metaphors. In a chapter entitled, “Corollaries concerning Poetic Tropes, Monsters, and
Metamorphoses,” Vico clearly affirms the importance he places on metaphor above all the other
tropes. He observes, “all the first tropes are corollaries of this poetic logic. The most luminous
and therefore the most necessary and frequent is metaphor. It is most praised when it gives sense
and passion to insensate things.”348 Again, he conveys the significance of metaphor, “it is
noteworthy that in all the languages the greater part of the expressions relating to inanimate thins
are formed by metaphor from the human body and its parts and from the human senses and
passions.”349 These tropes are not mere figures of speech; rather, as we might expect from a
thinker who tethers thinking to expression, they give birth to ideas and institutions. The whole
world unfolds itself through the power of metaphor, especially metaphors drawn from the body,
345
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“Thus, head for top or beginning; the brow and shoulders of a hill; the eyes of needles and
potatoes…Heaven or the sea smiles; the wind whistles; the waves murmur; a body groans under
a great way.”350 This process, moreover, is connected to the axiom related above, which Vico
now expresses a bit differently, “man in his ignorance makes himself the rule of the universe, for
in the examples cited, he has made himself an entire world.”351
This illusory notion of subjectivity plagues idealist treatments of Vico’s verum-factum
principle. Luft observes, “As Vico slowly begins to grasp the implications of his master key his insight into the embodied nature of humans and the poetic nature of their making - his
understanding of verum-factum changes.”352 It is primarily the idealist assumptions of a clear,
interior, self-mastering, human subject that prevents adequate interpretations of Vico’s
transformed verum-factum principle. Luft argues, “They miss the sense in which ‘knowing’
becomes an interpretive activity, an immanent making by means of social and linguistic practices
in-the-world.”353 Despite acknowledging the bestial origins of humanity the idealists and even
those who attempt to go beyond idealism, assume a latent human sense of subjectivity in the
beasts. Hence, they commit precisely the crime that Vico warns against: the conceit of scholars.
They read into the beasts their own refined concept of human subjectivity.
We must appreciate the ontological dimension of metaphoric making elaborated by Vico.
Verene comes close to appreciating the intimate relationship between language, body, and
thought but his attempts do not succeed since he retains an idealistic concept of mind. Although
he realizes that the corporeal imaginations are different than the reflection of humans in the Age
of Man, he still attributes thought to their originary powers of invention. His notion of thought is
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too rarefied to have been present in our archaic, poetic origins. His subjectivism prevents him
from fully realizing the embodied nature of thinking.354
Luft, in the spirit of Grassi draws comparisons between Heidegger, Nietzsche, Derrida,
Benjamin and Vico to open up new ways for realizing the ontological depth of Vico’s poetic
language. She notes that despite their differences, “one finds in all an almost inarticulate effort
to capture a shared sense of the existential relation between the poetic word, naming, and the
coming to being of things.”355 By situating Vico with these thinkers in this regard, Luft carves
out a path for us to draw Merleau-Ponty into the conversation. With his unique understanding of
the body as expression, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of expression draws us closes to
the corporeal poetic saying that gives birth to the human world in Vico’s corpus.
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CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Images as Introductions
Vico commissioned Domenica Antonio Vaccaro to create an engraving to place as the
frontispiece of the second edition of the New Science. He tells the reader that the allegorical
engraving is meant to provide her with an idea of the work before reading it, and additionally, to
help her remember it after it is read.356 Vico notes that it is meant “to give the reader some
conception of the work before he reads it, and, with such aid as imagination may afford, call it
back to mind after he has read it.”357 In other words, it has a didactic aim; it should ease the
reader’s entry into the text. The image, moreover, is portrayed as a memory device; this shows
Vico’s debt to the traditional art of memory.358 But the allegorical engraving is more than a mere
memory device as most scholars have maintained. Gianfranco Cantelli observes the image’s
resemblance of the heraldic devices constituting the language of the Heroic Age of Vico’s ideal
eternal story, “It was certainly not by chance that Vico, professor of Rhetoric, after having drawn
out an entire universe of symbols from the fantasy of the first men, came to condense his own
doctrine in an erudite heraldic device and thus retrace the path traversed by his own thought”359
The image condenses his entire pattern of thought into one figure or design.
Moreover, I argue, its relation to the second age demonstrates Vico’s adoration of the
heroic age: Vico wants the reader to reorient her mind according to the poetic logic of the heroes
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and their enchanting word of heraldic devices, medallions, and hieroglyphs. This supports my
claim that Vico’s poetic science is meant to infuse our lives with the passionate, sensorial
thinking of the Heroes, in order to nourish our natural capacity for invention. The heroic
emblem eases the reader into the text because it acquaints her with the imagistic thinking
constituting what she will find in the heroic age, which circulates throughout the text. Above, we
showed that it took Vico many years of practice to read the poets with any delight; his training in
metaphysics prevented that pleasure. Vico knows that it will take readers conditioned by the
barbarism of reflection strenuous effort to read his poetic science. It is unfamiliar and
uncomfortable for readers in the Age of Man to encounter a text grounded in heroic images and
poetic characters. The sophisticated, erudite reader must reacquaint herself with imagistic,
poetic thinking in order to experience the sublime pleasure promised to her.
The engraving is meant to effect this reorientation and redirect the mind to attend to a
different form of thinking, one that uses not a trace of reflection or reason. Cantelli tries to
adduce Vico’s motivations for placing an engraving at the beginning of his text. “It was
probably a lapsus, but it was all the more significant therefore.”360 I do not think this was a mere
slip or afterthought on Vico’s part. By placing the image at the beginning of the text and treating
it as part and parcel of his introduction, Vico shows that the image has a deep, philosophical
relationship to the text.
Beyond any didactic purposes, I maintain that the image reflects the intimate relationship
between narrative and the image.361 On the one hand, the frontispiece mimics the primordial
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images, emblems, and things, which Vico culls from the depths of primordial history in the New
Science. It mirrors the heroic language in the Age of Heroes where the language spoken was
“that spoken by means of heroic emblems, or similitude, comparison, images, metaphors...”362
In accordance with the heroic language, the New Science begins with an image is a metaphor.
The image is the story. Our starting-point, then, is the image. It is our initial encounter with
Vico’s New Science.
Placing an image at the front of the text is a performative display, acting out the imagistic
starting-point of language and logic. The image is not meant as a mere ornament to the rational
principle demonstrated in the text.363 Vico’s poetic science reveals that logic and pathos are not
originally separated; logic is, in fact, derivative of fables. Vico presents an etymology to
demonstrate this point:
“‘Logic’ comes from logos, whose first and proper meaning was fabula, fable,
carried over into Italian as favella, speech. In Greek the fable was also called
mythos, myth, whence comes the Latin mutus, mute. For speech was born in
mute times as mental or sign language, ...whence logos means both word and
idea...Thus the first language in the first mute times of the nations must have
begun with signs, whether gestures or physical objects...”364

The starting-point of the New Science mirrors the starting-point of the human world. The story
begins with an image that birthed nations; these are the physical gestures, archaic mute words,
and things that are the first words and languages.
Adriana Cavarero begins her text, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, with an
image evocative of the child’s realm: the stork. The stork, she writes, “protagonist of a
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folklore...brings babies and narrates them fables.”365 The stork is the bearer of tales; it is a
storyteller. The most prominent figure on Vico’s dipintura is the statue of Homer; the storyteller
of humanity’s infancy.366 Both Cavarero and Vico begin their texts with images of fabled
storytellers. Regrettably, Cavarero does not provide the actual image of the stork, which
accompanies the original story as it originally appeared in Karen Blixon’s text, Out of Africa.
The chapter titles of Cavarero and Vico’s texts mirror each other. Cavarero entitle her
introduction, “A stork for an Introduction.”367 And Vico’s introduction title reads, “Explanation
of the Picture Placed as Frontispiece to Serve As Introduction to the Work.”368
Both the image of the Stork and the Dipintura are meant as introductions to the written
text. I highlight this seemingly trivial similarity because it points to an essential ingredient in the
art of narration. In the ratio-mathematical western metaphysical tradition, images and narrations
contribute little to rational, logical thought. Beginning with images is a bold move, upturning
traditional value hierarchies: Plato’s divided line is upturned.
The image is reminiscent of an archaic, yet ever-present way of knowing. Through
meditating upon an image, we are drawn further away from the dominance of the text and
abstract, reflective philosophical thinking. This meditation subverts the dominance of abstract
philosophical thought. This accords with the theses that Cavarero turns to again and again - the
inessentiality of the text. Her image, moreover, evokes the child’s realm, which is in line with
her emphasis upon birth and natality. The scholar might ask, what can a child’s tale possibley
teach a learned, erudite man? Vico, too, returns to a child’s realm, to the stories born during
humanity’s infancy. Throughout the New Science, he observes that the first poets had qualities
365
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that he found present in the women and children of his day. Women and children retain great
powers of imagination because they have not been entirely educated. Their bodies retain the
unruly mark of the robust giganti, whose bodies had yet to be refined. In other words, woman
and children retain these traits because they are, by and large, untouched by the logic of the
learned. Di Pietro notes, “Vico observed that the women of his time remained more imaginative
in later life than men because they were not educated so thoroughly - and therefore were spared
the detrimental influence of a badly organized school curriculum!”369 Vico, a professed
autodidact, saw himself on the edges of the Academies, like women and children – and better off
for it.
His outsider status accords with the outsider status of woman and children; they were not
welcome in the academic kingdom constituted by philosophical discourse. This accords with
Cavarero’s contention that women are better off for not having been corrupted by the force of
philosophical discourse; they retained their natural ability to share stories. In returning to scenes
of birth, Vico and Cavarero enter a domain that has always delighted women and children,
namely, the realm of narrative and images. Both begin with traces of the child’s world: their
fables and speech, far removed from the discourse of philosophers, in the Age of Men.
Let’s turn to Cavarero’s image of the stork. She tells the story of a man who woke in the
middle of the night to fix a leaking dyke. After he plugged the leak he went to bed. When he
awoke in the morning and went to his window, he found that by running around in the middle of
the night had left the pattern of a stork of the ground. Cavarero describes the true value of the
image of the stork. “Rather than simply being an effective, didactic device, it was a gesture that
grasped a fundamental truth of the fable. Precisely because the design is the story, rather than
just accompanying or illustrating it, the design coincides with is perfectly - in the sense that the
369

Di Pietro, “Humanism in Linguistic Theory,” 349.

82

pattern that every human leaves behind is nothing but their life story.”370 Although the man in
the story is able to see the pattern that he left behind, Cavarero and Arendt demonstrate that we
need an other to grant us the gift of the pattern, or the unifying image that is the story of our life.
The man’s haphazard actions in the middle of the night mirrors the experience of the life
of nations that Vico uncovered from the thick night of darkness. There is a fusion of intention
and accident. Vico demonstrates that humans intend one thing and bring about other,
contradictory consequences. The following famous passage has been mistaken as a fledgling
expression of Hegel’s cunning of reason. Given our discussion of the true nature of providence
above, we can see that his notion of the unpredictability of actions is more in line with
Cavarero’s “mixture of intention and accident” 371 that accompanies any life story. Cavarero
observes, “Life cannot be lived like a story, because the story always comes afterwards, it
results; it is unforeseeable and uncontrollable, just like life.”372 Likewise, the early poets could
not predict the consequences of their actions. It is only after the action has occurred that the
meaning of the events can be divined, or revealed. “The significance of the story lies precisely
in the figural unity of the design, and this simple ‘resulting’ does not follow any projected
plan.”373 The story or image confers the gift of unity. The pattern can only be seen after the
action takes place.
The coins, medals, and medallions uncovered by Vico are the footprints that the early
poets left behind. Vico, like the man viewing the pattern of the stork from his window, is the
narrator who, from the “high impregnable citadel”374 of his desk divines the pattern of the actions
- the ideal eternal story. His story gives meaning to the early poetic expressions of humanity. In
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Karen Blixon’s tale, it was the narrator of the child’s tale who traced the stork on the page for the
child.375 Vico, like the narrator of Blixon’s tale, gives us an image of the ideal eternal story.
The storyteller, observes Cavarero, gives pleasure to the listener of the tale since the tale
responds to his/her desire to hear her own life story. “There is an ethic of the gift in the pleasure
of the narrator. The one who narrates not only entertains and enchants...but gives to the
protagonists of his/her story their own stork.”376 This is precisely the pleasure that Vico
promises to the reader of the New Science. Pleasure will fill her body as she meditates upon his
principles. And by meditation, Vico means narration. This sublime pleasure, I argue, is due to
the fact that Vico’s narration responds to the narratable self’s desire to hear her tale told. I am
projecting Cavarero’s theory of narratable identity on the singular level onto Vico’s narrative of
our collective identity – a move not be permitted by Cavarero.
Let us now turn to Vico’s Autobiography to see how Cavarero’s theory of the narratable
self parallels Vico’s life story. I argue that his work expresses Cavarero’s notion that the story
responds to our desire, and that, moreover, our greatest desire is to hear the story of our own
birth.

4.2 Birth and Fabulous Lies
In considering life stories, we must not neglect the centrality of desire. Merleau-Ponty affirms
centrality of this desire for our own life stories. He observes:

This desire for a total manifestation animates life as it does literature, and that
beneath the petty motives it is this desire which make the writer want to be read,
which makes man sometimes become a writer, and which in any case makes
man speak and everyone want to account for himself in the eyes of another x -
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which means that everyone thinks of his life and all lives as something that can
in every sense of the word be told as a “story. 377

Beyond the desire to hear our life story from the mouth of the other, what is really desired? In
short, the stork. The narratable self mostly desires the stork, or, in other words, “the unity, in the
form of a story, which the tale confers to identity.”378 Cavarero charges Arendt with neglecting
the category of unity. To show the intimate relationship between unity and the unique, Cavarero
points out they share the same etymological root. Although Vico does not use the word unity to
describe the aim of his narration, he does say that his aim is to place the fragments of our archaic
memories into a uniform form. He writes, “The great fragments of antiquity, hitherto useless to
science because they lay begrimed, broken and scattered, shed great light when cleaned, pieced
together, and restored.”379 Vico is putting the pieces into the unified form or pattern of the ideal
eternal story. I will use Cavarero’s strategy of etymology to show that unity and unique share an
etymological root with uniformity as well. Just as the unity given in the form of the story
responds to our greatest desire, Vico shows that we take a natural delight in uniformity. “The
human mind is naturally impelled to take delight in uniformity.”380 Vico observes that when we
apply this delight in uniformity to fables, we realize that we use common patterns to make sense
of our singular actions.
On the collective level, Vico observes, poets give meaning to the actions of heroes
through the application of concrete metaphors. He writes that our delight in uniformity, “is
confirmed by the custom the vulgar have when creating fables of men famous for this or that,
and placed in these or those circumstances, of making the fable fit the character.”381 The agent’s
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actions are made to accord with the concrete metaphor available. Vico continues, “Thence
springs this important consideration in poetic theory: the true war chief, for example, is the
Godfrey that Torquato Tasso imagines; and all the chiefs who do not conform throughout to
Godfrey are not true chiefs of war.”382 This expression of poetic truth elaborated by Vico
appears to lend itself to a form of postmodernism propounding the notion of the self as an
artificial, social construct. The actor is reduced to the poetic character, which symbolically
constructs her identity. Verene opens the way for such a reading. He observes, “The individual
is what it is because its being is the being of a type. Since the figure of the fable or poetic
character is not formed by abstraction from individuals or particulars already commanding their
own empirical reality, the poetic character is the reality, and physical reality is to shape itself in
terms of it.”383 The story certainly shapes the singular existent. The story confers the gift of
meaning. Storytelling has ontological depth, in that the person realizes himself or herself
through the story. Yet, Cavarero takes pains to show that the form of the story can never
eviscerate the living, breathing existence. She preserves the singular existents unique status by
emphasizing that the desire the always precedes the story.
Although Vico acknowledges the power of symbolic form here, it is not at the expense of
the living, breathing actor or agent of action, the hero who inspires the storyteller. The story
always comes after the action. Rather, Vico shows (in Cavarerean terms) that since the actor
takes such delight in uniformity, he calls for a story, which is the unity of events, to express the
meaning or truth of his life. That the meaning of our lives are expressed through narrations does
not reduce us to textually constituted subjects since it is first and foremost the desire for the tale
that calls for the storyteller’s response (in the form of a tale) in the first place. Cavarero
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bemoans the contemporary obsession with the form of the story. In order to draw scholarly
attention away from the story itself to the desiring self, she risks devaluing the significance of the
story, without which the narratable self would not realize it’s identity. I suspect that she
trenchantly emphasizes the primacy of desire as a rhetorical strategy to fend off those
intellectuals who fetishize the text. In this scenario, the desiring self is the David, so to speak,
and the cadre of intellectuals privileging symbolic discourse over the living, breathing existent is
the Goliath. She is coming to the rescue of the part of storytelling most in need of defense given
the academic climate. We desire the pattern or fable that will render our lives something more
than a mere sequence of events; the story gives our random, haphazard experiences meaning.
“This unity is nothing other than the story narrated by someone from beginnings to end, or at
least, from the beginning until now.”384 The unified story delights the narratable self because it
responds to our greatest desire.
Against postmodernists who revel in the fragmentary, Cavarero affirms that the singular
existent is one and unified at birth, yet this unity is then lost. “Indeed, the first and fundamental
chapter of the life story that our memory tells us is already incomplete. The unity of the self which lies in the miracle of birth...is already irremediably lost in the very moment the same self
begins to commemorate herself. This loss of unity gets turned into the lack that feeds desire.”385
This is why we speak of childhood as a loss - personal memory cannot access it.
“Autobiographical memory always recounts a story that is incomplete from the beginning...and it
is this first chapter of the story that the narratable self stubbornly seeks with all her desire.”386
The loss and lack of unity fuels the narratable self’s desire for narration. The narratable self
longs for the story of her own birth, a story it can never tell. And it knows that to fulfill this
384
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desire it must begin at the beginning, just as Vico’s doctrine of beginnings demands. “But it
wants to begin with birth, because that which sustains it is the desire for unity that only the
narration can offer in tangible form.”387 The singular existent can embark upon new adventures
and carry out different actions, although she can never predict their consequences. But that the
life she lives (however she may live it) can eventually be told in the form of a story is what is
important for Cavarero. Many various stories can emerge about the self, although they are
always only a response to the plural actions of the singular existent. The unity that the tale
confers is always incomplete and open to reconfigurations. Vico, moreover, uses the discourse
of narration over philosophical discourse in the New Science because the story of our birth, even
on the collective level, responds to the narratable self’s desire for unity – a unity which only
narration can confer. But as Vico has also shown, the birth of things is always obscure and
shrouded in fable.
Other theorists, such as Ricoeur and MacIntyre, discuss the relationship between
narrative identity and unity, yet they overlook the centrality of desire, thereby exposing the
narratable self to the danger of being reduced to linguistically constituted, textual subjects.388
Emphasizing the centrality of the actor’s desire is necessary for Cavarero because it prevents the
postmodern tendency to focus on the form of the story over and above the living, breathing
existent who calls for the story in the first place. This motivates her thesis of the “inessentiality
of the text” in regards to the narratable self. 389 As Arendt observes, “the problem of narration is
never configured as a narratological question; it in no way implies a focalized study of the
narrative text that analyzes its style or semiotics.”390 The symbolic forms can never take
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precedence over action, word, and deed. The desiring, exposed, vulnerable fragile existent
comes first; the story is always only a response to their actions. “Emphasizing desire keeps the
text from swallowing up the singular, corporeal existent.”391 This emphasis acts as a fortress
against the realm of philosophical discourse and its penchant for generalizations and
abstractions. Paralleling Vico’s conceit of scholars, Cavarero argues that the philosophers
conceive of the world in their own image. They impose their own lifeless, abstract discourse
onto the body. She writes, echoing Vico, “One could indeed maliciously suspect that the whole
affair about the centrality of the text, which reduces the existence of the living to a status of
extra-textuality, depends on the well-known tendency of intellectuals to represent the world in
their likeness and image.”392 This is but one way of expressing Vico’s conceit of scholars.
Later, I will argue that this emphatics defense against the voracious appetite of the intellectuals,
although effective in preserving the reality of the living existent and relevant in the domain of
scholarship, has prevented Cavarero from drawing together her own hermeneutic interpretations
of the collective story of humanity and its relationship to personal identities in her text, In Spite
of Plato, with her theory of personal identity on the singular level in, Relating Narratives.
Now, I would like to turn to Vico’s Autobiography to apply Cavarero’s concept of the
narratable self to Vico’s own life story. Cavarero observes, “Biography and autobiography are
bound together in a single desire.”393 I would like to briefly describe the circumstances, which
brought about Vico’s Autobiography. He was invited to write his life story for the purpose of
providing young minds with models for exemplary intellectual lives; it was to appear in a
volume alongside the life stories of the most brilliant intellectuals in Italy of his day; the volume
never came to fruition but Vico was able to publish it in a journal. Shortly after the publication
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of the 1731 edition of the New Science, Vico published a continuation of this Autobiography.
Today, his Autobiography is made up of these two parts, which he wrote during the writing of
the first and second editions of the New Science.394 It is outside the scope of this paper to
consider the full breadth of the Autobiography; I will rather focus on a few key elements that I
find accord with Cavarero’s theory of narrative identity. Verene observes, “Vico’s
Autobiography has not been misinterpreted: it has hardly been interpreted at all.”395 Although
information has been gathered about the Autobiography the question of its philosophical import
has rarely been addressed - Cavarero’s work will help us to draw out the philosophical meaning
of his life story. In this way, we honor Vico in a way that scholarship has yet to do.
The Autobiography demonstrates the Cavarerean notion that one cannot tell one’s own
story, especially the story of their own birth and that, moreover, to hear the story of our own
birth is our greatest desire. Let’s see how these ideas are immediately traced out in the first
paragraph of the Autobiography, which is incredibly rich with metaphors and symbolism. Since
it announces the major themes of the entire work, it is worth citing in full:

Giambattista Vico was born in Naples in the year 1670 of upright parents who
left a good name after them. His father was of a cheerful disposition, his mother
of a quite melancholy temper; both contributed to the character of their child.
He was a boy of high spirits and impatient of rest; but at the age of seven he fell
head first from the top of a ladder to the floor below, and remained a good five
hours without motion or consciousness...The surgeon, indeed, observing the
cranium and considering the long period of unconsciousness, predicted that he
would either die of it or grow up an idiot. However by God’s grace neither part
of the prediction came true, but as a result of this mischance he grew up with a
melancholy and irritable temperament such as belonging to men of ingenuity
and depth, who, thanks to the one, are quick as lightning in perception, and
thanks to the other, take no pleasure in verbal cleverness or falsehood.396
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Immediately, the reader is alerted to the anti-Cartesian position of Vico - his fable is a direct
challenge to Descartes’ self-proclaimed ‘fable’ in the Discourse on Method. We immediately
notice that Vico does not use the first person of Descartes’ fable of himself. Fisch observes,
“The very choice of the third person is a reaction from the ubiquitous ‘I’ of the Discourse.”397
We will explore this rhetorical strategy in depth and draw out its philosophical implications
below. The fall, moreover, indicates the anti-Cartesian stance of Vico’s philosophical life. “In
contrast to the Cartesian view of the subject as essentially disembodied mind...and as the firm
certain foundation of all knowledge, Vico drafts a picture of the subject in its full etymological,
anti-Cartesian force as sub-jectum, literally thrown under without a firm foundation, losing
control of oneself, and provisionally without consciousness.”398 Vico announces, by relating the
incidence of the fall, that he is not master of his identity, which is moreover, inextricably bound
up with his body. The period of unconsciousness, moreover, indicates a departure from the
enlightenment attitude that idolizes clarity and light; Vico, rather, descends into the dark, depths
of the pre-reflective attitude.

Next, we learn that the erudite, learned man of science, the

physician, errors in his predictions. “The physician, who is the natural philosopher, misreads the
signs of the sickness according to the mechanical law of cause and effect.”399 These signal
Vico’s departure from the enlightenment framework.
Next, let’s consider the order and arrangement of the first paragraph of Vico’s life story
and relate it to the order of the ideal eternal story in the New Science. Against, the paragraph
itself tends towards the image: it is a condensed expression, like the heraldic devices. Or we
may say that the paragraph is a metaphor in that it is a “fable in brief.” Verene breaks the
paragraph into three parts, which he argues, accords with the three ages of humanity
397
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demonstrated in the New Science. Upon his birth, the child dwells in the natural world in
communion with the sensorial world of unreflective experience. Verene explains, “Vico, like his
first men, ‘the children of the human race,’ is a natural being, full of spontaneity and activity,
running about the world.”400 The fall symbolizes the sequence of birth and rebirth: “after the fall
he is born as a different person.”401 The surgeon represents the frailty of human prediction. He
heroically survives the fall, which indicates his entrance into the Heroic age, where he must
appear before others and act. Before the fall, moreover, his mother’s meloncholia was balanced
by his father’s cheerfulness; after the fall, his mother’s melancholia dominates. He connects
ingenuity with meloncholia. Vico, moreover, contrasts ingenuity with reflection. In the Most
Ancient Wisdom of the Italians he associates imagination with the mother figure as well, calling
imagination, “the eye of mother wit, just as judgment is the eye of intellect.”402 The relation of
ingenuity with the lightning at the end of the first paragraph is clearly a reference to the poetic
character, Jove.
Verene, in sum, lines up the pattern of the first paragraph with the ideal eternal story, “In
the space of the first paragraph of his Autobiography, Vico has brought himself through a whole
course, from his birth to his adult character as a philosopher, ending with his conception of
barbarity and falsity, which applies to the atmosphere he finds himself in.”403 Finally, the child
finds himself a man, exercising his critical powers of man amongst the barbarians of the Modern
Age. Birth and growth mark the divine age; maturity, the heroic age; and, decadence and
dissolution the human age.404
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The pattern of birth, second heroic birth, and inevitable death follows the narrative
pattern of life stories elaborated by Arendt and Cavarero. Narrative springs from the inescapable
fact that we are beings who are born and who will die. The second birth is the identity we
achieve through action and deed. Arendt observes, “With word and deed we insert ourselves
into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and take
upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance....its impulse springs from the
beginning which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by beginning
something new on our own initiative.”405 The spontaneous impulse towards speech and action is
heroic - the hero leaves his private quarters and acts in the world, exposing herself to others.
This second birth marks Vico’s passage into heroism where he goes out into the world
and invites the company of others into his life and lets himself become, “someone about whom a
story can be told.”406 Once we act and speak in the world, we open up the possibility for our
stories to be told. This is the true sense of hero. Arendt writes, “The hero the story discloses
needs no heroic qualities; the word ‘hero’ originally, that is, in Homer, was no more than a name
given each free man…about whom a story could be told.”407 Cavarero follows Arendt’s recovery
of the term hero as “someone about whom a story can be told.” Our second birth is our
becoming someone about whom a story can be told. We must leave our private dwellings in
order to become heroes. This makes the solitude of the Academies and forests even more
pernicious. We cannot become heroes in solitude; we must take the heroic effort to appear
before others.
The ancient belief in the daimon further expresses the necessity of appearing before
others in order to have our life-story told. The daimon was a sort of guardian spirit that
405
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expressed a person’s unique identity and yet could not be seen by him or her; only others can see
the person’s daimon.408 We cannot see, let alone master, ourselves. Merleau-Ponty has
remarkably similar things to say about one’s style. He observes, “it is just as recognizable for
others and just as little visible to him as his silhouette.”409 Our faces and gestures are not
available to our own gaze. Judith Butler clarifies, “this exposure that I am constitutes, as it were,
my singularity. I cannot will it away, for it is a feature of my very corporeality and, in this sense,
of my life. Yet it is not that over which I can have control.”410 From the moment of birth I am
an exposable, vulnerable, fragile self, who takes a risk every time I appear before the other. Yet
I must take the risk of appearing before the other in my fragility in order to become someone
about whom a story can be told.
Cavarero explains, “The who is simply exposed; or better, finds herself always already
exposed to another, and consists in this reciprocal exposition.”411 Pure exposure is the basis of
intersubjective unity, according to Cavarero. Vico’s story of the self and of humanity, relates the
tale of a being who is entirely exposed. As we saw clearly in chapter two, the giganti do not
fashion the world from an inner mind or interior subjectivity. As Cavarero demonstrates, “they
are constituted by a being together [essere insieme], which, within the plural sphere of
appearance, shows their uniqueness and guarantees their reality.”412 Vico’s first poets are
entirely exposed, and lack any intellectualist trace of human subjectivity, a point that idealists
miss, as Luft has shown above. Cavarero explains, “the ontological status of the who - as
exposed, relational altruistic - is totally external.”413 In his Autobiography Vico does not speak
with the voice of a mysterious internal ‘I.’ He speaks through the voice of the other,
408
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demonstrating the relationality of identity. He reveals who he is, by showing the many ways in
which he appears to others, and the chance encounters, conversations, slips, mishaps, that all
contribute to the narrative that is his life story.
Moreover, even his reflective work is composed amidst others. He writes of himself that
he wrote, “in the midst of turmoil and distraction of the household and often in conversation with
friends.”414 Again, he writes, “he had prepared his lecture the evening before, working until five
in the morning in the midst of the conversation of his friends and the cries of his children, as was
his custom, whether reading, writing, or thinking.”415 Vico tells the story of a man in constant
relation with others; even during the solitary pursuits of reading, writing, and thinking, he is
engaged with others. His voice is entirely bound up with others in a dialogic relation. This is
perhaps another way for Vico to buffer himself from the solitude of spirit he found characteristic
of the Academies. His science was born in sociality with others.416 As Cavarero affirms we are
one, unitary, singular, and exposable self at birth. And, as every mother knows, a small crying
voice usually accompanies the infants entrance into the world.
Above, we looked at the way storytelling follows the tripartite structure of birth - rebirth and death. Storytelling springs from another natural tripartite structure as well: the tripartite
structure of beginning, middles, and end; this should also be brought to bear upon Verene’s
tripartite analysis. Vico as we have said is a champion of the second heroic period - wherein the
heroes struggle to invent themselves, somewhere in between the crude barbarism of the bestioni
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and the reflective barbarism of the philosophers. The Heroic Age, I argue, is where we should
situate Arendt and Cavarero’s theory of narrative identity. It stands apart from the discourse of
philosophers and yet is not limited to the mute, physical objects that carved out the first human
world; the age of storytellers, poets, minstrels and bards stands obscurely and ambiguously in
between these two conditions and forms of discourse. Of course this problematizes the notion
that narration has a linear plot structure. We saw that the first, true narrations did not have
beginnings, middles, and ends. But narration remains responsive to concrete, situated lived
experience. Moreover, storytelling responds to desire in a way that the discourse of the third
age, the Age of Man, cannot. Verene’s concept of recollective fantasia is a product his own age,
the Age of Man.
Now that I have uncovered the providential (natural) pattern motivating his life story,
which is made up of a beginning, middle and end, I can consider the next defining feature of the
Autobiography set forth in the first paragraph. This is Vico’s use of the third person. Above, we
noted that it is a reaction to Descartes’ Discourse, yet Verene suggests another possibility.
Verene notes that Vico is influenced by the Arcadian Tradition, exemplified by the poet
Gabriello Chiabrera’s use of the third person in his life story.417 Although Vico may have been
influenced by the style of the poet, the true model that Vico is responding to is Descartes’.
Verene observes, “There are no genuine models that Vico is following except for his explicit
opposition to Descartes.”418 Mazzotta agrees with Verene’s suggestion that Vico is influenced
by the Arcadian tradition, yet Mazzotta shows that Vico uses this technique in order to
demonstrate a philosophical point. Mazzotta observes, “for Vico the narrative technique turns
into a basis for a rigorous epistemological argument: in his handling of it, the point of the third-
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person narrative is that I am forever another.”419 Verene, argues for the unique originality and
unprecedented nature of Vico’s Autobiography. He observes, “I would like to suggest another
possibility for Vico’s original approach to the life story; the use of the third person shows that
one is incapable of telling one’s own life story. One always needs another to tell the story of
their life. Like the man stumbling in the dark before he created the stork, Vico, in his
Autobiography, describes the way in which he haphazardly, and circumstantially agitated the
principles of the New Science in his mind. Vico understood that he could only really see himself
through the eyes of another.
But Cavarero warns that one cannot simply make an other of oneself in order to tell one’s
own story. This strategy denies the need of real other, singular existent whom we must relate
and expose ourselves to in order to be granted the gift of the story. Although this is Vico’s
strategy, his performance indicates that he is aware of the fallibility of this strategy.

His lie

about the date of his birth suggests that he wants the reader to realize that the task of selfnarration is impossible. In order receive the gift of identity through the tale of another, we need
a real living, breathing other to give us that story.
Verene argues that, “As readers of Vico’s text, we must at least entertain the hypothesis
that Vico intends something for the reader by falsifying his birth-date.”420 There are several
possible reasons why Vico may have committed this error, including a mistake by the printer, a
family tradition that Vico followed as a child, or his father changing his birth-date to fit in with
his classmates (as parents even do today). Verene suggest, additionally, that Vico may have been
making a symbolic connection with the number seven. By attaching his life to this symbolism,
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Vico would have been attempting to demonstrate his greatness like other humanists had done in
the past. 421
Whether or not the lie is deliberate, it still reveals the obscurity of beginnings elaborated
by Vico in his New Science. Mazzotta observes that “what is decisive in one’s life - one’s own
birth date - lies beyond any possible determination by oneself. Whether deliberate or not,
moreover, the error shows that there is never sufficient, indubitable knowledge to guarantee the
truth of one’s self representation.”422 Vico’s lie show that no one has full access to the story of
his or her own birth; we are not the masters of our identities. The narratable self is essentially in
need of the other to tell their life story. Cavarero is clear that the story we most desire, the story
of our own birth is impossible to tell on our own. Vico’s lie beautifully illustrates her point –
whether deliberate or not.
The philosophers, tragically, are not concerned with the story of their birth. In the sphere
of philosophical discourse, it is irrelevant. And yet the effects of ignoring the story of our birth,
both singularly and collectively are dangerous. Cavarero rereads the story of Oedipus outside
the Freudian interpretation, which has dominated the myth to date. Above we observed the
tragic fate of philosophical discourse. Although Oedipus is able to define what he is with the
logic of the philosopher, he is unable to say who he is. He is unaware of the story of his own
birth. Vico tries to save us of the philosopher’s tragic fate by giving us the story of who we are
on the collective level in the New Science. The Autobiography teaches us, that we need another
to tell us who we are, to relate the story of our own birth. Both demonstrate the obscurity of all
beginnings. “The nature of everything born or made betrays the crudeness of origin. It is thus
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and not otherwise that we must conceive the origins of poetic wisdom.”423 We have no direct,
immediate access to our birth. The obscurity of beginnings only highlights the obscurity that
obstructs direct access to the self throughout all our lives. The recovery of our beginnings is our
greatest desire. Cavarero’s explains, “Autobiographical memory always recounts a story that is
incomplete from the beginning. It is necessary to go back to the narration told by others, in order
for the story to begin where it really began; and it is this first chapter that the narratable self
stubbornly seeks with all of her desire.”424 Vico, the philosopher on the edge of the Academies,
attempts to begin at the beginning of his life story and errors, but this error points to the truth of
life stories.
Returning to his birth in the Autobiography, moreover, demonstrates aspects of Vico’s
principles of birth elaborated above, this time on the singular level. The principle revealed how
things are born this way and not another. This principle is carried out in the story of Vico’s life
told by himself. Vico’s aim to, “demonstrate that his intellectual life was bound to be ‘such as it
was and not otherwise’ appears in a reformulation as a proof in his New Science.425 Most
importantly, Vico shows that his life was to unfold this way and not another because he was born
of this mother and not another. Philosophers who dwell in the Academies, in the realm of the
universal definitions and philosophical discourse typically ignore the fact that they are born of
this mother and not another; they rarely tether their intellectual life to the stories of their birth.
By returning to life stories, which entails an acknowledgement of the mother, we can replenish
intellectual thought today. As Cavarero observes, “birth, the act by which embodied individuals
are born and actualized, will also restore meaning to everyone, female and male. Humans will
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always come into the world in this way, never otherwise.”426 Our life stories force us to
acknowledge the natal scene, which is shrouded in the atmosphere of the mother. We turn our
gaze towards our emergence from the womb and the figure of the mother becomes visible once
again. Cavarero credits Arendt’s recuperation of the category of birth from the hands of the
philosopher for making this return of the mother possible. Arendt reveals the matricide at the
foundation of the philosophical tradition. Cavarero explains:

In her work, she focuses on the site that the gaze of men has long sought to
avoid for fear of staring death in the face as the yardstick of human existence.
The anxiety is what gave rise to the symbolic event that constitutes the act of
original matricide. It is also the basis of the obsessive desire to endure, to
survive, which leads men to entrust eternal objects of thought with the task of
‘saving’ them from the selfsame death they chose as the locus of meaning when
they decided, not by chance, to call themselves mortals [subject to death, morte].

Vico’s life story not only acknowledges his birth from this mother and not another, thereby
subverting a tradition that ignores the scenes of our birth and so our mothers, but he attributes his
depth and ingenuity to his mother. He says that he received his melancholia from his mother,
and this trait was, moreover, exacerbated after his fall. The mother figure, then, dominates his
narrative, since he credits her with his ingenuity, a faculty most praised by Vico across his
corpus. Melancholia is well-known in the ancient world as the humor of genius and ingenuity.
Verene points to the ancient association between ingenuity and melancholy. Both Aristotle and
Cicero associate melancholia with genius.427
Vico’s identification with his mother may point to unacknowledged aspects of Vico’s
narrative art: its femininity. Cavarero consistently calls the art of narrative a feminine art. Vico
not only makes the mother figure visible, tethering his identity to his corporeal birth from this
mother and not another, but he attributes his greatness to her, honoring the mother, rather than
426
427

Cavarero, In Spite of Plato, 6.
Verene, Vico’s New Science of Autobiography, 170.

100

eviscerating her as the philosophers, dwelling in a realm of eternal concepts, do. Now, we see
more clearly how ludicrous Harrison’s claim that Vico presents humans as ‘always already
dead.’ Vico’s emphasis on the mother and natality, eclipses the traditions focus upon mortality.
That his life must have been thus and not otherwise is intimately related to what Cavarero
calls the accidentality of being, introduced in our introduction. He portrays the accidentality of
being throughout the Autobiography. It is, for instance, by an accident of birth that Vico became
a scholar. He relates that he was, “born for the glory of his native city and therefore of Italy
(since being born there and not in Morocco, he became a scholar)...”428 By emphasizing the
accidentality of his having been born thus and not otherwise Vico attenuates his status as a
singular, unique, finite existent. Narrative returns him to these small “anecdotes of destiny.”429
Vico’s Cavarerean sense of intention and accident is obscured by Hegelian interpretations of
Vico’s concept of providence. In the New Science, Vico establishes a concept of providence that
is mixed intention with accident. In a famous passage he writes:

Men have themselves made this world of nations...but this world has
evidently issued from a mind often diverse, at times quiet contrary, and
always superior to the particular ends that men have proposed
themselves...Men who meant to gratify their bestial lust and abandon
their offspring, founded instead the chastity of marriage from which the
families arose. The fathers meant to exercise without restraint their
paternal power over their serfs, and they subjected them to the civil
power from which the cities arose. The ruling class of nobles meant to
abuse their lordly freedom over the plebeians, and they had to submit to
the laws, which established popular freedom. The free peoples meant
to shake off the yoke of their laws, and they became subject to
monarchs. The monarchs meant to strengthen their positions by
debasing their subjects with all the vices of dissoluteness, and they
disposed them to endure slavery at the hands of stronger nations. The
nation's meant to dissolve themselves, and their remnants fled for
safety to the wilderness, whence, like a phoenix, they rose again.
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Fisch erroneously concludes that this passage expresses the immanent logic of Hegel’s later
concept, ‘the cunning of reason.’430 He writes, “Here as throughout the development of man and
society there was thus an inherent logic transcending the conscious intentions of individual
agents.”431 Piovani rejects the attempt to impose Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’ upon Vico’s notion
of providence here.432 Given our alternative, naturalistic reading of providence, we affirm that
Vico is expressing the way in which the agents of action are unable to tell the story of their lives.
Only the backward glance of the narrator can give the pattern to the mere sequence of
unintended events. In fact, this passage resounds with Arendt’s thesis of the plurality of action.
Arendt observes that the unpredictability of actions is one of its major defining features. She
notes that this unpredictability “arises directly out of the story which, as the result of action,
begins and establishes itself as soon as the fleeting moment of the deed is past.”433 Only the
storyteller can see the meaning of the actions. Arendt continues, “This unpredictability of
outcome is closely related to the revelatory character of action and speech, in which one
discloses one’s self without ever either knowing himself or being able to calculate beforehand
whom he reveals.”434 Vico’s concept of providence expresses Arendt’s notion. According to
Vicol providence is simply the revelation of what is hidden. For instance, this revelation is open
to the storyteller who weaves the unpredictable actions and events into a narration.
The Autobiography abounds with chance happenings. It was only by chance that he
heard a great scholar present a beautiful oration on civil institutions, which provoked his own
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meditations upon the nature of institutions and desire to pursue the study of law.435 Moreover, it
was by mere chance that he was provided the opportunity to try his first case. He relates, “And
for his better acquaintance with legal procedure, chance would have it that a little later a suit
entrusted to Don Geronimo Acquaviva was brought against his father before Sacred Rota.”436
These incidents reveal a contingent, unique, life, in search of the meaning giving fruits of
narration. Like the man running around to fill the dyke, Vico, the actor is not aware of the
design of his life as he lives it. Only the storyteller can confer the unity or design in the form of
the tale.
Vico is the storyteller in the New Science who gives a pattern to what would otherwise be
a meaningless sequence of events. “He invites us to make the new science for ourselves by that
principle that is has, had, and will have to be. He takes the power traditionally attributed to the
Muses to sing of what was, is, and is to come and transforms it into a sequence of necessity or a
knowledge per causas.”437 Although Verene is right to point out the unifying glance conferred
by the narrator, he reduces the primordial song of the Muse to a form of logical making. The
Muse’s song rather is in line with the logic of the oral tradition, which follows the poetic
knowledge and the narrative art which structures events in terms of beginnings, middles, and
ends.
This accidentality of being is precisely what the philosophers try to cover up in their
generalizing, universalizing discourse. When we follow Vico’s methodological principle of the
New Science, the doctrine of beginnings, we are thrown into confrontation with the accidentality
of being. Beginnings force us to recognize the conditions of birth, which always emerge in this
time and not another; in this place, and not another; in this way and not another. Vico’s
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principles of birth both in the New Science and the Autobiography, protect unique, sexed,
singular existents from being swallowed up by the universals of philosophical discourse.
The fables we have been exploring above spring from the desire of the narratable self.
Before there is a story, before there is a text, there is desire. The backward glance of the
storyteller is primarily a response to this desire, an attempt to fulfill this insatiable desire. I
disagree with Verene’s view that the New Science is an autobiography. Vico is the biographer
through and through. The pleasure that the reader experience is due to hearing her own
collective biography narrated to her. The New Science is the gift, unifying the identity of the
reader. Hence, the reader experiences the pleasure that is the unique gift of the storyteller. A life
story does not have an author, but it can have a narrator. And the narrator, “is limited to
comprehending the story that the actor left behind, and putting it into words.”438 Any attempts at
autobiography are absurd since the actor cannot master her own identity.439 Identity is relational
and demands the other.
Cavarero upholds Arendt’s notion that, “life-stories never have an author. Biographies or
autobiographies result from an existence that belongs to the world, in the relational and
contextual form of self-exposure to others. The life story causes a reification of the self, no
matter what symbolic form it takes.440 As essentially narratable selves we are always already
taken up in the process of auto-narration. “There is no narratable self that is not always already
and forever immersed in this autobiographical text.”441 The pronoun of biography is not he, but
rather, you.442 Admittedly, Vico takes up the formal pronoun he in his Autobiography, rather
than the informal, intimate you, yet the he is enough to show that Vico realizes he cannot author
438
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his own story; it is enough to set himself up as the storyteller, rather than the author of his life
story. His attempt to narrate his own story under the guise of the he and his performative
falsification of the date of his own birth shows that he acknowledges that the narratable self
needs another to give one her own story.
Vico knows that his Autobiography can be nothing more than a fable, the myth of
himself. “There is, in autobiography, the strange pretense of a self that makes himself an other in
order to be able to tell his own story; or, rather, of a self which, using his memory as a separated
mirror in which he inseparably consists, appears to himself as an other - he externalizes his
intimate self-reflection.”443 This can account for Vico’s strategy of using the third person.

4.3 The Conflict Between the Collective Story and the Life Story
As Cavarero has demonstrated, philosophers, the “servants of the universal,” search after what
we are, rather than who we are. Vico does not relinquish the search for who even when he
establishes his science. His science is still a narration responding to the desire of the who. He
simply relates the story of who we are on a collective level. Our collective story encompasses a
plurality of unique existents. Vico grasps both the singular and collective aspects of originary
poesis by creating two works that work in concert with each other The New Science, and The
Autobiography of Giambattista Vico.
Cavarero calls Homer the first historian. She avers, “The stories that result from the selfexhibiting of unique beings within a plural scene are already inextricably interwoven with one
another. This is why Homer-the-storyteller is at the same time the first historian. Since it results
from the weaving of individual stories, the great History of Humanity is nothing but the book of
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single stories.444 The stories result from the actions of singular existents. This is evidenced by
the story of the gigantic who disclose themselves to the other through their shaking and shouting,
giving birth to the first human place.
Cavarero, in fact, recovers stories from our archaic memories in her text, In Spite of
Plato, and narrates them for herself. She weaves together new portraits for female figures
looked over by a patriarchal tradition. Just as Vico’s conceited scholars impose their own
familiar readings onto the distant archaic figures of our originary scenes of poesis, the patriarchal
philosophical tradition reads female figures through the lens of patriarchal biases. They interpret
what is far and distant by what is near and at hand. The female, as other, is far, and the
philosophers’ male bodies are near and at hand. If it is true, as Vico’s universal principle of
etymology demonstrates, that words are carried over from bodies, we may say that philosophical
discourse is carried over from male bodies.
Cavarero saves these female figures from obscurity by relating their narratives in a new
light. She says her aim is to provide new figures to nourish our new subjectivity. She writes,
“Indeed in the Western tradition female subjectivity is buried under figures of hyper-masculine
men, and by figures constructed by men.”445 Here we see clearly Vico’s principle that when men
are ignorant about things distant and unknown they make themselves the measure of things.
Women (the unfamiliar) have been figured in terms of men (the familiar.) By recovering the
female figures Cavarero responds to our desire for new figures in order to realize ourselves. She
writes, “Our need for mythic figures is still present. Certainly, the best solution would be for us
to admit that our new thought and the fresh, new subjectivity we have constituted call for new
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figures.” As the giganti transformed into men, women have transformed into new beings and are
in need of narration to realize their new identities.
To recover these figures Cavarero enacts a hermeneutic strategy of stealing. She writes,
“my hermeneutical project consists of investigating the traces of the original act of erasure
contained in the patriarchal order...This is how my technique of theft works: I will steal feminine
figures from their context, allowing the torn-up fabric to show the knots.”446 Her excavation is
guided by a feminine philosophy drawn from the maternal figure. “From there we women search
for, and ultimately find, the ancient figuration of the Mother surrounded by daughters and
sisters.”447 The male perspective has traditionally dominated our reading of these figure. But
Cavarero affirms that the figures lend themselves to a “play of multiple perspectives.”448 In
particular she re-narrates the tales of Demeter, Penelope, Diotima and a young woman from
Thrace.
Let us look at the figure of Penelope. The patriarchal symbolic order relegates Penelope
to the place of woman and wife. She takes up this allotted place as an alien in the symbolic order
of Man. We might say in terms of Vico’s narrative that her place is hidden in the ideal eternal
story, since the story of beasts and heroes create the world of Man. As Cavarero observes, “For
the events from which Penelope retreats with her endless work are the great events of history –
the history of men, of heroes. Therefore, they are inroads onto a history that is not hers, where
she will not take up a space, but only a place in an alien symbolic order.”449 The female figures
stand outside history, as history is the story of man. Vico’s story of humanity is certainly the
story of man, yet by delving into prehistorical monstrous, bestial giants out of which man was

446

Ibid., 5.
Ibid.
448
Ibid.
449
Ibid., 13.
447

107

formed, Vico shows the fabricated, invented nature of the order of man. Still, Vico ignores the
feminine aspect of prehistory. As Harrison affirms, “Vico had little to say about the prehistory
of this goddess, for his New Science was seeking to reconstruct the origins of patriarchy, that is
to say the religious traumas that led to the differentiations, oppositions, and hierarchies of the
patriarchal institutions…Under the goddess’s reign, however, earth and sky were not opposed,
nor were life and death, animal and human, inanimate and animate, matter and form forest and
clearing.”450 The overthrow of the goddess cults of the forests by the savage sky gods, like Jove,
is not recounted by Vico; he is narrating the story of Man. Cavarero, on the other hand, is renarrating the tales we receive from Homer in order to open up a place for new stories to emerge stories she hopes will help woman give birth to their own identities.
Although the results of their hermeneutic approach are different, as narrators, Vico and
Cavarero share similar strategies. Vico, too, steals the poetic characters from the scholars who
have buried them. Recall Vico’s inscription on the plinth: lady metaphysics lays hidden and
unknown. Vico, moreover, shows the way in which the poetic figures or characters offered
patterns of identity for early humanity. Recall that the poetic figure of the war chief was more
real than the individual warrior; this was simply Vico’s way of expressing the truth that we are
narratable selves in search of unifying patterns that confer the meaning of our lives. In short, we
structure our lived experience in terms of figures. Our collective stories are storehouses of
communal wisdom from which to gather figures to live by. Cavarero resuscitates different
female figure from this storehouse of collective wisdom to confer the new form of female
personhood a story to live by. Vico’s narrative art encourages reinterpretations. His narratives
are not a complete or final. Cavarero in a sense performs Vico’s injunction to narrate his poetic
science for herself.
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Let us return to the example of Penelope to witness this strategy. How does Penelope
subvert the ideal eternal story or patriarchal symbolic order that casts her as an alien inside its
realm? Cavarero observes that it is possible that Penelope pretends to not recognize Odysseus
when he returns home, disguised as a beggar. She demands evidence because she does not want
to recognize him, despite hearing his voice and seeing his face. Like the story of Job in
Cavarero’s later work his voice should have betrayed his unique identity despite his being
dressed up. Perhaps, Cavarero muses, he was happy in her secluded abode away from the world
of men: from the suitors as well as Odysseus.
The role that is meant to subjugate her actually liberates her as she realizes herself
through her work. There are hints of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic at work here. Cavarero
observes, “Penelope is an expert weaver. Her metis is all in the rhythmic doing and undoing in
the loom. It cannot be separated from her body, and its object is not an eternal essence
positioned outside this world, outside the weaving room where she sits with her handmaids.”451
Her place is within and yet separate from Odysseus’ palace, and we may also say the conceptual
palaces of Nietzsche of Vico, the huts of the heroes and the walls of the Academies. She resides
in Odysseus’ palace and yet preserves her identity and wholeness of being in her own private
abode weaving alongside her female companions. In weaving and laughing with her maids,
exchanging glances with them, she fashions a world for herself that is rooted in her body and is
her own. Cavarero writes, “She speaks of birth and rootedness, rather than death and
adventure.”452 In this way, Cavarero treats Penelope as an admirable female figure weaving
away from the gaze of the male patriarchal order.
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I find a discrepancy in Cavarero’s work between her description of narrative as a
response to the singular existent in terms of the individual life story and the collective story. In
Relating Narratives, she denies the possibility of realizing our identity through the collective
‘we.’ She says of the relational, exposable, singular existent, “she is the you [tu] that comes
before the we [noi], before the plural you [voi] and before the they [loro].”453 Cavarero is weary
of the ‘we’ in relation to the unique, unrepeatable existence of the ‘you.’ The movement of the
you to the we is as slippery a slope as the movement from the who to the what. At every turn the
who is in danger of being swallowed up by the what. Cavarero cautiously resists this tendency.
Yet her caution may prevent her from acknowledging the collective depths inhering in the you.
Judith Butler, for instance, hesitates to adopt Cavarero’s rejection of the we. In reflecting upon
her writing she observes, “I resort here to the plural we, even though Cavarero advises against it,
precisely because I am not convinced that we must abandon it.”454 Since the singularity of the
existent it so threatened by theorists who want to turn it into a social construct, Cavarero is on
heavy guard; perhaps, she is too overprotective.
Cavarero writes, “In the reflection of the one in the other, the very personal identity that
is consigned to the tale of an unrepeatable life story, runs the risk of losing its expressive reality
and founding itself in the ‘common woman’ that is being represented here...The empathy risks
producing a substance. Put simply, who I am and who you are seem to surrender to the urgency
of the question of what Woman is.”455 Cavarero is always wary of reducing the who to a what.
“Since there is no who that is not always already intertwined with its what, or that is inseparable
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from it, the tale also tells what someone was and is...the tale sometimes makes the protagonist
into a ‘character’ or ‘type.’456 The unique existent must not be reduced to a character.
Despite this, Cavarero shows that narrating archaic female figures to ourselves will help
us to achieve new identities. Cavarero, following, Arendt does not understand identity as a
social construction, “but rather as that which a singular existent designs in her uncategorizable
uniqueness.”457 But, nevertheless, Cavarero seems to leave no room for the singular existent’s
adoption of collective tales to realize herself, even though this makes up her appropriative
strategy in her text on the archaic figures, In Spite of Plato. Here she writes, “What we have
called an altruistic ethics of relation does not support empathy, identifications, or confusions.
Rather this ethic desires a you that is truly other, in her uniqueness and distinction.”458 Why
then, does she take up the stories Thracian servant girl, Penelope, Demeter, and Diotima in order
to realize her identity?
How can we resolve her intention of stealing collective, archaic figures and reconfigure
them in order to aid our ability to create new forms of identity with her insistence that any
identification with the ‘we’ robs us of our singular, unique, status? Are not the archaic figures
accretions of our collective voices? By dipping into the archaic imagination to provide figures to
aid the constitution of our identities, she seems to be displaying the desire to read our story on
the collective level, (the stories that inhere in the residue of the very language we use to tell our
own unique stories, as Vico’s etymologies have shown.) Both Vico and Cavarero dip into the
well of archaic fables and reinterpret them according to a new logic. They remake or rearrange
the deposits of our collective memories for themselves. Vico undercuts the erudite wisdom of
the philosophers with his poetic wisdom and Cavarero undercuts the logic of the patriarchal
456
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philosophers by resuscitating female figures through her own interpretive strategies. In other
words, she is narrating the fables for herself, just as Vico requires his readers to do in the New
Science. So why do they keep their meditations upon the singular life story and our collective
stories separate?
Despite the litany of scholars who acknowledge the interrelatedness of the Autobiography
and the New Science, the fact remains that Vico kept his treatment of our singular identity out of
his collective narrative and reserved treatment of it for his Autobiography.459 Of course, he
speaks to the reader of the New Science and demands her participation, but he, nonetheless,
relates only the collective dimension of her tale. This tension between the singular existent and
the unique way she takes up her cultural heritage will be taken up again in the following chapter
where we discuss the difference between spoken and speaking language. Vico and MerleauPonty, we shall see, acknowledge the social dimension of our identities. Our cultural traditions
are in the service of our singular creative endeavors. We do not need to escape the ‘we’ in order
to invent the world anew; rather, it is precisely by taking up spoken language that we are able to
create spontaneous, genuine expressions.

Most scholars agree that the Autobiography and the New Science are related. Croce observes, “Vico’s
Autobiography is, in a word, the application of the Scienza Nuova to the life of its author, the course of his own
individual history: and its method is as just and true as it is original.” See Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista
Vico, 266. Olney further establishes the interrelatedness of the Autobiography and the New Science. “The two books
were, in their composition, intertwined to the degree that either can be understood in its fullness only by way of the
other.” See Olney, Memory and Narrative: The Weave of Life Writing, 86. Furthermore, Fisch suggests that, “Aside
from the light it sheds on his other works, and the interest it has in common with every other intellectual biography,
Vico has the unique interest of being the first application of the genetic method by an original thinker to his own
writings.” See Fisch, preface to Autobiography, v. Mazzotta, moreover, suggests, “He knew with great clarity that
what was missing in the New Science is a precise, sustained discourse on subjectivity - how the self enters, shapes,
and is itself shaped by the fabric of history. It is no wonder, then, that one should view his writing the
Autobiography, which is carried out while he is revising the New Science, as a vehicle enabling him to reflect on the
problematics of the self.” See Mazzotta, The New Map of the World, 17. And again, Verene observes, “this
principle suggests that the ‘autobiography’ is a category that might be applied to Vico’s philosophy itself. In a sense
Vico’s aim is to write the autobiography of humanity itself.” See Verene, The New Art of Autobiography, 71.
Elsewhere, Verene affirms a similar point. He writes, “Vico’s conception of historical writing and life writing are
interlocking. The way he presents his own humanity is of a piece with how he presents his science of humanity.”
See Verene, The New Art of Autobiography, 71.
459

112

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 The First Words
According to Merleau-Ponty, both intellectualism and empiricism share the flawed supposition
that words do not bear a sense of their own; they are purported to merely be the envelopes or
vehicles of thought.460 The sense of a word cannot be fully realized through a conceptual
apparatus. We realize the sense of the word through its gestural signification. As Merleau-Ponty
observes, “The sense of words must ultimately be induced by the words themselves, or more
precisely their conceptual signification must be formed by drawing from a gestural signification,
which itself is immanent in speech.” 461 Words secrete their own significance at an affective
gestural level beyond the grasp of intellectualist understandings of language. The speech or
gesture itself bears a sense that allows us to read its meaning.462 The insight that words are the
bearer of meaning runs counter to the dominant western intellectual tradition. Landes explains,
“classical and intellectualist explanations of speech fail because they embrace the problematic
supposition that the word does not bear its sense.”463 By acknowledging that words bear a sense,
we are able to go beyond these dominant intellectualist and empiricist theories of language.
Vico uncovers the primordial gestures, which directly express what they are.
Furthermore, “the natural heroic emblems…spoke forth in their very muteness. Hence, they
were in their own the best emblems because they carried their meaning in themselves.”464 These
mute emblems bear the sense of their meaning. “For example, three ears of grain, or three
scythe-swinging motions, naturally signified three years. And so it came about that “names” and
460
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“characters” were interchangeable, and “name” and “nature” came to mean the same thing.”465
Every wall in ancient houses, Vico relates, had an emblem carved upon it, since there was not yet
any written language; the age was analphabetic.466 Some other examples of mute emblems
include family coats of arms, the totems of the American Indians, ancient coins, plumed helmets
and the eagle on the scepter.467 The Eagle is a striking emblem because of the United States
adoption of the bald Eagle as its official emblem confirms Vico’s principle that all nations begin
with Jove, whose symbol is the eagle. Vico observes, “the eagle on the scepter…was used alike
by the Egyptians, the Etruscans, the Romans, and the English, who still use it as an ornament of
their royal arms…the symbol meant to signify that the realms had their origins from the first
divine kingdoms of Jove by virtue of his auspices.”468 Later thinkers and scholars in the age of
men attribute analogical meaning to the primordial forms of expression and poetic languages, yet
they are merely imposing their own rational, abstract framework onto them.469 These mute
languages are what Merleau-Ponty would call primary forms of expression, which all forms of
secondary expression are merely derivative of. By secondary forms of expression, he includes
our mathematical, logical, and scientific forms of thought. Vico’s primordial things are mute,
and yet speak; they are the silent, operative language which Merleau-Ponty’s work on aesthetics
attempts to capture and elucidate.
Vico extols the beauty of the Italian language and ridicules the aridity of the French, yet
his sentiments go beyond petty patriotism. He writes “the French are the only people who,
thanks to the subtlety of their language, were able to invent the new philosophical criticism...and
analytic geometry...stripped of all concrete and figural elements and reduced to pure
465
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rationality.”470 On the contrary, he says the Italians, “are endowed with a language which
constantly evokes images. Our language, thanks to its perpetual dynamism, forces the attention
of the listeners by means of metaphoric expressions.471 The imagistic thinking of the Italians
allows for the possibility of artistic achievements: painting, sculpture, poetry, and music,
whereas, the French language itself opens up the possibility for the invention of analytic
geometry and intellectual criticism.472 Vico is demonstrating the way in which languages give
birth to the ideas themselves. Moreover, each age in Vico’s cycle is constituted by a specific
language, which gives birth to different ways of being. His reflections on the difference between
the Italian and French language express his axiom that languages and ideas accelerate at the
same rate.
According to both Merleau-Ponty and Vico language accomplishes thought. MerleauPonty writes, “thought tends toward expression as if toward its completion.”473 Eddie confirms
the relationship between Merleau-Ponty and Vico on this point. He writes of Vico, “his cardinal
principle is similar to Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s: ‘mind’ are formed by language, not
language by ‘minds.’”474 On this point Vico shows that “the human mind is naturally inclined by
the senses to see itself externally in the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to
understand itself by means of reflection.”475 Vico’s universal principle of etymology established
above reveals the way in which languages emerge outside the domain of intellectual thought, but
rather within our pre-reflective experiences. Vico and Merleau-Ponty stand outside of traditional
rational theories of language in this regard.
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Vico places speech at the forefront of his thinking and more specifically, poetic
expressions. The idea that we can understand different cultural phenomena through an
examination of speech is a thought entirely original to Vico. White affirms:
For at the interior of Vico’s thought there resides a principle of interpretation, or
to use a recently revived term, “hermeneutical principle,” of which no other
thinker in Europe prior to Hegel even glimpsed the possibility. This principle
derives from the perception, original with Vico in the form that he gave to it,
that speech itself provides the key for interpreting cultural phenomena...Here the
basic distinction is between poetic expression on the one side and discursive
prose representation on the other. The former is conceived to be a creative and
active force by which consciousness confiscates the world; the latter a passive
and receptive operation in which ‘things as they are’ are mirrored.476

Vico, anticipating Cavarero, writes that verse precedes prose. “Wisdom,” writes Vico, “is
eloquence speaking.”477 Thought depends upon speech for its accomplishment. It is through
speaking and writing that our thoughts are formed. For example, Merleau-Ponty cites the
common experience of the writer he does not know what he means to say until he begins the
process of writing.478 Merleau-Ponty observes, “a thought content to exist for itself outside the
constraints of speech and communication, would fall into the unconscious the moment it appear,
which amount to saying it would not exist at all.”479 Struever argues that the Italian Renaissance
Humanists, with whom Vico is kin, uphold the same notion of expression. For instance, the
rhetorician Trapezuntius writes in a similar fashion:

For indeed, reason itself lies hidden in the obscure process of the intellect before
it has been drawn forth by speech; it is just so much light or brilliance as the fire
hidden in the flint, before the iron strikes it: indeed, while it is hidden no one
would think to call it fire. 480
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An unexpressed thought is hardly a thought at all. We do not first have pure, determinate
thoughts, which we then share or express. Expression kindles and brings forth the thought itself.
Indeterminate objects become more determinate through the power of naming. When we name
an object, we in part create it, since the sense of the word inheres within it. Merleau-Ponty
writes, “the word, far from being the simple sign of objects and significations, inhabits things
and bears significance.”481 Communication involves more than the exchange of prefabricated,
ready-made words.
Just as Vico compares the first poets to children, Merleau-Ponty compares the child’s
power of naming to pre-scientific thought. The child only recognizes an object when it has been
given its name. The name inhabits the object in the same way that color and form inhabit
objects.482 Pre-scientific thinkers similarly come to realize objects through naming them.
Moreover, the names are not the adequate expressions of things. According to Vico, “For that
first language, spoken by the theological poets, was not in accord with the nature of things it
dealt with (as must have been the sacred language invented by Adam, to which God granted
divine onomathesia, the giving of names to things according to the nature of each).”483 Here is
one of the many instances in which Vico cautiously distinguishes Sacred and Gentile history.
Our concern here, like Vico’s concern in the New Science, is gentile history.484485 We encounter
things as indeterminate, and through naming help to realize it more fully.
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Words share a part in the creation of the thing. There is not first a determinate object that
is then given a name that rationally accords with it. And yet, words are not merely conventional.
Only the erudite, learned scholars could imagine that language is conventional. Vico writes,
“The philologians have all accepted with an excess of good faith the view that in the vulgar
languages meanings were fixed by convention.”486 Below we explore the reason for believing
that language is formed by a rational agreement among men. Both Vico and Merleau-Ponty
denounce this intellectual error and warn that it prevents the birth of genuine expression.
The natural, affective dimension of language must be realized if we are to create new
expressions. Or, as Merleau-Ponty observes, “conventions are a recent mode of relation between
men, and language must be put back into its communicative current.”487 Once the sensorial,
affective dimension of language is revealed the notion that language is conventional appears
foolish. “This would no longer hold if we took the emotional sense of the word into account,
what we have called the gestural sense, which is essential in poetry for example.”488 Those
thinkers who argue for the arbitrary and conventional nature of language overlook the sensorial,
gestural dimension.489
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This is not to say that words are entirely natural. Both Vico and Merleau-Ponty
demonstrate the ambiguous relationship between the natural and the conventional. MerleauPonty writes, “The artificial sign does not reduce to the natural sign because there are no natural
signs for man.”490 Gesture are not natural or adequate expressions of things, rather gestures are
contingent and historicized. As Vico demonstrates we must attend to the way the gestures are
born in a particular fashion, at this time and not another.491 “Just like words, passionate feelings
and behaviors are invented. Even ones that seem inscribed in the human body, such as paternity,
are in fact institutions.”492 Vico returns to the birthing sight of these institutions.
Although they are not entirely natural, they are not entirely arbitrary. Vico does state that
languages have “natural significations,” and “natural origins.”493 But he is expressing a natural
relation between the body as site of expression and earth. Vico distinguishes the fabulous,
metaphoric origins of the first poets from the gentiles. “For the first language, spoken by
theological poets, was not a language in accord with the nature of things it dealt with (as must
have been the sacred languages invented by Adam, to God gave divine onomathesia, the giving
of names according to the nature of each,) but was a fantastic speech making use of physical
substances endowed with life and most of them imagined to be divine.”494 They are not divorced
from the body’s sensuous, situated lived experience and so not wholly arbitrary. They are rather
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“formed naturally in the imagination...”495 And Merleau-Ponty shows that “imagination is
dialogical.”496 The body is always already taken up in a dialogic relationship with the world.
This cannot be severed from language, and so language cannot become a mere code.
In order to understand this dimension of language, we must establish the creative power
of the body-subject. Vico’s first poet’s creation of the first concrete metaphor, Jove, elaborates
the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject. Fred Evans writes, “Merleau-Ponty shows that we
are our engagement with - our opening onto things in the world. Similarly, objects are not first
“mute” things that then casually interact with us; they call forth our engagement from the
beginning.”497 The giants are responding to the call of the thundering sky reverberating in their
bodies as they shake and shout, imagining that the sky is the body of Jove. This is a true
narration. This is the first human place and the first name. Jove fixes the flux of experience; he
is the “stayer or establisher.”498 As Merleau-Ponty says, “it is the body that shows, that
speaks.”499
To emphasize the corporeal sensorial roots of expressive language, Vico pictures large,
savage, bestial proto-humans, or giants. I take the giants to be a metaphor for the corporeal,
frightening, chaotic beginnings of all expressive language. Just as the poetic characters shrank as
the imagination of the poets shrank, so too did the actual poets shrink, from large giants,
characterized by a “generous savagery,” to delicate, and refined men who “under soft words and
embraces, plot against the life and fortune of friends and intimates.”500 The size of the poets
from bestial to small and refined represents the loss of contact with the corporeal origin of things
and the abstract language that is cut off from the body.
495

NS par. 69.
Richard Kearney, Poetics of Imagining, 123.
497
Fred Evans, The Multivoiced Body, 99.
498
NS par. 379.
499
Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 203.
500
NS par. 1106.
496

120

Vico returns to the night of thick darkness. The adjective ‘thick’ in his most famous
passage should not be overlooked. “But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest
antiquity, so remote from ourselves...”501 Again, he emphasizes that “through the thick clouds of
those first tempests...they made out this great truth...[my italics]”502 It has philosophical import
and has been overlooked by scholars. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of expression is
concerned with the viscosity, depth and thickness of lived experience. Wiskus notes, “We must
turn to the viscous link that binds the words into meaning, for beneath the conceptual content of
each word - beyond our everyday employment of language as representation - lies a dynamic and
creative realm of expression.”503 According to Vico’s etymologicon, this is the realm of the
primordial forest and the first poets.504
Vico’s poetic metaphysics seeks to see and hear the first poetic words. He hears the
grunt of the giants and gathers the coins, animals, medals and monsters that make up the first
words. Descending to origins is not for the faint of heart or for the rarefied esoteric thinking of
the scientists and rational political theorists. In reading Hobbes and Vico together, Struever
notes, “Hobbes and Vico reconstitute their audiences by stabilizing only the roughest, rawest
meanings of their terms; they counteract the academic tradition which employs soft, worn
political coinages that obscure the tough assumptions Hobbes and Vico appreciate.”505 MerleauPonty’s task is similarly poetic in that he seeks to uncover the ‘raw meanings’, which are at the
origins of ready-made concepts. Wiskus argues that Merleau-Ponty’s work is, “poetic in the
etymological sense - for it consistently works to disclose the creative generation of philosophical
thinking as emerging from the depth between (or beneath, behind, or before) articulated
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words.”506 Merleau-Ponty’s work is poetic in that it follows Vico’s universal principle of
etymology which reads, “This was the order of institutions: first the forests, after that the huts,
then the villages, next the cities, and finally the academies.”507 Merleau-Ponty writes, “It must
question the world, it must enter into the forest of references that our interrogation arouses in it,
it must make us say finally what in its silence it means to say.”508 We must enter the primeval
forest in order to question the originary site of thinking, the meaning giving that breaks the
silence, namely, the shouting of the giants in response to the sounds of the earth. “Looking up
they experiences the sensations of a turbulent sky, the sounds of thunder, their newly awakened
fear, and the shaking of their great bodies; and they uttered their first sound, pa, that inventively,
imaginatively (ingenium) brought together in a metaphor, sensations that in nature did not belong
together, creating an image of a being in the sky. Vico calls pa a concrete metaphor or
imaginative universal.”509
According to Wiskus, Merleau-Ponty’s operative language is, “the language of poetry,
the abode of metaphor.”510 She explains, “Poetry and metaphoric language work precisely
according to the principle of noncoicidence; they aim at ‘making silence speak, at saying what is
not said, at exploring language beyond its usual destination which lies (Mallarme) in saying what
is obvious, in what is familiar’.”511 Luft has shown that Providence is nothing but a showing
what is hidden, the saying what is not said. We can see this when we look at how Vico traces the
etymology of the word providence. Luft explain, “The term divinity was applied to providence
because the study of the workings of providence was divinare, the power of divining - that is the
power to understand ‘what is hidden from men - the future - or what is hidden in them, their
506
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consciousness.”512 Vico forces us to encounter the unfamiliar in order to go beyond the obvious,
familiar world of constituted language. Merleau-Ponty writes, “We need only take language too
in the living or nascent state, with all its references, those behind it which connect it to the mute
things it interpellates...with its movement, its subtleties its reversals, its life, which expresses and
multiplies tenfold the bare life of things.”513 Vico philosophy begins with the state of things at
their nascimento. And the first words are mute. The first poets spoke in hieroglyphs. “Mutes
make themselves understood by gestures of objects that have natural relations with the ideas they
wish to signify.”514 Furthermore, “the language of the gods was almost entirely mute, only very
slightly articulate.”515 According to Merleau-Ponty, “Language is a life, is our life and the life of
things.”516 This links the principle of narration to both our world and selves. “Language lives
only from silence; everything we cast to the others has germinated in the great mute land. But,
because he has experienced within himself the need to speak, the birth of speech as bubbling up
at the bottom of his mute experience, the philosopher knows better than anyone that what is lived
lived-spoken.”517 Vico begins in the ‘mute land’ wherein silence gives birth to expression.
Furthermore, as Vico shows, expression is born of need. It is gives birth to the poetic world in
an ontological sense. By tracing the roots of languages and arriving at things, deeds, and
gestures, Vico uncovers the relics of the mute land, the clearing in the forest that fashion the
human world. “Born at this depth, language is not a mask over Being, but - if one knows how to
grasp it with all its roots and foliation - the most valuable witness to Being.”518 As we showed
above, Verene confirms the importance of the hidden in Vico’s metaphysics when he points to
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the original frontispiece to the New Science, which showed an image of a woman. Merleau-Ponty
continues, “philosophy is an operative language, that language can only be known from within,
through its exercise, is open upon the things, called forth by the voices of silence, and continues
an effort of articulation which is the Being of every being.”519 Ready-made, sedimented
language is easy to use and does not take the heroic “effort” of articulation.
Vico descends to the forest to grasp the ontological leaves of Being. He uncovers the
truth that “metaphor makes up the great body of the languages among all nations.”520 His
recovery restores philosophy as an operative language. Vico creates new metaphors in narrating
our primordial experience. His work exemplifies a way of language praised by Merleau-Ponty,
when he writes that “It would be a language of which he would not be the organizer, words he
would not assemble, that would combine through him by virtue of a natural intertwining of their
meaning, through the occult trading of the metaphor - where what counts is no longer the
manifest meaning of each word and of each image, but the lateral relations, the kinships that are
implicated in their transfers and their exchanges.”521 For Vico, the reader must also make the
New Science for himself and find new ways to illuminate the hidden aspects of things and make
new connections.
Not only is there an intimate exchange between the body subject and its surroundings, but
the senses themselves are wholly interrelated. Today, the senses are separated off and classified
one from the other. Synaesthesia is treated as a psychological abnormality rather than our basic
sensorial condition. I conjecture that Vico would find this in accord with the analytic tendencies
of modern man and his critical arts, characteristic of the Age of Men. In line with Vico’s
tendencies towards synthesis over analysis, Vico uncovers the synaesthesia that governs
519
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perception in our originary bestial condition, in the Age of Gods. In order to inhabit the sensorial
word of the first poets, Vico points to the experience of the Germans described by Tacitus,
wherein they, “spoke of hearing the sun pass at night from west to east through the see and
affirmed that they saw the gods.”522 Vico’s descent into our mythic origins reveals our
primordial synaesthetic experience of reality.
Once the layers of our conceptual edifice are peeled back, we find the natural state of our
sense, untouched by the reflective, intellectual thinking which creates the fiction that the senses
can be separated from one another. Merleau-Ponty supplies one example of how our basic
synaesthetic experience of reality can be apprehended: mescaline. In this regard, we may say
that Vico’s insistence for the reader to meditate the New Science for herself, points to the way in
which the New Science is a meditative practice that is meant to allow the reader to reencounter
our primordial experience of reality in the way that mescaline can dismantle the presuppositions
of our conceptual fictions. Vico’s New Science is performative and we are directed to participate
in the performance.

5.2 Spontaneous Versus Sedimented Language
The age of men is constituted almost entirely constituted by sedimented language. “The
language of the gods was almost entirely mute, only very slightly articulate; the language of the
heroes, a mixture of articulate and mute...the language of men, almost entirely articulate and only
very slightly mute, there being no vulgar language so copious that there are not more things than
it has words for.”523 Everything has been named. Language is cut off from the body and words
no longer respond to immediate lived experience. The first two ages, in the other hand, are

522
523

NS par. 375.
NS par. 446.

125

robust with an expressive language born of the body’s relation to the earth. But the world will
always elicit a new song, since, as Merleau-Ponty observes the world is always spilling over in
excess, or in Vico’s words, there is no, “language so copious that there are not more things than
it has words for.”524 In order to awaken the generative power of naming, we must not limit
ourselves to what is already named.
Expressive language is born of the body. Vico explains, “Words are carried over from
bodies and from the properties of bodies to signify the institutions of the mind and spirit. The
order of ideas must follow the order of institutions.” (NS par. 237, 238) Kearney traces a similar
movement in Merleau-Ponty according to which, “meaning first arises in the implicit form of a
corporeal signs and only subsequently takes up the form of abstract cognition. The logic of
science presupposes ‘the wild order of carnal signification.’”525 Vico, like Merleau-Ponty,
shows that the realm of constituted language is derivative of the embodied thinking and
expressive language of primordial, feral, bestial poets.
During the Age of Men, words appear to final and complete because the incomplete,
unfinished nature of both words and things is forgotten. The chaotic, confused moment of
expression is looked over. Humanity loses sight of “this secret and feverish genesis of things in
our body.”526 It is forgotten that even the refined abstract principles of mathematics are born of
our corporeal, bodily insertion in the world. Merleau-Ponty reminds us that invention requires an
initial stage of doubt and chaos. For example, rational philosophers in the age of men, define the
essence of the triangle without considering the corporeal birth of the concept. When we consider
the “formal essence of a triangle” we ignore the “logic of invention.”527 He calls the initial
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emergence of the triangle a “gesture”528 This initial gesture takes a heroic effort. Our silent
dialogue with things is bombarded with the noise of pre-fabricated words. As Merleau-Ponty
confirms, “We become unaware of what is contingent in expression and in communication.”529
The work of the hero is no longer needed. In the third age, characterized by abstract and
reflective thinking, we take up a constituted language that does not require a heroic effort or our
inventive capacities. We communicate in “words that require no genuine effort of expression
from us, and that will demand no effort of comprehension from our listeners.”530 In the third age,
“we live in a world where speech is already instituted.”531 Heroic effort which faces the chaos
and fear accompanying spontaneous language is skipped over in favor of well worn, ready-made,
and easily used language.
Throughout his work, Vico demonstrates the relationship between effort and creative,
genuine expression. “Discovery is the result of luck; making, the result of hard work. I wanted,
therefore, to have geometry taught through forms, not through numbers, so that, even if learning
did but little to develop it, yet it would strengthen the imagination, which is the eye of mother
wit, just as judgment is the eye of intellect.”532 Because geometry makes use of images, it can
strengthen what Vico calls our “creative wit.”533 In other words, the effort and toil it takes to
work through a geometric problem is a creative activity; one must make it for itself - as if it were
the first time the image or form is being expressed. When we re-make the problem for ourselves
we enter into all the tensions and struggle inherent in any creative, inventive act.
Because the raw, generative beginnings are forgotten, scholars lose the capacity to
wonder and to create novel expressions. “The linguistic and intersubjective world no longer
528
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causes us any wonder, we no longer distinguish it from the world itself, and we reflect within a
world already spoken and speaking.”534 Vico describes this realm of constituted language as a
gorgeous mansion, which we have inherited from our parents; the inheritors do nothing more
than move the furniture around. He observes, “our modern physicists remind me of certain
individuals who have inherited from their parents a gorgeous mansion leaving nothing to be
desired in point of comfort or luxury. There is nothing left for them to do except move the
furniture around, and by slight modifications, add some ornaments and bring things up to
date.”535 This is the condition of man enclosed within the walls of the academy and
disconnected from the beginnings of things in the forest. “Men first feel without perceiving, then
they perceive with a troubled and agitated spirit, and finally reflect with a clear mind.”536 This is
the way in which poetic sentences are born.537
An agitated, troubled spirit accompanies birth and genesis. The birthing process always
entails the pains of labor. As the artist gives birth to his own style, he is forced to endure the
labor of genuine or original expression. “The labor of the painter is the birth of expression and
the world is a call or demand for this birth. These are maternal metaphors of labor and birth, but
this is the travail of expression.”538 We witnessed the fear and agitation accompanying the first
word and we must give this agitation and exertion the philosophical import it deserves. It is an
integral ingredient of the creative process, one, which cannot be bypassed.
In the realm of constituted language, one is comfortable and at ease because no work is
required of the speaker. Great effort is not called for; everything has already been created. As
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Merleau-Ponty writes, “we live in a world where speech is already instituted.”539 Let us compare
the dissolute, learned man, resting languidly in his mansion to the poetic character, Hercules. In
the Age of Heroes, through great toil, Hercules burnt a clearing in the thick primordial forest and
cultivated the land.540 Heroic struggle marks the birth of the poetic characters and primary poetic
expression. Conversely, constituted language does not require effort either from the speaker or
listener. As Merleau-Ponty observes, we use “words that require no genuine effort of expression
from us, and that will demand no effort of comprehension from our listeners.”541 Spontaneous,
creative expression demands great toil, struggle and effort. This is perhaps the reason that Vico
tells the reader that the discovery of his master key took 20 long years of labor and struggle.
Moreover, in his Autobiography he traces the chaotic, confused, and toilsome emergence of his
discoveries.

5.3 Coherent Deformation and Tropes
Creativity is born of a coherent deformation, a concept that Merleau-Ponty adapts from Malraux.
“We cut our existence off from the past itself, and we only allow our existence to seize upon the
present traces of this past.”542 The traces are Nietzsche’s minted coins that have lost their force,
and Vico poetic characters, which shrank in size alongside the shrinking imaginations of the
thinkers, “Later, as these vast imaginations shrank and the power of abstraction grew...Jove
became so small and light that he is flown about by an eagle.”543 (NS par. 402) The sublime,
awesome, chaotic site of the bestial creation of Jove, the first concrete metaphor, is reduced to a
diminutive, closed, tidy, arbitrary appearing sign. The true narrations now appear false to the
539
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rational mind. We must return to the initial site in order to reveal their hidden, originary force,
and retell the story to create new metaphors.

Merleau-Ponty’s use of coherent deformation is

illustrated throughout Vico’s oeuvre: the call for the young to use their heroic minds is a call to
resuscitate the heroic imaginative powers of the heroic age. The New Science itself is a kind of
coherent deformation, taking up past narrations and refashioning them into a new, yet incomplete
narration.
It is only in the age of men, the age of reflection, that one could imagine inhabiting a
language divorced from speaking expressive acts.544 New acts of expression must take up and
rearrange the constituted language. “Sedimentation occurs and I shall be able to think farther.
Speech, as distinguished from language, is that moment when the significative intention...proves
itself capable of incorporating itself into my culture and the culture of others - of shaping me and
others by transforming the meaning of cultural instruments.”545 It uses the available
significations and fashions them into something new. “It gives the illusion that it was contained
in the already available significations, whereas by a sort of ruse it espoused them only in order to
infuse them with new life.”546 It appears as if the new were always already there, and we forget
that it emerges from a coherent deformation of the given acquired language. The new emerges
from a refashioning of the available, pre-established language. The age of men, in this sense, is
an age of forgetting. The scholars forget the “logic of invention” that gives birth to their
concepts.547
Returning to the primordial event of expression, will allow us to reinvigorate the capacity
to invent in Vico’s last age in the storia ideale eterna, our own reflective, modern age. “We are
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called to uncover beneath thought, which basks in its acquisitions and is merely a stopping point
in the indefinite process of expression, a thought that attempts to establish itself and only does so
by bending the resources of constituted language to a new usage.”548 Constituted language must
be taken up and refashioned in order to create the new. In many ways, Merleau-Ponty’s
constituted language resembles Vico’s sensus communis and the topical arts that take up the
commonplaces. Vico shows that creativity involves dipping into the well or storehouse of
cultural memory, the topics. The topics function like raw colors in painting; we need some basic
material or topoi to start with before we impart our own form.549 Expressive language cannot
invent ex nihilo.

“To express is...to ensure, through the already well-worn words, that the new

intention takes up the heritage of the past.”550 We gather up the past to give birth to the new.
Coherent deformation would be impossible without the storehouse of culture accretions
at its disposal. One way to think of these acquisitions is through Marshal McLuhan’s description
of the culture wisdom that Vico digs through to tell a novel tale, or reinvent the old. “Vico, like
Joyce, insists that new technology is not added to culture, but it “ruins” whole societies, tossing
them into the middenhide or heep, whence they are forever being retrieved and refurbished for
generations.”551 Vico’s war with technology as Verene called it above is not aimed at
demolishing modern humanities barbaric state.
As Struever observes of Rhetoric, “its topoi are more than storage bins, they are points of
departure.”552 “This notion of a sensory topics enhances the role played by experience, rather
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than reason alone, in creating expression: it underlies his presupposition that logic and reason
cannot exhaust experience (Section 405.)”553 Vico’s sensory topics go beyond the traditional
rhetorical art of topics. More than mere rhetorical devices the topics have an ontological
linguistic function: they give birth to the human world and our experience of reality. They are
more than devices to be used by orators in speech making. Although Merleau-Ponty and Vico
recognize the value of cultural acquisitions inherited from the past they are interested in the way
in which new language is born. If our inherited institutions lose contact with the primordial
affective dimension of language, linguistic creativity suffers.
In order to invent, constituted language must be taken up and refashioned. MerleauPonty writes, “we are called to uncover beneath thought, which basks in its acquisitions and is
merely a stopping point in the indefinite process of expression, a thought that attempts to
establish itself and only does so by bending the resources of constituted language to a new
use.”554 We must gather up the past in order to give birth to the new, by dipping into the well of
cultural memory. “To express...is to ensure, through already well-worn words, that the new
intention takes up the heritage of the past.”555 Genuine expression happens through taking up the
sedimented language. Struever explains, “This notion of sensory topics enhances the role played
by experience; it underlies his presupposition that logic and reason cannot exhaust
experience.”556 The world always calls forth new expressions.
The Romantic conception of ingenuity idealizes the image of the lone thinker, creating
original works of art. The way in which Vico’s and Merleau-Ponty emphasize the importance of
sedimented language in the process of creating the new goes against the grain of the Romantic
Aristotle’s maxims are generative because they relate to the flexibility and open-endedness of language itself.” See
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ideal. The oral tradition, from which Rhetoric was born and remains close to, also emphasizes
the importance of commonplaces. In the oral tradition novelty depended upon how a speaker
took up the common storylines and plots and configured them to fit the particular audience, time,
and place. “Narrative originality lodges not in making up new stories but in managing a
particular interaction with this audience at this time – at every telling the story has to be
introduced uniquely into a unique situation.” 557 This is the way in which the poetic characters of
the Heroic Age were formed as we saw with Vico’s discovery of the true Homer. The first
people were poets by nature not art.558
To invent is always a social endeavor, for Vico; his departure from the written tradition
and descent into the oral tradition unveils the communal nature of invention. Our minds are too
“refined by the art of writing” to fully imagine our communal, oral prehistory.559 The Romantic
Age’s conception of the solitary, original genius creating the new is a myth born of the written
tradition, according to Walter Ong. Originality in the Oral tradition has to do with the
rearrangement of commonplaces.560 Ong observes, Cognitive scientists such as Lakoff and
Turner, moreover, emphasize that novelty is derivative of a communal ground; the poet or any
original thinker always works with a basic set of conceptual metaphors, though this is often
forgotten. “General conceptual metaphors are thus not the unique creation of individual poets but
are rather part of the way members of a culture have of conceptualizing experience.”561 In a
similar fashion, Nancy Struever, affirms the communal ground of originality in Vico’s
conception of invention, “Our mental constructs are not, cannot be solipsistic: they assume the
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priority of social discovery. For Vico, the locus of meaningful change is on the collective
level.”562
But it is the singular reader who is supposed to make the collective tale her own: she
must narrate it for herself and in narrating. Whereas Cavarero tends to lose sight of the prepersonal dimension of experience, Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the ambiguity between the two
realms. Merleau-Ponty observes, “an existential theory of history is ambiguous, but it cannot be
reproached for its ambiguity, because the ambiguity is in the things.” 563 Both Vico and
Merleau-Ponty advocate a genius for ambiguity, and it is apparent in their treatment of the
individual and her relation to history.564 Merleau-Ponty reveals how deeply interwoven both
dimensions of experience are. He observes, “it is impossible to say where the forces of history
end and where ours begins, and strictly speaking, the question is meaningless, since history only
exists for a subject who lives through it and a subject only exists as historically situated.”565 We
cannot be reduced to our economic background, sexuality, or political status. For instance, even
if we grant psychanalysis the power to interpret Cezanne’s life, Merleau-Ponty shows that it still
doesn’t explain his creative efforts.
And yet we cannot understand ourselves without acknowledging the cultural stories that
shape us. “The conception of law, morality, religion, economic structures are co-signified in the
Unity of the social event, just as the parts of the body are co-implicated in the Unity of the
gesture, or just as ‘physiological, ‘psychological’ and moral motives intersect in the unity of
action.”566 Expression and history are entwined in a network of meaning. As Edie observes, for
Merleau-Ponty, “History, because it is human action, and because human action is never
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completed, can never exist completely without taking into account what ‘comes after,’ the
incarnate, operating intentionality which is at work in the open field of the temporal, and whose
future is always in suspense.”567 Vico’s narrative leaves open a space for reinterpretation by
calling to the reader to make the New Science for herself, thereby acknowledging history as a
continuous call to action. “Historical reality, like historical knowledge, contains within itself an
appeal to the judgment of the future generations towards which it is groping.”568 Vico’s
injunction to the reader is an appeal in this sense.
Vico adds depth to Merleau-Ponty’s sense of history, moreover, because the experiential
basis of the oral tradition easily engenders the sense in which participation and engagement are
called for. Hegel did not begin his history with fables because “the foundations of the observed
and observable reality provides a firmer ground than the transient soil in which legends and epics
grow; these no longer make up the historic record of those peoples that have risen to a firm
individuality.”569 But it is precisely the infirm, transient nature of the soil that beckons
continuous narration. There is no firm individuality for Vico or Merleau-Ponty that can be
completely realized, once and for all. There is a constant dialogic exchange between the
individual and its cultural acquisitions. Vico’s oral narrations capture Merleau-Ponty’s sense
that “we are caught in a secret history, a forest of symbols.”570 This is our oral heritage,
shrouded in mystery and resting on a shapeshifting ground.
Moreover, tethering Vico’s oral residues to Merleau-Ponty’s sense of history further
emphasis the role of voice. There is a greater preoccupation with voice in oral history, as
opposed to disembodied minds. For instance, Merleau-Ponty writes that history teaches the
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philosopher that “he must see himself within the dialogue of minds, situated as they all are, and
grant them the dignity of self-constituting beings at the very moment that he claims that dignity
for himself.”571 As we saw above, Vico’s vivid narrations of shouting and singing beasts and
heroes force us to realize ourselves as part of an interplay of voices. Evans observes, “As voices
we tend to one of these two limits, shifting now to a generalized version of the social discourse
that we articulate, now to a more personalized version of it. The more personalized
version…reflects our bodily existence and the particular nuances of a social discourse at the site
where one begins his or her history.”572 Vico’s imagery allows us to imagine the corporeal
nature of discourse, even on the collective level. We do not merely encounter an interplay of
minds when we take up our cultural heritage, but we engage with an interplay of voices. Our
bodies encounter the bodies of our archaic past.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have lightly touched upon the pleasure that narration confers. I
related Vico’s own account of the increasing delight he took in oratory and poetry after setting
aside his training in traditional metaphysics. If we follow Vico’s injunction to narrate the New
Science to ourselves, we will find our mind taking increasing delight in it as well; his poetic
science draws the reader away from traditional philosophical discourse and towards the oral
poetry of our archaic fables. Once we bracket off the conceit of scholars we are free to weave
together the threads of memories and images which Vico unearths for us.
Pleasure attends the narrations of the oral tradition. By drawing from the condition of
primary orality, Vico brings us closer to the sensuous, passionate, and pleasurable nature of the
oral tale. For instance, without written language, repetition was needed to help preserve the tales
in the storyteller’s memory. And repetition is inherently pleasurable. Havelock observes, “its
rhythms are biologically pleasurable, especially when reinforced by musical chants, by melody,
and by the body motions of dance.”573 The whole body becomes involved in the story, whether
by singing, dancing, or chanting. When the tales of the bards were meant to instruct, which they
often were, they were designed to please the listener so that the instructions remained in their
memories.
As we have seen, storytelling is necessary for the realization of identity; therefore, it is
imperative that we learn how to tell stories again in order to realize our identities. Following
Vico’s example, we can learn from the oral poets. Writing, in fact, can hinder our ability to
share the stories of our lives. As Ong observes, “learning to read or write disables the oral
poet…it introduces into his mind the concept of the text as controlling the narrative and thereby
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interferes with the oral composing process, which have nothing to do with texts but are the
‘remembrance of songs sung.’”574 Vico’s instruction to the reader to become involved in his
performance harks back to our condition of primary orality, where the listener participated in the
story by singing, dancing, clapping, or chanting. By telling us that our bodies will be filled with
pleasure upon narrating his poetic sayings for ourselves, we are led back to the pleasurable
experiences conferred by the ancient Homeric bards. As Ruth Sawyer explains, “The
troubadours animated the minds of men; by amusing them, they led them to think, reflect, to
judge.”575 Today, in our Academic institutions, the body is not induced to feel pleasure during
instruction. The body, in fact, is almost forgotten. The learner is expected to remain still and
motionless. As we witness the epidemic of psychotropic drugs being prescribed to young
children, especially young boys since they are vigorous, active and robust, mirroring the unruly,
grotesque bodies of the first creative poets, it is imperative that we remember the pleasures
conferred by narration, and the powerful ways that pleasure aids instruction.576 Rather than
dulling the child, we should awaken them to a sensorial experience of reality through introducing
the pleasures of narration. We witnessed the shrinking bodies of the robust heroes with the
onslaught of reflective, abstract discourse in Vico’s ideal eternal story. This serves as a warning:
we should not reduce and diminish the child’s active life in this manner. Vico was teaching us a
powerful message about discourse and its intimate relation to the body. In order to keep our
creative capacities alive, we must engage the body.
Vico worried that young minds would be trained too early in the critical arts, which are
centered upon the analytic, reflective logic of the scholars. According to Vico, if the young are
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not nourished on topical arts, which delight and aid the imagination, they will become incapable
of genuine, novel expression and creativity. For instance, if they are trained too early in the
conceptual sciences, “it is apt to smother the student’s...capacity to perceive the analogies
existing between matters lying far apart and, apparently most dissimilar. It is this capacity which
constitutes the source and principle of all ingenious, acute, and brilliant forms of expression.”577
This, of course, is the capacity to create metaphors, which we saw gave birth to the first human
world. Moreover, we are reminded of the “wild and savage comparisons”578 of Homer - the
poetic character of the Greek peoples, who were by a natural necessity all poets. Children must
be trained in the arts that once preoccupied the bards and storytellers of the Heroic Age. We
must reawaken their sensorial experience of reality.
Vico reinvents the traditional tropes of rhetoric and confers ontological status upon them.
As Verene observes, “these forms which make up poetic logic (see par. 404-11) for Vico are not
simply devices for the literary embellishment of truths arrived at by logical means; they are for
him features of a logic that itself precedes the logic of syllogism and rational argument.”579 In a
rare moment in the New Science, Vico addresses the young people of his own time, whom are
robust with memory, imagination and the powers of invention. He believes that figural
geometry, because it deals with images, heightens these primitive, corporeal powers, yet if the
young are pushed into mathematics and algebra without first exercising these powers they will be
subdued into the condition of barbaric reflection or the barbarism of intellect. They “become
over fine for life in their way of thinking and are rendered incapable of any great work.”580 Here
it is clear that Vico’s narrative is meant to nourish these natural powers of imagination in order
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to protect against the abstract, metaphysical criticism that can ruin young minds and turn them
into members of the barbaric condition he witnessed in his own lifetime. The New Science is, in
fact, training in the sensory topics. Vico, with the force of his imagination, fills up our minds
with the primordial, ontological topics in order to render us capable of great works, too.
Children have weak reasoning powers yet are rich in imagination; if we rob them of the
former in order to elicit the later, we will do great damage to their lives. Vico explains,
“imagination is more robust in proportion as reasoning power is weak.”581 Vico is not
advocating a return to the bestial, wild forests at the expense of reason either; rather, he thinks
that by acknowledging the value of our primitive powers, we can bring them to bear on our
reasoning powers in order to go beyond the pre-established order. Without infusing the spirit of
the forest into our thinking we will remain incapable of inventing the new. Children must follow
this natural order of things so that they can bring their imagination to bear on their later powers
of critical thinking. This prevents the extreme, barbaric side of criticism from taking over.
“Providence gave good guidance to human affairs when it aroused human minds first to topics
rather than to criticism, for acquaintance with things must come before judgment of them.
Topics have the function of making minds inventive, as criticism has of making them exact.”582
The tropes are not the devices of sophisticated artists, but rather make up the creative powers of
the first bestial, unrefined poets. Vico affirms, “from all this it follows that all the tropes...which
have hitherto been considered the ingenious invention of writers, were necessary modes of
expression of all the first poetic nations...But these expressions of the first nations later became
figurative.”583 They are born of need and necessity.
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Vico situates modern humanity in the midst of barbarism. Verene observes that “Vico is
at war with the Cartesian world that, through technology and reflection, would deprive us of the
civil wisdom of humanism.”584 Wisdom, in the Vichian sense, is intimately related with
speaking. Vico affirms that eloquence is wisdom speaking. His new critical art is supposed to
initiate a new way of speaking in order to combat the critical arts and barbarism of reflection.
This new way of speaking is not merely a return to the ancient art of rhetoric, but a way of using
rhetoric to invent the new. The new critical art is a narrative art meant to spark a transformation
in the reader’s way of being, drawing her out of a condition of barbaric reflection dominated by
the critical arts and into the barbaric sensuality of her genetic origins in order to rekindle her
originary threefold powers of imagination: memory, fantasy and imagination.
Abstraction is derivative of originary action. Vico’s method of studies follows the course
of the transition from the oral tradition to the written tradition. The movement from the forest to
the Academies should be mirrored in education in order to shape inventive, creative singular
beings. For instance, children should primarily learn how to tell stories and engage with each
other. “Speech is, above all else, a sensory motor activity, of a concrete nature, derived from
action, sound and rhythm. It interacts with perceptual motor activities.”585 This mirrors the
primary orality prefiguring the advent of the alphabet. In other words, it follows the primary
stages of humanity’s birth on the collective level: The Age of Heroes. “Writing, on the other
hand,” observes Titone, “implies a further step along the road to abstraction, reasoning, and the
construction of general mental schema.”586 The child must be able to organize their experience
orally, engage with other children orally on an interpersonal level, and learn to tell stories for
pleasure before they are subjected to the rigors of abstraction and writing. Additionally, Di
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Pietro affirms that Vico “felt that the learning of languages was especially appropriate to young
people because in youth the use of the imagination and the wish to associate with young people
in social contacts is strongest. Languages lead naturally to the play of the imagination and to
interactions with others.”587 In describing her proscriptions for a Vichian approach to childhood
learning Titone explains, “the common instructional feature of these is that action precedes
words. Specifically, an act of instruction should take into account the fact that life experiences,
along with affective and cognitive processes all intersect.”588 Moreover, sensorial stimulation is
the basis of all elementary instruction.
To increase the pleasure of instruction and so the imagination, educators should consider
adding music and visual art to accompany their instruction.589 As in the birth of language itself, a
child’s language development begins with the senses. Titone even suggests that the rise of
imagery due to mass media actually serves the education of the child, who’s imagination
expands with sound, color, and imagery - despite its deleterious effects on the broader
contemporary society.590 We have, perhaps, entered a condition of secondary orality, as we have
argued for above. The condition of seconday orality, in this sense, is conducive to the child’s
proper order of learning and developmentally appropriate instruction.
If we ignore the sensorial roots of thinking, there will be devastating consequences for
childhood education today. Vico relates his own harrowing experience of being forced to study
logic before it was developmentally proper. “But his mind, too weak to understand that of
chrispippean logic, was almost lost in it, so that to his great sorrow he had to give it up. His
despair made him desert his studies (so dangerous it is to put youths to the study of sciences that
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are beyond their age!) and he strayed from them for a year and a half.”591 We can avoid this by
considering alternate methods of education, such as the Waldorf Astoria method and the
Montessori method. Both acknowledge the importance of place, movement, and rhythm in
childhood learning; in this sense, I argue, they are Vichian in spirit. For instance, consider the
concept of Eurythmy or beautiful movement, used in the Waldorf method of education:

Rudolf Steiner, the progenitor of Waldorf methodology, had such a profound
respect for poetry, he developed a new art of recitation, Sprachgestaltung, or
‘speech formation.’ Alongside this art he developed yet another, Eurythmy, or
‘beautiful movement.’ Eurythmy is preformed not only to music but to the
spoken word as well. Steiner’s eurythmy choreography is replete with
indications to performers concerning the sounds, meter, rhyme, and meaning of
many great poems.592

The child is delighted once again with the enchantments of our archaic oral poetry: dance,
rhythm, meter, song, repetition, movement. The whole body and voice are engaged in the poetic
spell. These are what nourish the child’s imagination, just as narrative and song once nourished
corporeal imaginations of the ancient heroes.
Moreover, consider Maria Montessori’s emphasis on the creative powers of the child and
how it accords with Vico’s work. Montessori observes, “there are various things that ‘call’ the
children…the beauty of decorated objects is nothing more than ‘voices’ which attract the
attention of the child and encourage him to act. These objects possess an eloquence that no
teacher could ever attain.”593 Robust imagery stimulates the child. And the child should be free
to respond to these calls. The ability of the child to move freely is paramount to the Montessori
system of education; it is through movement that the child constructs their world.594 Just as
humanity created the first human worlds through agitated movement, the child is in the process
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of creating her world. The heroes, like children, are creators or makers - not thinkers. In order
to build their worlds, they must be free to move about and create familiar dwelling places.
Montessori, additionally, encourages self-motivation. Like Vico she observes the fact that
children learn their mother tongue without instruction. Goretti argues that this accords with
Montessori’s concept of the absorbent mind and “the extraordinary power of the child’s mind to
absorb the resources of language and the qualities of environment.”595 The child is totally
immersed in her environment, both discovering and creating her world through a rich sensorial
experience.
Servitude towards philosophical discourse, Vico has taught us, robs us of our sensorial,
corporeal experience and our ability to take pleasure and delight in learning. According to
Gianturco, Vico reveals that “the passionate sides of our natures can never be swayed and
overcome unless this is done by more sensuous and corporeal means…the soul must be enticed
by images and impelled to love; for once it loves, it is easily taught to believe; once it believes
and loves the fire of passion must be infused into it so as to break its inertia and force it to
will.”596 The child will not develop her rational side if she is not first compelled by sensorial
imagery that awakens her powers of imagination.
Vico had the good fortune and courage to become an autodidact. For this reason, he was
able to break the shackles of the Academies, with their philosophical discourse and teach himself
the pleasure of narration. He communed with heroes who broke into song, overflowing with a
passion springing from both joy and sorrow. Without being rooted in our passionate, sensorial
natures, our imaginations become arid and sterile; we become incapable of invention. Vico
recognizes that the robust imagination he discovered in the first poets was present in the children
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of his own day. He called the poets, after all, the children of the human race. We must honor
and nourish the child’s corporeal imagination and avoid harming it with our own reflective,
rational conceits, which demands motionless, inactive bodies.
The fate of childhood education today is a product of the conceit of scholars identified by
Vico. We live in an age of barbaric reflection where children are made inhuman by inactivity and
desensitized by drugs. To reawaken our senses, we must listen to the songs of the oral poets and
reinfuse our instruction with engaged, delighted, activated, singing, chanting, laughing, and
dancing bodies. Cavarero argues that women are in a privileged position to re-enchant the world
with song and narration. Since our patriarchal tradition prohibited women from taking up
philosophical discourse, they have been spared the detrimental effects of the Academies. Since
they have been cast outside the Man’s symbolic domain, Cavarero affirms, “women have
somewhat less of a chance of committing that formidable error that consists in exchanging the
‘unrepeatable uniqueness’ for the abstract ‘Man.”597 Like Vico, the stranger on the edges of the
forests and academies, they have been afforded the pleasures of narration because of their
outsider status.
While the philosophers took flight into the realm of pure, abstract thought, beyond the
constraints of birth and death, women remained engaged with each other, sharing stories,
laughing, and singing together. If we are children are to become storytellers today and so fulfill
the desire of narratable selves, we must teach our children to use their bodies and voices. Sawyer
observes in the Way of the Storyteller, “there are two indisputable facts about this art of
storytelling…that our instrument is our voice; that we work with, and by means of the spoken
language – words.”598 Here the voice is valued over and above the written text. The text appears
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more and more inessential in terms of our narratable identities, confirming Cavarero’s thesis of
the inessentiality of the text. This is what Steiner’s technique of speech formation combined
with beautiful movement points towards: techniques to use and master the voice and body as a
way to relate to others and share experiences through narration. “A voice resonant, flexible, and
pleasant to the ear, well supported by fundamental deep breath, words distinctively and easily
spoken, and there you have an adequate instrument for your art.”599 Sawyer treats the body an
instrument that will create pleasurable narrations, as the piano or violin creates pleasurable
music. In telling a tale, the listener longs to be delighted. As Cavarero affirms, “destined for the
ear of another, the voice implies a listener – a reciprocity of pleasure.”600 In the misogynistic
western philosophical tradition voice is “secondary, ephemeral, inessential, and reserved for
women.”601
Teaching the arts conducive to pleasurable narration may seem frivolous from the
perspective of the traditional Academies in the Age of Men, the age laid out by Vico, governed
by abstraction and the written word. But, as Cavarero affirms, “pleasure is part of vocal selfrevelation,” and that, moreover, “emission is vital pleasure.”602 As Hobbs affirms, “Knowledge
which begins with language, is confirmed with the mind-body’s assent of delight and
pleasure.”603 Since our identities are shaped by the stories we tell and the voices of others
around us, we must learn to practice the art of narration to foster our sense of self and
community. Sawyer writes, “To be able to create a story, to make it live during the moment of
telling, to arouse emotions – wonder, laughter, joy, amazement – this is the only goal the
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storyteller may have. To honor one’s art.”604 This art is perfectly captured in Vico’s Heroic
Ages, where storytellers abound singing, dancing, and enchanting listeners with their tales.
Vico teaches us that the best languages are heroic.605 He says it is a kind of language he
witnessed in the women of his day.606 Cavarero observes, “Women tell stories: there is always a
woman at the origin of the enchanting power of every story.”607 Perhaps we, too, would be better
off living like Penelope and her handmaids, tied up in narratives:

But in the weaving room, these women neither separate their philosophy from the
body to grant it eternal duration nor entrust their experience of finitude to death in
an arrogant desire for immortality. The world of ideas and the sea are not theirs.
Having let men go forth to their adventures at sea, they stay together quietly,
exchanging looks and words rooted in the individual wholeness of their existence,
now so evidently gendered in the feminine that this life shared in a common
horizon allows every woman to recognize herself is another woman. They are
weaving and laughing in their quiet abode.

For instance, it was precisely the occlusion of women from traditional systems of education that
allowed a unique literary style to develop among female writes in the 19th century. When they
began to enter schools during the 16th century, the institutions they attended were oriented
towards practical activities and did not practice Latin, the core language of academics. Ong
observes, “women writers were no doubt influenced by works that they had read emanating from
the Latin-based, academic, rhetorical tradition, but they themselves normally expressed
themselves in a different, far less oratorical voice, which had a great deal to do with the rise of
the novel.”608 By being pushed to the edges of the Academy, women developed unique voices
that gave birth to a different form of writing, and created different characters for readers to live
through. The novel certainly provides us with alternate characters to live through, rather than the
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universal concepts of the philosophers. Like Vico, these women were liminal figures. The
liminal status that women, children, and autodidacts have in relation to traditional systems of
education leaves enough space for them to create unique lead voices that resist being swallowed
up by oracular voices.
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